For those jumping here from the sidebar, the post all of this is in connection to was a discussion of Alan Goff's claims about positivism at Signature. While I'm sympathetic to many of his elements, I think Goff is perhaps conflating naturalism with positivism. It also appears that he is pushing the "everything is apologetics" position a tad too far. Even if, as I agree, everything is apologetics in one sense. I think as a pragmatic matter we separate them out by degree.
This has become the thread that never dies. Although it is an interesting enough topic with the key actors in the debate contributing, so I certainly am not complaining in the least. Even so, I've added a few extra pages of comments. If you post a comment here it will go to the last page.
I just brought the baby home, so my comments will of necessity be short. (Basically I can comment while he's "feeding") I'll primarily address Alan, as I've not had a chance to read all of Dan's comments yet.
First off I probably should correct myself somewhat. Putting the blame on you Alan, for all of the relatively similar comments in the FARMS review is unfair. I recognize that people write what they are interested in and then (often after the essay is finished) they submit it to FARMS. There isn't really much "direction" in terms of what to write by FARMS. I know, for instance, Kevin Winters wrote a review to The New Mormon Challenge which was very philosophical that they decided not to accept.
I suspect part of my frustration is just remembering how promising FARMS seemed back in college and how to me and many others the infatuation with Signature seems to take them off course. As I said, I'm clearly sympathetic to your position. What troubles me is that I don't know that many people not already familiar with these issues will necesarily buy the whole postmodern or Kuhnian attack on positivism nor really see how positivism or tendencies along those line render the history problematic. I still think that "so what" applies.
Certainly I agree that one can't complain about writing to small audiences. As you rightfully point out this site is only targeted at a small audience. And certainly I don't think metaphysics doesn't matter, although as I've commented before, I think the practical impact of philosophy is vastly overstated. I love it, but even Heidegger thought philosophy was somewhat useless except to change the individual. (I think I have a quote along those lines that pops up in the upper right occasionally) So we may actually disagree on practical impacts. I tend to think that when push comes to shove in the real world there isn't much difference between a good postmodernist and a good positivist. The problem comes when you get people who don't understand the philosophy and then twist it and push it to extremes - as often does happen in English departments and the soft sciences. (With both movements)
As Dan pointed out, even acknowledging Kuhn, it doesn't mean we scientists don't pragmatically talk about falsifying theories or testing theories or so forth. At best it means that philosophers trying to explain what scientists do naturally have to have more complex explanations. But I don't think, for example, that scientists ought to change how they do science on the basis of Kuhn. Far from it. I instead think how people view scientists ought to change.
And, as Dan pointed out, that means that the real emphasis ought to be in constructing good arguments to explain the facts. If FARMS, instead of doing that, focuses in on these philosophical issues (however interesting they may be) I think they are failing to live up to their promise.
I recognize that this may seem somewhat hypocritical since clearly I am focusing in on philosophy and fundamental theology. There are reasons for that, which I'll not go into, but personal interest has a lot to do with it. Perhaps I ought to take some of the time I spend on these things and do more formal apologetics. To be honest though, I got quite tired with apologetics some time ago. I'll still do it a bit and certainly with people who are having a crisis of faith. But by and large I got a little burnt out on it all - recognizing that other than being a footnote here or there, I didn't really contribute much to the literature outside of electronic forums.
I've thought at times of doing a response to Quinn's work on "magic" (really Renaissance philosophy and arts of memory), since I'm not sure the FARMS responses were adequate. But I simply don't have the time to dedicate to it. If I do anything this fall, it'll be a paper for the upcoming philosophy conference offering an alternative to Blake Ostler's approach to free will. But I doubt that will offer much by way of apologetics, except perhaps to offer a way of keeping foreknowledge as a rational part of Mormon theology.
Alan, a few scattered comments.
You say of my position, "The subjective doesn't count as evidence, so no proper evidence exists that there were gold plates." I think you got it. Now, for subjective evidence to count, you must explain the following: (1) how do you explain contradictory subjective experiences, both in competing religious traditions and during the life of the same person; (2) why the experience of the witnesses weren't based on delusion, specifically Joseph Smith's strong suggestion? If the BofM is not a true history, isn't it natural to seek a naturalistic explanation for the BofM witnesses? On the other hand, is it realistic to expect people to change their naturalistic world-views because of the subjective and unreliable experiences of a few men?
As you keep talking about your various strategies for countering the critics, the word "apologist" does not seem to cover your activities as well as "polemicist," which Quinn has previously used to describe some apologists at FARMS. "Apologists" implies a sincerity that seems lacking in some of your recent posts. "For one, it gives us a rhetorical advantage to put Mormon revisionists on the defensive by calling them positivists. ... It occupies their time." As someone who has labored and agonized over these issues, that attitude offends me. No wonder you view your opponents with such cynicism.
You euphemistically call this approach "pragmatic," but it directly contradicts and overshadows your claimed concern about "principle." This you contradict in the very next sentence: "I often use postmodern approaches, but I don't consider myself a postmodern." Social constructivism will not save the BofM and Book of Abraham. To use relativism to save a religion that believes it is the only true church of God on earth is like try to cure the disease by killing the patient. I know Clark has mentioned that the classic postmodernists were "far from" relativism, but as formulated by some apologists/polemicists it is definitely relativistic. It is disingenuous and counterproductive to scholarly discourse.
Clark is right. FARMS is too focused on Signature Books. But I think there is a reason for this. FARMS knows it's losing the scholarly debate and, like David Hume said, "When knowledge is against the man, the man is against knowledge." The use of postmodernism and the preoccupation with positivism is an intellectual's way of calling people names. It is an attempt to shift emphasis away from evidence and arguments, where they are losing. They have abandoned the scholarly pursuit after "truth" for a purely political ploy.
What they don't realize is that Signature has taken control of the dialogue; they are leading the discussion, as they rightly should. Those who make extraordinary claims should be questioned. If the BofM is history prove it. Yes, empirically. Because the BofM and BofA make claims that can be empirically tested. Call Signature positivistic. But you are still going to have to deal with the precarious position in which you find yourself in regard to your scriptures. Now that the world is beginning to take notice of Mormonism (forget about Signature; what about Clarmont and the planned PBS documentary?), there will be no escaping these issues.
I think it quite obvious that the religious are far more committed to their positions, than are the critics, unless the critic happens to be also religious. As you say, "I feel God requires this work of me." That's far more motivation than I will ever muster. For my part, it's hard to get worked up about defending an ideology that you wished weren't true. It's kind of like buying life insurance. You can only win that bet by dying. Yes, in the course of my life, I have made many unhappy discoveries. I believe in truth too; and no matter how unpleasant it sometimes is, I want to embrace it. It's really not as bad as you might assume. On the other hand, Alan, you think you are helping your fellow intellectual Mormons to "maintain belief" and not "waste [their] souls." Yours must be a heavy burden.
Something you might want to consider: For all your anxiety over the salvation of your fellow Mormons, isn't the intellectual Mormon you are trying to save from modernity and doubting really you?
Dan has misinterpreted my discussion of McMurrin. He notes that I say that there is some room for doubt based on the previous two sources I cited. But then I go on to give the definitive evidence from McMurrin's Lectures; I didn't leave any room for doubt after citing the other source. But let me try again.
On page 17 of the Religion, Reason, and Truth volume McMurrin explicitly states the positivistic truth claim in regard to religion:
If theology is to be cognitively meaningful in its assertion of the existence of God, it must be able to tell us in experiential terms what the world would be like if its propositions were true as distinguished from what it would be like if they were false. The existence of God must make a difference that can be expressed in propositions for which we can at least describe a method of verification or disconfirmation, even though we may not be able to have the requisite experience necessary to such verification. If God is defined as an objective reality, as in traditional theistic religion, to have meaning within the context of knowledge the propositions asserting his existence must be in principle testable as true or false, or, more correctly, as probable or improbable.
McMurrin uses a standard positivistic formula and calls it positivistic. In the passage from the Lectures book pages 112-113 I have already referred to, McMurrin articulates a positivistic epistemological assertion similar to this passage, then he calls it positivistic, then he states his agreement with it. How much more definitive could one be than that? On page 113 McMurrin does express disagreement, but not with the positivistic epistmology. He instead believes that some religious claims could be framed to still qualify under a positiivistic metaphysics as knowledge. Responding to Russell, who says it is possible to frame a concept of God that is cognitively meaningful, McMurrin concurs with Russell and disagrees with the standard positivistic position, saying that in principle some claims about divinity (say, about the resurrection) could qualify as positivistic knowledge: "I personally agree with this position, though I am of the opinion that most theological pronouncements and arguments have been meaningless and have provided no knowledge whatsoever about God. But they have given us plenty of information about theologians."
I earlier referred to Dan's method as mind reading, but in that context I was referring to when he declares historical subjects' mental states in the complete absence of supporting evidence; he just fabricates psychological states to fill in the gap caused by lack of evidence. He equates his mind reading with my reading of McMurrin. But a substantial gulf between the two cases that doesn't permit this fase analogy to be persuasive. What I have done here is different from such mind reading because McMurrin has often stated publically and published what he was thinking. I am restricting myself to evidence McMurrin produced. Vogel's trickery with words seems to me to have crossed the border into silliness.
Dan, if that is your position, that the subjective doesn't count as evidence, then that is very, very problematic. (Not the least of which since witness accounts of events are, by their very nature, subjective) It's even more problematic as a philosophical basis to argue. Indeed I'd suggest that this is among the most positivistic claims you've made.
Regarding FARMS, I'm not sure Signature is winning the debate, but that once again depends who the audience is. I think Signature is often just as guilty here as FARMS is. It sometimes can't decide whether it is writing scholarly history or targeting and critiquing Mormons. That's somewhat understandable with the looser forum of the major journals (Dialog or Sunstone). However the schizophrenia I notice sometimes detracts from the reasonable arguments and texts that Signature publishes.
So don't think that my criticisms of FARMS absolve Signature. Rather my point is that both parties are locked in a near narcissistic dysfunctional relationship one generally sees among young troubled couples.
Just to add to the above. How do you feel Dan, when sociologists draw scientific conclusions based upon self-identification of subjective states? (i.e. the question, are you happy?) Surely that is subjective, yet seems inherently part of a naturalistic worldview. There just seems something very incoherent about your position here.
Alan, now I'm silly. What other names are you going to call me? I thought you were just a dispassionate scholar.
With regard to McMurrin, it is you who is not getting it. All you have shown is that at various times he expresses what appears to be a positivistic stance, which is what he admitted when he said he had a "flavor" of positivism. You even point out where he "disagrees with the standard positivistic position," and you quote him saying how he "came dangerously close to converting ... to positivism," and how became "convinced ... of both the strengths and weaknesses of the positivistic position." What have not proven was your characterization of him as "proudly and frankly" declaring "I am a positivist." You should be willing to admit that you made it up for rhetorical effect. I do not disagree as to the facts, but rather the spin that you put on them. Don't you think it's proper to keep what McMurrin thought about himself separate from your assessment of him? I think we should at least try to fairly represent what he thought about himself, don't you?
Unlike you, McMurrin did not see positivism as an all-or-nothing proposition, and that is the source of you misunderstanding him. The problem is that you want to use him for rhetorical effect, but the real McMurrin does not fit so neatly into your fiction (or should we call it "historiographical metafiction"?). In your previous post, you also misrepresented McMurrin when you explained: "When McMurrin states that his position is "florvored' by positivism, he is a positivist who also adheres to a number of other philosophical positions." That might be Goff's way of interpreting it, but not McMurrin's. To him, positivism was only a "flavoring," not a dominant part of his philosophy. But I guess to someone with a hammer everything looks like a nail.
As to mind-reading, your misrepresent my previous post. Remember, it was you who introduced the charge of mind-reading when I questioned your characterization of McMurrin as "proudly and frankly." At that time, you said: "The initial problem emerges from Dan's overconfidence that he knows what is going on in people's minds." You made this unfounded and unrelated charge based on the fact that I relied on one quote and should have used others. So I said, "I do not see mind-reading in my discussion of McMurrin. At most, there is a judgment based on incomplete information." So, where was I trying to read McMurrin's mind? I only quoted what he said. You're only complaint was that I didn't use other sources, not that my interpretation of the quote was wrong. So far, you have not produced any evidence that McMurrin's self-description changed. Nevertheless, imagine my surprise when, after accusing me of mind-reading McMurrin, you state: "I think he would have wondered what the fuss is; he wouldn't have seen the charge of being a positivist as anything to run from." What kind of historian makes a statement like this. It's almost like saying if Abraham Lincoln were alive what would he do? Or, what would Jesus do?
You say, "What I have done here is different form [Dan's method] because McMurrin has often stated publically and published what he was thinking. I am restricting myself to evidence McMurrin produced." As I have shown, your speculation about McMurrin is overstated. You don't know what his response would be to your interpretations of the various passages you quoted. But is it necessary to know that? Your McMurrin-come-back-to-life argument served the same purpose as the made up quote.
When you start talking about "Dan's method [of] mind reading," you subtly change the context of your initial charge, which I described above, to an earlier charge of mind-reading with regard to you and Joseph Smith. Because we have not discussed Joseph in detail, I'll assume you are referring to yourself. I thought we cleared that up. I wasn't trying to mind-read you when I said "I understand your angry at me ..." It was a half serious comment based on an assumption derived from context. It certainly wasn't a serious attempt at psychoanalysis. But I note that the inordinate amount of time you paid to making sure everyone didn't think you were angry, and the fact that you now want to revisit it, does lend itself to such an analysis.
Clark, I don't expect you to take sides with regard to FARMS or Signature Books. I hope through an open and free exchange of ideas (which largely depends on the church's attitude about its own scholars) that maybe the young couple can settle down into a more comfortable relationship. Perhaps they need therapy?
I'm not sure what you mean by "the subjective doesn't count as evidence." It depends on what the subjective evidence is, what it's evidence for, and whether there is better evidence to consider. So you will have to be more specific and explain what the problem is as you see it. What is the "philosophical basis" from which you think I'm arguing from? How am I being positivistic? Naturalistic, yes. But positivistic? How so? Does my assessment that the witnesses' experiences were probably hallucinations, in your mind, automatically make me a positivist? I don't think so. As I told Blake, I allow for the possibility for the supernatural, but have yet to see any proof. I have yet to hear a reason why I should accept this subjective evidence over other subjective evidences. They can't all be true unless you take a constructivist position.
Just because you happen to believe in the reality of subjective experiences does not mean you don't have problems. As I explain in the introduction of my biography: "In my experience, those who champion the supernatural invariably do so arbitrarily, picking and choosing with little explanation which events qualify as genuine, which do not, and why one experience is superior to another. In my view, the defenders of a certain spiritual experience are vulnerable to the chaos of contradictory claims and lack the means--the methodology--to enable them to distinguish between theoretically "real' events and those clearly explained by naturalistic assumptions."
I'm also having difficulty understanding your questioning in your second post. Can you expand?
Clark, my rejection of the supernatural is not the litmus test you all think it is. Positivism rejects all forms of un-positive knowledge. That does not mean that one is therefore uncritical of subjectivism or is under the necessity of accepting all subjective testimony. That would lead one down the slippery road to relativism and solipsism. The problem is that Alan wants to use anti-positivism as an apologetic tool for a particular subjective truth claim, which it cannot do. Positivism not only discounted all forms of metaphysics but was too restrictive with regard to the soft sciences. Anti-positivism was useful in opening science up to less certain knowledge, but not necessarily information obtained from subjective states. For that reason I, too, reject positivism. I see value in philosophy, psychology, sociology, etc. Nevertheless, only a sincere relativist can defend all forms of subjectivism, which Alan seems to deny. Alan is only interested in defending one particular form of subjectivism. Postmodernism is only an expedient tool for his apologetics (polemics). But without taking a constructivist position himself, the same tool can be turned back on him. Hence, he is an ideological positivist.
Dan, I plan on answering, but I don't have time right now. So excuse me if it is a little while. A few brief comments. First we ought be careful with how we apply the term "supernatural." In my ontology of Mormonism, there is no supernatural. I recognize that's not the sense you are using it in, but my theology of Mormonism isn't that far removed from naturalism. I think that important to point out.
Regarding positivism and your own personal methadology, the soft sciences do appear to be key, which is why I brought them up. It seems that the debate about positivism in the soft sciences is rather pertinent here, since they do allow personal judgments as evidence. Now they may radically be reinterpreted or discarded on the basis of other evidence, but that happens with any data point in a study.
The problem is that you a priori reject those pieces of evidence as evidence. The fact of the matter is that psychology, sociology and perhaps even economics use as evidence data you exclude. The issue isn't whether you agree with the conclusions using such evidence. I rather doubt you would. The issue is this framing of the issue which as you mention above, does seem rather typical for positivism. Further it was one of the many reasons positivism was rejected. (Well it still hangs on as a tendency, but it isn't overt like it once was)
How about an example a little less close to home? Alien abduction. Are psychologists wrong if they apriori reject the phenomenal states of witnesses as evidence for alien abduction?
Wouldn't it be begging the question to suggested psychologists are wrong for "dismissing the evidence of these witnesses as evidence?" I think it might be. And that's because whatever "theory ladeness" there really is to evidence works both ways. There is no privilaged vantage point whereby we should apriori accept the witnesses' phenomenal states as evidence either--the witnesses'accounts are not apriori, "evidence" of an "Alien theory" which is one theory amongst other possibilities. While ultimately, there are no certain grounds for exclusively looking to a medical cause, I don't think it's too far off to say that we don't have two competing theories here, each with their own supporting "evidence."
We might be generous and say, the possibility of alien abduction is merely bracketed by psychology's methodological naturalism, but the reality is, for all intents and purposes, the alien interpretation is rejected, along with any notions that there is a real "alien theory" with it's own supporting "evidence." I don't think our current paradigm of psychology is obliged to deal with the possibility of actual alien abductions. I further don't think any journal of psychology needs to "balance" its views by laying bare its dismissive assumptions towards Alien interpretations. I don't think there needs to be any generous concessions of the kind, "we could always be wrong in looking for a strictly psychological or medical cause, and recognize the possibility these people are actually being put under the knife by Zeta Riticulas." Niether must they confess, "We respect the interpretive community of UFO abductees, recognize their existential truth, and offer our own conclusions as the paradigm from the psychology community."
And I think Kuhn would argue, that it's best for science to work dutifully within the current paradigm and exhaust everything it has to offer and avoid carelessly trying to start a revolution. The revolution will come on its own, as our theories will one day seem to crack under their own weight and cry out for a new interpretive framework.
Gad, you miss the point. The issue isn't whether it is evidence for alien abduction. It may well be, although I personally think there is stronger evidence against alien abduction. The issue is whether it is evidence. i.e. ought it to belong to part of an argument. Dan seems to suggest not.
The problem I think you and perhaps Dan have is that you don't want to consider separately the evidence and the argument. It is all one. Since something can be used as evidence for a conclusion you find ridiculous, rather than critique the argument, you critique the evidence. That just seems fallacious reasoning.
Dan is so determined to maintain that McMurrin wasn't a positivist that he, without even reading the relevant material, is willing to do all sorts of logical gymnastics to this end. I get the sense that if Auguste Comte were a Mormon revisionist, then Dan would defend to the last inch the improbable idea that Comte couldn't be a positivist. It is this kind of frittering away of creditability on lost causes that is the consequence of Dan's inability to yield even on the most obvious of issues and mistakes. McMurrin outlined a positivist epistemological position a number of times, called it positivistic, and expressed his agreement with it. To maintain in spite of this that McMurrin is not a positivist is absurd.
Vogel entered this venue determined to demonstrate also that he wasn't a positivist. But he ended up convincing those here that he is. Here is a definition of positivism. Compare it to Vogel's claims about the Book of Mormon witnesses. Robert Eric Frykenberg, in his History and Belief pages 316-317, refers to several types of presuppositions historians bring with them to the job of interpreting the past:
The second category of presuppositions is itself, like the first, also a form of bias. Sometimes labeled "positivist," sometimes "verificationist," "scientistic," "empiricist," or even "physicalist," this category is intrinsically just as much an ideology as any other. Positivism in its more extreme forms has also been secularistic and antisupernaturalistic. Its underlying presupposition has been that no valid understanding of any event is possible that does not come to us directly from empirical observation. Only findings modeled by empirical methods and verificationist procedures, especially those utilized by the physical sciences, have been seen as sufficient or valid.
To this point the match with Vogel's claims seems perfect. Frykenberg goes on to include other positivistic claims that very early in this thread I distinguished as separate, though related, positivistic claims:
Coming into vogue during the Enlightenment and becoming increasingly popular among historians during the nineteenth century, this view has consisted in a belief that methodology, in and of itself, could bring about a more perfect, if not a more total, comprehension of events. At last, a fully "objective," "pure," and "untainted" grasp of events could be possible. Cleansed of all bias and preconception, especially of anything supernatural or theological, a historian could distill "true facts" from more solid data. Solid data, taken from validated evidence, could produce facts. Facts of pristine authenticity, once established and rigorously tested, could speak for themselves.
Dan expresses this positivistic claim in is classical form, and still seems reluctant to be designated a positivist. If you make positivistic claims, it follows that the title is appropriate. If you want no longer to be called a positivist, you must surrender making the positivistic claims.
Dan earlier falsely claimed to know my mind to divine that I was angry. I wasn't, but I do feel another emotion now - frustration. After initially accusing me of being dishonest and doing dime-story psychology by accusing me of being angry, Dan hasn't learned from past errors and launches into similar personal attacks again. Dan shows a pattern of resorting to logical fallacies and personal attacks, and also shows no awareness that the tactics are questionable. I gave an example of a false analogy the other day. Twice Dan advanced the argument that since I claim not to be angry, I must be claiming to be dispassionate. That would make me, he thinks, a positivist for claiming to dispassionate. The first time he advanced this argument, I didn't respond because it was framed in a facetious way. But the second time he seemed to advance it quite seriously. To my composition students, I teach this as the logical fallacy of equivocation. But normally in equivocations, the student is using the same word twice. Vogel is using different words (not angry and dispassionate) conflating their meanings, then attributing the argument to me. So not only is the argument an ambiguity, it is also a straw man, for I never made the argument.
Vogel, once again, accuses me of dishonesty. Vogel has repeated his earlier error of launching ad hominem attacks. I have not returned these ad hominem slurs, but I have been careful when I call Vogel's argument silly; I aim the criticism directly at the argument. When I assert that Vogel hasn't assembled a coherent or competent argument in this discussion group, I direct the criticism at the deficiencies in the argument. Vogel directs a fair number of his attacks at me personally. Blake earlier bowed out of this argument (and stopping fruitless argument that is returned with logical fallacies and personal attacks seems the appropriate response now) because he grew frustrated with Vogel's inability to frame a coherent response that didn't just assume a variety of positivism then get upset when labeled positivistic. Vogel has mentioned it enough times that we can be sure that he is concerned that he is respected. One can't advance unreasoned arguments such as these and still demand respect.
Not satisfied with having once inappropriately psychologized me by saying my response emerges from my anger, Vogel, again, engages in similar cheap psychoanalysis. This time he, based on no evidence that he has cited, suggests that I am really maintaining the argument I do about the Book of Mormon and other foundational events because I am trying to assuage my own doubts. Vogel, again, rushed to personal factors to explain his opponent's position rather than exploring the arguments themselves. This is very disappointing. I expected the arguments to be framed in better ways.
Logical fallacies, Lucy-in-her-booth psychologizing, and personal attacks: all of these tactics took me aback because I have read several of Vogel's books and many of his essays. I had never noted such a concentration of incompetent arguments by this author. I expected much better argumentation, but in those other public forums, Vogel has an editor to smooth out these deficiencies.
Clark, I know that Mormons like to say miracles are in accordance with some natural law that we do not yet understand. This is unintelligible to me since that means there are laws that contradict the laws we already have, which means the laws we have are not laws. Mormons also hold a quasi-materialism that includes the notion that spirit is a more refined matter; if that were true, E=MC2 would be false. Believers in the supernatural have yet to produce compelling evidence that would cause science to drastically alter it's naturalistic world-view. Look, Joseph Smith was neither a theologian, nor a philosopher. He had his own brand of rationalism, largely as a response to the deists and rationalists of his day, and he tried to explain heaven, salvation, and God in quasi-rationalist terms. As he saw it, it was his job to explain the mysteries, not make them. I believe this is a major source of his appeal. It all seems to make sense to the average Mormon.
Regarding positivism, I do not disagree with any of Alan's "ten varieties of positivist experience." I only disagree with what he seems to imply. He leaves them open-ended. For example, "history ... must have no commerce or intercourse with fiction." Historians are story tellers, to be sure, but there are parameters in which that story must remain. Historians must not write intentional fiction and pass it off as true history, which has been done by at least a few postmodernist historians. Another example, "the historian can or must gain access to brute facts, facts free of all interpretation." As I have pointed out, it is neither possible nor desirable that historians be a tabula rasa, but that does not mean that "any thing goes," as Feyerabend said. We cannot substitute a critical approach to history with an authoritarian charismatic leader's version.
Regarding your point about positivism and the soft-sciences. You say that they "do allow personal judgments as evidence ... {but} you an priori reject those pieces of evidence as evidence." I assume this statement ties in with your previous question: "How do you feel Dan, when sociologists draw scientific conclusions based upon self-identification of subjective states? (i.e. the question, are you happy?)" The problem here is one of analogy. What sociologist are doing with the evidence is not the same thing that supernaturalists are doing. Sociologists are not trying to use subjective states to prove something about objective or supra reality, nor is there a question about causation. No one is claiming that God causes happiness or that the devil causes sadness. If you recall, supernaturalists once claimed that demons were responsible for madness and various physical ailments, including blindness (as Jesus and his contemporaries seemed to believe). As science has forced supernaturalists to abandon that interpretation, perhaps now it's time to abandon the view that delusion and hallucination come from God. As humans it is imperative that we know ourselves and how our brains work, for, I believe, our future as a species depends on it.
Relativistic social-constructivism does not promote tolerance as some think, because it indirectly justifies the epistemological underpinnings of the abusers in this world. Nor does it promote dialogue, because if one believes there is no criteria for truth, one has no incentive to study other views. Post-modern thinking is in reality pre-modern irrationalism. If naturalism is set aside for metaphysical and supernatural explanations of spiritual phenomena, there is no search for psychological understanding of the self.
I know that the subject of this board is metaphysics, but I can't help think that a more historical approach to historical issues is what is needed. By which I mean: even if in theory the supernatural is possible, how does that help Joseph Smith? At some point, you have to look at the specifics in Smith's biography. All sides must admit that the possibility of deception exists with Joseph Smith's claims, especially with regard to his activities as a treasure seer. What you conclude about those activities will color your interpretation of his religious claims. The fact that the same stone used to translate the BofM and receive revelations was used to find buried treasure makes it impossible to separate the two activities. Unlike other biographers and commentators of Joseph Smith, I'm familiar with the art of deception. In the intro to my biography, I explain:
"No biographer is completely free of bias. As is no doubt apparent, my inclination is to interpret any claim of the paranormal--precognition, clairvoyance, telekinesis, telepathy--as delusion or fraud. I do not claim that the supernatural does not exist, for it is impossible to prove a negative. I maintain only that the evidence upon which such claims rest is unconvincing to me. As a teenager I dabbled in stage magic and sleight-of-hand tricks, but my attention soon turned to charlatans and confidence men who use similar methods. The more I learned of the art of deception and its history, the more skeptical I became of any kind of real magic."
Now, imagine if you read in some historical source that some shaman pulled a rabbit out of his hat, that would be cause for skepticism, would it not? Less obvious is descriptions of Shamans who handle fire, walk on hot coals, cut and instantaneously heal themselves, etc., which are tricks that can be observed to the present day. Why not apply this information when encountering similar descriptions in historical texts? When I read that Joseph Smith put a stone in his hat and searched for buried treasure, I now that was a method used by charlatans in his day. Of course, there were also many who were deluded into thinking they saw treasures. Common to both groups was the fact that nothing was ever really uncovered. The fact that no treasure was ever uncovered is, I think, strong indication that Smith possessed no real gift. (His real gift, I suggest, is in convincing people he had a gift despite there being no real evidence.) Perhaps he was deluded? When Josiah Stowell reported that Smith predicted a feather would be found with a certain treasure, and the feather was found but the treasure was not, there is only two possibilities: either the feather was planted there by Smith or the treasure really did slip through the earth as the treasure diggers believed. (If you belief that, then you really are a supernaturalist.)
Obviously we can't test the claims of the dead, but those who practice divination today can be tested, and indeed they have. Under controlled conditions those who practice water witching have miserably failed, despite the fact that they believe the rod moves on its own. (The subconscious movement of the rod and other like instruments is called the ideomotor response.) This kind of information should be considered by the historian when assessing Smith and his contemporaries. That's why I state in the intro to my book:
"None of Smith's defenders, as far as I know, have attempted to school themselves in the methods of the charlatan or in the psychology of the psychic. Yet, I believe such an education is essential to understanding phenomena that one sometimes encounters in the historical record. ... In my mind, the failure of present-day adepts to prove the efficacy of divination under scientific conditions should weigh heavily on the interpreter trying to make sense of Smith's early involvement in treasure searching as well as his subsequent use of the same method as a translator. Since the same psychological forces producing this phenomenon today were undoubtedly at work in previous centuries, in what way could Smith possibly train himself to be a prophet using such delusive methods? Is it reasonable to assume that the same instruments that deluded so many of Smith's contemporaries suddenly became real in Smith's hands?"
If a historian is unable to deal with reality in the present, if he is unable to detect fraud when it is presented to him, or if he has not a clue as to how to deal with psychics, faith healers, remote viewers, and the like, his interpretation of similar situations in the past are likely to be naive and uninformed.
Addictio: I am as confused by your comments as you seem to be by mine. I don't believe that I said or implied anything about requiring some "covering law" as a condition to making probability assertions. Actually, I just wanted to know what the basis of Dan's probability claim is. When someone asserts that "it is probably the case that X," they must have some justification for such an assertion, some way of justifying the claim. So far as I can see, Dan now offers nothing but hasty generalizations based upon experiences of delusions and hallucinations whose dysfunctional etiology we know -- and he then extrapolates such cases to visions experienced by high and normal functioning individuals. (He has spelled it out since we last dialogued -- but that is essentially his argument).
In my prior post, I actually had in mind something like a Bayesian probability theorum. Such a theory does not require the sort of covering law that you seem to think it does. Dan is quite clearly ignorant of theories of probability and when he asserts that "all visions are probably delusions" because we know that some hallucinations are, he bases his probability claim on a false comparison and hasty generalization of the data without any basis at all for assessing probability. Moreover, it seems to me that unique events like visions are inherently such that probability claims are difficult to assess.
Take for example the experience of the three witnesses. David Whitmer stated consistently over a 20 year time period that Joseph and Oliver came to him on a morning in late June 1829. Joseph had a revelation that said he would be one of the three witnesses. So he, Joseph and Oliver prayed together and then they sat down on a log and began to talked for a while. While they were talking, a light appeared and began to get brighter until the angel appeared together with a table. On the table were the urim & thummim, the Liahona and plates. David described the plates as looking like gold, being boudn by rings and having a certain size. The angel took the plates and began to turn the leafs over so that they could see the engravings on them. A voice then declared that the plates had been translated correctly and commanded them to bear witness. There is nothing here that suggests any abnormal psychology, any fraud or emotional hype (something David definitely wasn't to in any event). They all three saw the same and experienced the same thing. Yet Dan focuses on the light that began to appear and then asserts that this experience is like waking visions that arise from an abnormal etiology. However, he is grasping at straws and ignoring the obvious. Waking hallucinations are not experienced by many people at the same time, they are not predicted beforehand as to what the experience will be, the types of description of concrete objects are rare indeed - and most importantly those having such "vision" are aware that they are hallucinating. The description given by Whitmer shows that they were in a normal functioning state that was quite quotidian. So I conclude that Dan focuses on statements that agree with his position, ignores a vast majority of statements that don't, focuses on second hand assessments rather than first-hand statements and takes any sign that a vision is not simply like picking up a baseball as evidence that it cannot be "real" in the sense that I have used it.
So it seems it seems to me that your analysis with respect to some sort of Hempelian view of natural law as underwriting my demand for a justification for probability claims is off the mark -- widely. I suspect that frequently when probability or even the notion of "the most parsimonious explanation" is invoked, what is really happening is that someone has made their mind (e.g., Dan) and they are really just expressing an opinion or preference -- or supporting their preconceived notions.
As for Dan's claim that a naturalistic explanation is always preferable (something that Gad seems also to buy into), I can see no reason to limit "natural" to "verifiable". It just so happens that the "natural/supernatural" division is a false dichotomy in LDS thought -- and Dan's continual invocation of this false dichotomy is, from my perspective, merely a refusal to include within his world-view what others include within theirs, e.g., visions and spiritual experiences. As I read Dan, what he means by "naturalistic" is a matter that is publicly verifiable and therefore what he actually employs is the positivist criterion. I now disagree with Clark on this issue -- I think that it is important to show how the controlling paradigm and assumptions of those like Dan pre-determine their use of evidence. Their underlying assumptions dictate the outcome -- garbage in, garbage out. So I think that Alan's project has some value.
Clark, why isn't it a "both-and" rather than an "either-or" approach? That is, why isn't it important both to focus on the particular evidence and also to look at why those who are looking at the same evidence reach different conclusions? The notion that we simply assess evidence independently of some world-view or commitments is non-sense as you know as well as anyone. So it seems to me that assessing how one's assumptions may impact the way the evidence is assessed is important. It is also important to look at the viablity of the assumptions, as Alan does. It just so happens that Dan's assumptions are unsupportable and self-contradictory. He just doesn't seem to see that when he says he is a naturalist he is really assuming something much more like classical positivism.
BTW I don't plan on responding to Dan. He is just not getting what others are saying as far as I can see and I think that we are talking past each other.
"Gad, you miss the point..."
"The problem I think you and perhaps Dan have is that you don't want to consider separately the evidence and the argument... rather than critique the argument, you critique the evidence. That just seems fallacious reasoning."
I am, yes, suggesting the two can't be entirely separated. Evidence doesn't exist in a vacuum. Perhaps we're talking past each other because we're not on the same page with what we mean by "evidence." Let me try to see where you're coming from by throwing out an extreme example. If a diagnosed schizophrenic claims God's voice has instructed him to blow up a McDonalds, in your terminology, wouldn't it be fallacious reasoning to to criticize the "evidence" (the phenomenal experience of God's voice) just because the conclusion seems ridiculous?
"As for Dan's claim that a naturalistic explanation is always preferable (something that Gad seems also to buy into), I can see no reason to limit "natural" to "verifiable"."
I don't agree with all of Dan's terminology, though I think in spirit, we're pretty much on the same page. I am curious if anyone here has an example of a "supernatural" explanation that they take seriously and that exist outside of their own religious tradition.
I do not think "naturalism" equates to "verification" (in case you meant to say I agree with that whole sentence). Also, I think some danger can exist in throwing around words like "naturalism" as with "parsimony"--these words can all too easily end up equating to whatever one happens to think makes the most sense at the time. It would be tough for me to absolutely commit to "naturalism," though naturalism certainly plays a big role in how I look at the world.
Gad, I hope to address Dan's comments hopefully this afternoon. (Between work, baby and lack of sleep I don't have the time to dedicate here that I did while pensively awaiting the baby's birth)
Regarding your comments, I agree evidence doesn't exist in a vacuum. But clearly it still is evidence. That's my point. What we criticize is the argument. An argument that used a schizophrenic's testimony without dealing with their schizophrenia clearly is a weak argument. But we don't simply exclude all testimony because of that. Rather the significance of the testimony is found within the context of the argument, much like the meaning of any word in a sentence is found in its context and not alone. The point is that we don't judge the evidence by the conclusions. Rather we judge the argument.
Regarding your second comment, depending upon what you mean by supernatural (as I've mentioned, I don't think the supernatural is a sensical concept), haven't you provided an example that is unfalsifiable? After all if I claim a supernatural experience, wouldn't that claim by its very nature entail it belonging to my religious beliefs? (Assuming by supernatural you mean scientifically unrecognized religious phenomena)
I do agree with the problems of the term naturalism. Further it doesn't have a precise definition. I think that the fact many Mormons are ontologically naturalists suggests that this can't be dealt with uncritically.
Sorry for the delay. As I said, blogging will be more sporadic the next few weeks. First some specific comments for Dan followed (hopefully) by some more general comments which likely will be more useful. If I have time I'll add a few critiques of Alan as well, since clearly I disagree with him on various points as well.
"On the other hand, is it realistic to expect people to change their naturalistic world-views because of the subjective and unreliable experiences of a few men?"
I don't think anyone is suggesting that. At least I'm sure I'm not. I think this is why the conversation has ended up being a lot of talking past one an other. The issue, as I see it isn't really naturalism nor requiring you to adopt views you find silly or possibly abhorrent. Rather the issue is whether we discount, out of hand, all subjective reports. You've claimed in a few places that we ought to. However I think that opens you up to critics who find such reports plausible. Further, I suspect, that you may be inconsistent on what subjective accounts you discount. (See below) For some people this ends up coming off as simply assuming your conclusions and then looking for evidence to back it up. Any other evidence is simply disparaged as the result of frenzied minds.
But I'm definitely not saying you ought to become Mormon Dan, however much I may think that will help you in the long run. (big grin)
"To him, positivism was only a "flavoring," not a dominant part of his philosophy."
I'm admittedly not a huge fan of McMurrin's, but that seems a fair characterizing of him. As such he would be rather typical for the era of analytic philosophy he grew up in. I'd add that I tend to find general labels, such as postmodernist, pragmatist, existentialist, feminist, and even positivist often as misleading as they are helpful. They may orient you in a vague, general way, but when push comes to shove what we ought to focus in on are positions and not labels. Having only read his theological book on Mormonism, I'm ill equipped to say much about him, beyond that he sounds vaguely Popperian in approach with a strong dose of American pragmatism.
I should also add that I think many of the arguments here are made to appear philosophical while they really are at a somewhat higher level. I also have found, especially in these sorts of discussions, that it is hard to label someone's philosophical position without their really engaging the philosophy. I tried that at ZLMB and it quickly spiraled out of my control, unfortunately. The fact is that non-philosophers, and even a lot of philosophers in areas out of their expertise, don't have cogent, distinct positions. They are inconsistent and vague. I suspect you are Dan, and thus the difficulty in labeling you a strict positivist. And I don't mean that as a criticism. Heavens, I know I am. As I read up in an area I'll often vacillate between several positions which all fit my vague senses (and my ignorance of the issues)
I'm not sure what you mean by "the subjective doesn't count as evidence." It depends on what the subjective evidence is, what it's evidence for, and whether there is better evidence to consider. So you will have to be more specific and explain what the problem is as you see it.
I was quoting you. You said that proposition was about right in describing your position. Your more nuanced comments here I might agree with, although the fact you say, "what it's evidence for" rather than "how it is used" suggests the problem remains. My complaint is that evidence is just that: evidence. It becomes evidence for something only in the context of an argument. To suggest that it is the conclusions and not the argument that counts simply means that you inherently traffic in circular logic or baldly assert your conclusions.
Now I'm sure you don't intent that implication. I suspect both you and Gad want to say that ridiculous conclusions are ridiculous so we don't need to even examine the argument. Perhaps in some cases that is so. However if we are being rigorous and more importantly rational then what counts are reasons. i.e. the explanation or argument. Certainly we do short cut these things in practice. But we ought be aware that this is what we are doing, merely asserting our preconceptions. I dare say most people never reason through their beliefs very much. Being philosophically inclined, I'm of the opinion that it is always better to reason through to them.
Now I suspect that were you or Gad to do this, you'd probably reach similar conclusions. But the complaint is that this is never done. As you might tell from the above, I don't think in practice this is a big deal, which is why I'm more concerned with arguments in Signature books rather than philosophical presuppositions. But certainly, while writing to a collection of believers, it is fair game to point out these hidden spots that believers ought to recognize as problematic. I think FARMS does it a tad to much, but that gets us back to the whole audience issue. (Although I thought Alan had a fair rejoinder for that criticism)
Just because you happen to believe in the reality of subjective experiences does not mean you don't have problems.
I think nearly everyone believes in the reality of subjective experiences. Otherwise everyone around you would know what you are thinking and feeling right now. Subjective experiences are common and are a constant fact in our knowledge. (Witness our everyday use of memory - a more subjective experience I can't imagine)
What I think you mean to say (or perhaps rather ought to argue) is that the face value content of a subjective experience ought not always be trusted. But recognize that this isn't what you've been arguing for. i.e. if someone claims to see a person that this person is actually in front of them.
The problem is that you've confused literalist hermeneutics with subjective evidence.
As I mentioned though, in both psychology and sociology, subjective experience and their normal interpretation by the subject are taken at face value for various studies. (i.e. as data points in some larger study of correlation) Now I've often criticized such studies for just this issue - the naive assumption that a person's interpretation of an experience is trustworthy in terms of facts. But I'd never argue that it isn't evidence of some kind.
So what I think is the problem is simply the error that subjectivity entails a kind of foundationalist epistemology where the subject has Cartesian certainty in the content of the experience or a kind of direct realism. But that's not what we've been arguing. I think the philosophical terminology may have got the better of you here.
I know that Mormons like to say miracles are in accordance with some natural law that we do not yet understand. This is unintelligible to me since that means there are laws that contradict the laws we already have, which means the laws we have are not laws.
I'm not aware of any Mormon miracle claim that violates known laws of physics. They may entail a much higher order of technology. But I'm sure you don't want to conflate technology with physical law.
I find your comment somewhat confusing though. Surely you don't want to assert that the laws we postulate right now in physics are the final certain laws? Speaking now as a physicist, I'd caution you that such a claim is very problematic. Surely the significant changes at the beginning of the last century along with the problematic status of unifying quantum mechanics and general relativity ought to provide caution. While scientists are extremely skeptical to those claiming to have new laws (and understandably so) they are also rather cognizant of the fallibilism inherent in science.
spirit is a more refined matter; if that were true, E=MC2 would be false.
What on earth are you talking about here? How would that possibly follow?
Believers in the supernatural have yet to produce compelling evidence that would cause science to drastically alter it's naturalistic world-view.
As I said, I don't believe in the supernatural (which entails a view of God outside the universe and typically an ex nihilo creation). Mormonism with its claim God is embodied within the universe seems unwilling to make such claims (although a few might) But here you are conflating a naturalistic-world view with new phenomena. But of course, if evidence for some new phenomena were found it wouldn't overthrow the naturalistic world-view but only expand it, much like new phenomena like black holes did. So I suspect you are conflating naturalism with the idea that all physical laws are known. They are not the same thing in the least. (Although it is an understandable mistake)
Certainly though religious people can't, on demand, produce the kind of phenomena a scientist needs to provide a compelling theory to unbelievers. So in that I fully agree with you. And certainly I don't expect unbelievers to write, catering to the believers. But I think the unbelievers ought to recognize that believers aren't going to find arguments of "I don't believe" terribly compelling either. (Which is what you position reduces to - prove it to me) So when a believer critiques an unbeliever's model, however well crafter, of course they are going to bring up these hidden premises and show how that affects the overall model and explanation. That seems entirely fair.
Now if your claim is further, that even the believers ought not believe, simply because a public proof isn't available, then things are a tad more tricky. And to the degree Signature steps across that line I think they've really got a philosophical problem on their hands. However I'm of the opinion that when they have stepped across that line it is out of philosophical naivete and not a real grappling with the issues. (i.e. while I think there are positivist tones to the writing, I'm not convinced they are entirely thought out or "intentional")
Perhaps you do want to argue that. It would be an interesting discussion.
Relativistic social-constructivism does not promote tolerance as some think, because it indirectly justifies the epistemological underpinnings of the abusers in this world. Nor does it promote dialogue, because if one believes there is no criteria for truth, one has no incentive to study other views.
First off no one here is advocating relativism. IF you think we are, then you are simply completely misunderstanding us. Secondly the problem of a criteria for truth is that it assumes truth is always knowable in a simple way. Yet at other times you seem to acknowledge a strong fallibilism. If we don't know in a rigorous fashion we can (a) stick to what we can know or (b) allow multiple views for what is more up for grabs. If an argument rests on the assumption that there is no God, no angels and so forth, simply because they haven't been proven, that's an argument from silence. i.e. we don't know. Further, I think a strong positivist, would agree with me there.
I recall a funny story about Bertrand Russell along those lines. He and a companion were driving down a road and saw a house. His companion said, that house is white. Russell replied, "it is white on this side."
Good positivists were sticklers for staying with what could positively be stated. Go outside that arena and you simply were incoherent. Of course many did go beyond what could be claimed. And there always were problems with induction (generalizing from limited facts). But in practice, I think the issue was more particular arguments than philosophy. I don't think the discrediting of positivism had a huge effect. Although it did open up subjective accounts to more study in sociology and psychology, which has proved to be very helpful.
Alan, you grossly misrepresent my position. I do not deny that McMurrin was positivistic in his philosophy. That would contradict what McMurrin himself said, which I quoted. Your hypothetical about Comte is a fallacious counterfactual argument. You must really think I'm an idiot if you think I would fall for this kind of subterfuge. I have only complained that you have overstated McMurrin's positivism so that you can make an ideological argument. The issue is not what Goff thinks about McMurrin -- in fact, I have little objection to your overall analysis of McMurrin -- it's what McMurrin thought about McMurrin. If you recall, this is what started this conversation: "We can admire a few Mormon revisionists (Sterling McMurrin and Dan Vogel) who quite proudly and frankly say "I am a positivist.'" Now, when you accuse me of being stubborn because you think I have an "inability to yield even on the most obvious of issues and mistakes," all I can say is: it's not so clear to me. Are you complaining that I'm making life difficult for you? Well, welcome to the real world.
On your definition of positivism: we have covered this ground too many times. You are repeating your argument that anyone who rejects the supernatural is a positivist. There might be some overlap between positivism and naturalism, as I have previously mentioned, but naturalism does not automatically entail positivism. And didn't you concede this point twice: (1) "I thought I agreed with you that naturalism and positivism are distinct issues that, though often related, ought to be kept distinct"; and (2) "I don't think you are a positivist because you are committed to naturalism. I think you are a positivist because you call others apologists while you think you are free of the same charge"? Now, which is it? Both Blake and Clark have equivocated on the issue of "supernaturalism." Does this make them positivists? I think I understand the positivism of the pre-1950s, but it is difficult keeping up with the current expanding anti-positivist definitions. Sometimes I get the impression that it's anything that isn't postmodern, which seems to entail relativism. At other times, you seem to use it as a synonym for "anti-Mormon." As I see it, your argument relies too heavily on definitions. Imagine a critic that based his whole rejection of Mormonism on the definition of apologist.
As I told Clark above, I do not disagree with the ten definitions you gave of positivism, but that does not free us from being responsible for dealing honestly with the evidence or lack thereof. The implication that Mormonism cannot be empirically tested is false since the BofM and BofA lend themselves to such testing. On the other hand, you have all gone on and on about how I reject the validity of non-empirical evidence, which isn't so, but none of you have specifically stated what the evidence is that you think I'm rejecting. So let's hear it. What is your non-empirical evidence? The assumption on your part, it seems to me, is that someone should just take your word for it and that it's not open to examination by others.
While historians once tried to model their discipline after science, it was a mistake. Historians will never be able to "verify" their hypotheses in the same way that scientists can, that is, until someone invents a time-machine. So we are stuck with assessing the strengths and weaknesses of various interpretations. A closer analogy would be courts of law, but even that does not capture what historians do.
Alan, you try to attribute to me a belief that I have repeatedly denied. I have never said that "methodology" (as if it is possible not to have one) can "bring about a more PERFECT, if not more total, comprehension of events. At least, a fully "objective,' "pure,' and "untainted' grasp of events ... possible. Cleansed of all bias and preconception ... Facts of pristine authenticity, once established and rigorously tested, could speak for themselves." I removed from your description the part about "especially of anything supernatural or theological," because that is not a necessary condition for positivism. Besides, which supernatural or theological bias are we supposed to use without becoming authoritarian, on one hand, or relativistic, on the other? Nevertheless, I don't KNOW that my interpretations are the TRUTH -- I'll leave those kinds of assessments to the religious -- I only assert that at least in some instances they are better than the ones with which they are currently competing. As with McMurrin, you seem to have difficulty accurately representing the views of your opponents. I can only conclude that you have this need to force me into a category where you find it easier to dismiss me without having to deal with my evidence.
You seem to be unable to let this anger thing go. I have repeatedly explained that it was not an attempt to read your mind or psychoanalyze you. Given the circumstances, I do not believe it was an unreasonable assumption; it certainly did not deserve the response you have given it. Perhaps I pushed my response too far when I talked about denial, but I was trying to make a point. I hoped you would see how I felt being called a positivist despite my denials. I guess the point was lost on you.
Now, you keep going on and on about my having accused you of being dishonest, which is the bases for your accusation that I use ad hominem, when all I said was: "Alan, people tend to get angry when you ignore what they say and do not deal directly and honestly with the issues they raise." When you interpreted this the first time as a personal attack, my response was: "When I said that you were not dealing with the issues "directly and honestly,' I was not making a character assessment. But it's interesting that YOU interpreted it that way." Notice that this is the second example of where you ignore your opponents response and continue repeating the accusation. Alan, you are really a one-man propaganda machine.
The form that our conversation took was mostly determined by your initial defensiveness, lack of tact, and dismissive attitude. For the most part, I was following your lead and responding. I was deconstructing you, so to speak. If you remember, I came in on the conversation with a general statement that "some apologists try to label me a positivist ..." It was not specifically about you, but your response to my statement set the tone for this exchange. You said the debate will continue until "Dan ... admits he is an apologist for an ideology ... [and] presents evidence in ways advantageous to that ideology and doesn't include opposing evidence sometimes WILLFULLY [meaning is dishonest]." Those were fighting words. Your challenge also made it clear that you were not going to back off, or to use your words about me, that you "would defend [your interpretation] to the last inch." As you can see, it was you who first pretended to read minds and to make accusations of dishonesty. You keep trying to rewrite history, but it's not working.
As I see it, I have successfully responded to each of your attempts to label me a positivist. I have only admitted to being a naturalist, which, as you yourself have admitted, is not the same as being a positivist.
You're right, the first time I said you were claiming to be "dispassionate" was a joke. However, the second time wasn't framed in the way you describe it: i.e., "not angry" therefore "dispassionate." I said, "But you did characterize your discussion as emotion-free and dispassionate." So it wasn't the denial of anger (although, as you recall, you did not deny having been angry, only that there was no sign of anger in your words) that brought about my comment, it was the implication that there was no emotion in your writing and that you were only discussing metaphysics. But you seem to forget that you had attacked me and accused me of "willfully" suppressing evidence without any proof. That's a verbal form of aggression. In your next post, you seemed to know that you had crossed the line and admitted that you "should have been more diplomatic." The curious thing is that I have been so busy defending myself against your hyper-sensitivity and exaggerated response that I didn't notice that you had also accused me of anger: "I see anger on this bulletin board; I don't see it in my previous response." At this point, Alan, the only written evidence you might construe as anger was when I said: "you underestimate and disrespect me if you think you can get away with what you wrote above." From that statement, you "psychologized" me, imputing not only "anger" but also calling it a "highly emotional response to an exchange of ideas ... threats ... rage." Don't well all read too much into other people's words?
Nevertheless, the point I was trying to make was the frustration you felt when you were denying that you were angry and demanding evidence is like the frustration I feel when I'm accused of being a positivist without evidence. You might say, "I never said I was dispassionate." Well, where did I say that I was objective and without ideology?
When you state that "Vogel hasn't assembled a coherent or competent argument in this discussion group," why does that not surprise me? Why should I expect someone to be "objective" who spends a lot of time discrediting that concept? The fact is, you have not dealt with my evidence and arguments, but instead have labeled it "positivist," "silly," "simple," etc. You probably don't realize it, but the whole time you are accusing me of ad hominem, which is not true, you sound like you're personally attacking me and my scholarship. Your assumption that I have an editor to "smooth out" the "deficiencies" in my scholarship is another of your fictions. I would suggest that your interpretation of what is going on here as apposed to my publications is colored by your present circumstances.
Call some of my comments "cheap psychoanalysis," but you seem very defensive about the possibility of someone analyzing you in this manner. It was just a question for you to think about: "For all your anxiety over the salvation of your fellow Mormons, isn't the intellectual Mormon you are trying to save from modernity and doubting really you?" Is there no personal stake in the subjects you choose to study and publish about and has that not colored your interpretations? Your interest in this subject is more than ideology, is it not? Are you saying you have no doubts? Why the evasion of my question? We all have biases; I'm trying to understand yours. I'm not sure why you described my question as an instance where I "rushed to personal factors to explain [my] opponent's position rather than exploring the arguments themselves." It was a call for self-reflection, not a counter-argument for an argument that did not exist.
I fear all the personal crap is beginning to bore readers, if there are any left. I know, I'm bored. Forgive me when I say, I only hope that someone like you reviews your book when it comes out. Alan, I think we should take a break, don't you? I really want to have more substantive discussions, not more ad hominem. But given your approach with the positivism/apologetic thing, which amounts to little more than name calling, I don't see how a debate could go any other way.
"Both Blake and Clark have equivocated on the issue of "supernaturalism.""
I'm not sure that's true. I think I kept to a fairly consistent definition, but suggested that you were likely using it in an imprecise sense. As I've said, I don't think Mormon theology is compatible with a belief in the supernatural.
"I suspect both you and Gad want to say that ridiculous conclusions are ridiculous so we don't need to even examine the argument."
Well, that's still not exactly what I'm saying. Let me return briefly to the alien abduction example. Yes, I think the idea is kind of rediculous. Does that mean the phenomenal experiences are thrown out? Absolutely not. And Psychologists from what I've read take them very seriously. But they also appear, whether implicitly or explicitly in a clinical way,to throw out the abductee argument without much of a hearing. And I think this is entirely justified. Even in Kuhn's world.
Well, MUFON is conducting some fairly serious research into the abductee phenomena, with devices that take fairly real time readings 24 hours a day within a number of abductees homes. To be honest, I'm really interested in what they come up with. But even if they produce something kind of interesting, it's going to take far, far more than than this before I would say any reputable journal of psychology needs to speak as if there were an other, competing theory... And I say this even, believing skeptics all too quickly buy into the current explanations. The fact that there is this battle on the side lines, I think has coulded some judgement. I believe the current theories aren't very good, I don't believe they are well supported. But skeptics sometimes are too quick to simply want an answer, any answer just to rule out their opposition as professional skeptics. Anyway, even though I don't think the current theories are very good, in no way in my mind, does that give credibility to the abduction argument or do I think psychologists should take the abduction argument seriously.
As far as the supernatural goes, in my last post I put the term in quotes, because I don't have a good definition. Blake used the word, and so I'm curious, in his mind, or anyone elses who would use that term, of an example where a supernatural explanation should be taken very seriously. I don't restrict, or even mean to imply that one's religion must have anything to do with the supernatural. I mean, in the case that one's religion does, to refrain from using it as an answer to my question. To make it clear, I'm not saying one has to believe such an argument, but only believe it needs to be taken with a great deal of seriousness.
Gad, I think we're saying much the same thing: that what counts is the argument.
Regarding the supernatural, I agree it is a very problematic term and perhaps difficult to give an effective and useful definition to. I suggest we avoid the term because I don't think it ever helps discourse. It ends up being a catchword for "what I don't think is possible."
Gad: What I mean by "supernatural" is "not included within the nature of things." Given such a definition (and I may add that this was one prominent scholastic view) what is supernatural depends on what is natural or in the nature of things. It is not contrary to the nature of things for people to have spiritual experiences and for what is experienced to be possible (i.e., possibly real) given the nature of the world as I see it. For example, it used to be that it was not natural for matter to be a form of energy. Now it is because our idea of matter has broadened to include such states. As I see it, people like Dan exclude as a possibility (desite rhetoric to the contary) that spiritual experiences are in the nature of things are even possibly real -- mind independent. Mormonism has simply exanded the notion of what is in the nature of things to include the "spiritual" or what is not experienced by the five senses. Because I believe that human experience is not limited to what can be derived from the five senses (I am not an empiricist) or proven by a logicaly necessary argument (I am not a rationalist) I believe that the realm of the real includes more than what the five senses deliver to us -- and so I deem it perfectly natural to have experiences of things that don't involve the five senses.
Blake, when you told Addictio that you "just wanted to know what the basis of Dan's probability claim is," that was not exactly what you had asked of me. As you recall, you demanded that I prove probability using "mathematical probability tables ... since you cannot assess probability without them." That sounded like a demand for me to prove probability using an objective statistical theorem, which seemed unreasonable to me. Now you mention the possibility of using a "Bayesian probability theorem," which to some might sound like a mathematical statistical theorem. However, after a little surfing on the web, I learned that it is a subjective method that can be used to make highly improbable things sound probable. Some have even used it to prove the probability for Jesus' resurrection and the existence of God. Although Bayesian theorems have the appearance of mathematical certainty, they are nevertheless subjective and basically a means of scoring bias. Problems of using Bayesian theorems in the context of miracles have been noted (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entiries/miracles). So, I'm not sure why you suggested using such a method.
Generally, it is inherently impossible to calculate the ratio between a known and a non-existent. Any attempt at statistical probability in the case under discussion necessarily begs the question, because one must first admit there are spiritual experiences. Hence, the source referred to above says: "The balancing of probabilities is of no use until it is decided what goes into the balance -- that is, what constitutes the evidence that is to be subject to the balancing of probabilities." Nevertheless, in the sense that I have used "probably," as more likely than not, I think it is self-evident. If you catch someone lying, do you not distrust all other statements, especially if there is no corroboration?
The recent debate about DNA and Native Americans is an example of reaching a reasonable conclusion based on a sampling of the total population. So far we have no Israelite DNA and even the apologist seem willing to admit that it is not likely that Israelite DNA will ever be found. So, as with visionary experience, we have two groups of Native Americans: the tested and the untested. Would it not be unreasonable to insist that more testing will uncover Israelite DNA? Of course, no hypothesis can be completely falsified, but there is a point at which holding a hypothesis becomes manifestly irrational.
The basis on which I say the unknown group of hallucinators are PROBABLY delusional is the fact that the two groups are otherwise indistinguishable. There is variation and complexity in different experiences and there may be different brain functions operating to produce the various effects, but this seems true for either group. But the two groups you describe (i.e., delusional/dysfunctional/hallucinators vs. high/normal-functioning/visionaries) is pure fiction. You are wrong in your assumption that delusions do not happen in high-functioning and normal people, evidence of which I have already given. The survey to which I referred was of 15,000 normal people. Most of the causes of hallucination that I listed were for otherwise normal people. Whenever I referred to those cases with "dysfunctional etiology" (as you call it), they were counter-instances for your argument that delusion was undetectable. Since this is the second time you have made allusion to high-functioning visionaries being different without giving a reference or cogent argument therefrom, I think it's time for you to prove that assertion.
I do not believe you can call my argument a "hasty generalization" since it is a generalization based on the majority of cases. The survey I referred to showed that most of the 10-15 percent hallucinated a living person. Even you argue that presumably true visions are such rare and "unique events" that "probability claims are difficult to assess." This claim is interesting in light of what I mentioned above that some have used Bayesian theorem to calculate the probability of the resurrection -- you don't get any more rare and unique than that.
When I argue that most of the hallucinations in the survey were of living people and delusional, it is reasonable to infer from the known to the unknown. If it walks like a duck, and squawks like a duck, it PROBABLY is a duck. It is undisputed that the human mind is capable of creating delusion. You have admitted that Whitmer's mind produced delusion, and that he was unable to distinguish between true and false revelations. Cowdery received a false revelation that contradicted Smith's revelation during the same month that he presumably saw the angel and plates. I think that impeaches your two main witnesses.
In your description of Whitmer, you neglected to mention some important details and distort others. The account you give is basically derived from the three interviews Whitmer had with Edward Stevenson. You fail to mention that only weeks before his group vision, Whitmer believed he had seen a Nephite with the plates in a knapsack on the road between Harmony and Fayette; that after arriving in Fayette, he had an impression that the same Nephite was under the shed; that his mother saw the angel with the plates while milking the cows; and on the morning of the vision, prior to Joseph's and Oliver's coming to him, Whitmer had a hallucination of a man while he was plowing in the field. As Whitmer told Stevenson, "I heard a voice and saw a personage who said, "Blessed is the Lord and he that keepeth his commandments.'" (Incidentally, Smith says these words spoke by Moroni in the group vision.) This is strong indication that Whitmer was in a very receptive or conducive state of mind when he joined Smith and Cowdery. Certainly, your claim that there were no extenuating circumstances associated with Whitmer's vision is false.
You say, "They all three saw the same and experienced the same thing." We do not know that. As I have already argued, Cowdery did not leave a description of his experience for comparison; and Smith's description conflates Whitmer's pre-group vision with the group vision. The published testimony is so vague and general, even giving the false impression that Harris was present with the other two witnesses and failing to mention the angel's glory or other artifacts seen on the table, that it is impossible to say that all saw the "same thing." In my essay in AMERICAN APOCRYPHA, I explained the mechanisms operating in group hallucination (I apologize for the long quotations from my essay, but it seems necessary since Blake either ignores or has not read what I have written, or else he wouldn't make such uninformed statements):
"Generally, the illusion of group hallucination is achieved through the following mechanisms: expectation, anticipation, suggestion, and cross-infection that can begin prior to the hallucination, operate during the experience, and continue to modify the memories of the participants long afterwards [see Zusne and Jones, ANOMALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY, 135]. Thus, expectation and anticipation might operate in producing similar experiences for the various participants; communication between participants during the hallucination, ranging from verbal descriptions to subtle nuances in body language and facial expression, might facilitate similarity of experience (and if a leader-follower dynamic is operating, such as in hypnotist or spiritual guide situations, uniformity of experience is more easily achieved); and like any human experience, visions or hallucinations are not immune from reconstructive memory and subsequent communication between the participants which can contaminate their individual recollections rather than clarify them. Assuming that the experiences of the participants are similar but not identical, subsequent conversations may not bring out subtle differences. Although group hallucination is a documented fact, and the dynamics of the phenomenon are more or less understood, it is not always easy to discover the principles operating in a given case since the subtleties of what operates largely on an unconscious level are not easily recovered from the participants themselves."
'... In their study of multiple hallucinators, Green and McCreery found that participants only apparently experience the same apparition. "[W]e do not know how precise the correspondence is between the images perceived by the various subjects,' they explain. "Even in cases where the reports reveal no discrepancies, we cannot be sure that there were not some which did not emerge from the verbal statement. ... As a matter of fact, quite wide discrepancies could exist between the perceptions of one person and those of another without attracting any attention' [Green and McCreery, APPARITIONS, 41, 42]. This means, theoretically, that the witnesses in describing their experiences would not have necessarily noticed discrepancies, even if their visions were similar but not identical."
I will point out that although we can't compare Cowdery's and Whitmer's experiences, Joseph Smith is a link between them, and he said the vision he had with Harris was 'the same vision ... at least it was again to me." However, Whitmer told Orson Pratt and Joseph F. Smith in 1878: 'I don't think [Harris] saw all that we did, but our testimony as recorded in the Book of Mormon is strictly and absolutely true just as it is written." Palmyra resident Abner Cole claimed in 1831 that 'there appears to be a great discrepancy, in the stories told by the famous three witnesses to the Gold bible," particularly between Harris's and Whitmer's description of what the plates looked like. Despite these hints at differences, I also discussed in my essay the possible principles of unification in the witnesses' accounts:
'Harris's and Whitmer's accounts share common elements--the angel, the table, the plates and other objects, the angel speaking, and the voice of God -- but one does not know if the two men saw the same angel, the same table, or the same plates, or if they heard the same voice, or the same words, or even if their experiences lasted the same length of time.'
'Moreover, similarities may be the result of preconditioning: the June 1829 revelation that promised what objects would be seen, their possible handling of the plates and feeling them through the cloth, their examination of characters Smith had transcribed from the plates, and Smith's own descriptions of the plates and other objects as well as his accounts of previous encounters with the angel. Joseph Smith reveals that the order in which each man prayed was "[a]ccording to previous arrangement.' It is possible that prior discussions with the witnesses included other elements of preconditioning that were not recorded. Additionally, Smith's presence at both events and the possibility of transmitting information about Whitmer's experience may have been a contributing factor in Harris's further preparation.'
'Finally, differences in experiences may have blurred over time as details faded and general impressions remained. The publication of Smith's version in 1842 may have influenced Harris's and Whitmer's descriptions--Smith's account perhaps acting as a catalyst of uniformity. Indeed, the testimony itself was designed to unify multiple experiences.'
You say, 'Yet Dan focuses on the light that began to appear and then asserts that this experience is like waking visions that arise from an abnormal etiology.' This is false. 'Waking dreams' do not 'arise from an abnormal etiology,' that is, any more or less than Whitmer's experience. My use of the term 'waking dream' describes the type of hallucination involved and has no reference to the experiencer's state of mind. As I explained in my essay:
'In their 1975 book, APPARITIONS, Celia Green and Charles McCreery of the Institute of Psychophysical Research, Oxford, England, described three types of apparitional experience: (1) that which is superimposed onto one's otherwise normal environment; (2) that which temporarily replaces one's entire field of perception (sometimes referred to as a "waking dream' experience); and (3) that which partially obscures one's environment. Green and McCreery warn that what might appear to the viewer as the normal environment can actually be part of the hallucination. "[I]n cases in which the illumination differs from the normal,' becoming either lighter or darker during the experience, they argue that "[t]here seems to be a strong case for regarding the entire environment as hallucinatory.' Elaborating further, they state: "Now if the subject's surroundings appear illuminated, as well as the figure of the apparition itself, we seem driven to the conclusion that ... the whole environment the subject is seeing is hallucinatory' [Green and McCreery, APPARITIONS, 1-7, 8, 13].'
So you can see from this why I focused on the light. This is why Moyle was surprised by Whitmer's account. Having undoubtedly read the published testimony many times, Moyle and most Mormons probably assumed the angle had appeared in the normal setting of the woods. Since the testimony had not even mentioned the light, Moyle was unprepared when Whitmer told him that a 'different kind of light' and a 'soft haze' replaced the natural environment and 'then spoke of Paul hearing and seeing Christ but his associates did not. Because it is only seen in the Spirit.' Then Moyle recorded his 'assessment,' or more accurately reaction: 'I was not fully satisfied with the explanation. It was more spiritual than I anticipated.' This is not inconsistent with Stevenson's account as you seem to imply. Yet there are other accounts that supports Moyle. In 1878 Whitmer explained to Orson Pratt and Joseph F. Smith: '[W]e were overshadowed by a light. It was not like the light of the sun[,] nor like that of a fire, but more glorious and beautiful. It extended away round us, I cannot tell how far.' According to Stephen Burnett, Harris told an Ohio congregation in 1838 that 'he never saw the plates with his natural eyes only in vision or imagination,' adding that the witnesses had seen the plates 'spiritually or in vision with their eyes shut.'
You say, 'Waking hallucinations are not experienced by many people at the same time, they are not predicted beforehand as to what the experience will be, the types of description of concrete objects are rare indeed ...' You might as well say no other group of people have hallucinated an angel and gold plates. The particulars of each case cannot be used to discredit the general principles operating here. I'm not sure what you mean by 'concrete objects.' Whitmer said the table looked solid, but nothing was touched and everything was seen 'in the spirit.' In 1877, Whitmer told Stevenson: 'on the appearance of A table Was laid the Plates ...' If you are going to use the rare-means-true argument, which is an arbitrary standard, then group hallucinations are true in all cases, including the Fatima and Lourdes visions of Mary.
Just because the phenomenon is rare and you find it difficult to explain does not mean that it is either 'real' or 'supernatural.' Nevertheless, this kind of thinking shows up a lot in various paranormal claims.
You say, 'those having such "vision' are aware that they are hallucinating.' Presumably by this you mean that those having 'waking dreams' know that they are hallucinating, while the BofM witnesses were convinced of the reality of their experiences. The witnesses believed their experiences were real (the same as the Fatima hallucinators do), but at the same time they understood that it was not an every-day experience. That's why I called it a 'pseudo-hallucination.' This is unlike the woman I once saw in McDonald's carrying on a lively conversation to the invisible person sitting across from her. Unlike this woman, the witnesses knew they were hallucinating -- they just called it a vision. To them, it was a spiritual reality, not a material reality as I understand it, and not a metaphysical reality as you understand it.
You say, '[The witnesses] were in a normal functioning state that was quite quotidian.' They were certainly aware that what they were experiencing was not ordinary or commonplace, but that it was accomplished through the power of God and spiritual sight and that their minds had to be prepared by exorcizing faith. But when are the deluded aware that they are deluded? Isn't that the meaning of the word? What do you expect to have happened? I know Addictio gave the example of religious enthusiasm, but he was using an obvious situation to overcome some of your unreasonable objections. It doesn't require high-emotions and extraordinary situations to produce hallucination. It only requires reasonably suggestible people and an influential person to give those suggestions. To miss this point, is to miss something fundamental about human nature.
So what were Whitmer, Cowdery, and Smith talking about while sitting on the log? I have suggested it may have not been unlike the conversation Smith hand with Rigdon during their vision of heaven. According to Philo Dibble, several people present in the room 'saw the glory, and felt the power, but did not see the vision.' Dibble recalled:
'Joseph would, at intervals, say: "What do I see?' as one might say while looking out the window and beholding what all in the room could not see. Then he would relate what he had seen or what he was looking at. Then Sidney replied, "I see the same.' Presently Sidney would say "what do I see?' and would repeat what he had seen or was seeing, and Joseph would reply, "I see the same.' This manner of conversation was repeated at short intervals to the end of the vision.'
Dibble adds that during the procedure Smith 'sat firmly and calmly,' while Rigdon 'sat limp and pale, apparently as limber as a rag.' Some might interpret Rigdon's condition as indicative of a hypnotic trance and conclude that Smith was leading the former through a series of suggestions. Moreover, as ultimate interpreter of the vision, Smith could create the impression of shared vision.
I'm not saying the following is what did happen but what could have happened, or at least what could produce the same effect in a naturalistic way by using Dibble's account as a model. Imagine these men sitting on the log and Joseph says to Cowdery and Whitmer, 'If you have faith, God has promised to show you the plates ... and God cannot lie. Do you believe God fulfills his promises? 'Yes.' 'God has sent the angel to mother Whitmer and has shown her the plates. Do you believe God has the power to show them to you also?' 'Yes.' 'The angel is here now with the plates ... all you have to do is lift the veil of unbelief and you will see the vision. ... God wants you to see it. Do you see the light?' 'Yes.' 'Do you see it getting brighter?' 'Yes.' 'I see the angel with the plates just as mother Whitmer described. What do you see?' 'I see the same.' 'I see a table in front of the angel upon which are the spectacles, sword of Laban, director, breastplate, and brass plates just as the revelation promised. What do you see?' 'I see the same.'
You say, 'Dan focuses on statements that agree with his position, ignores a vast majority of statements that don't ...' You have not demonstrated this accusation. You did not discuss the 'vast majority of statements,' although you tried to make it appear that you did with your summery of what Whitmer 'consistently [stated] over a 20 year time period.' As I said, it was in fact an unidentified summary of Stevenson's three interviews with Whitmer. Nevertheless, you have not shown how Stevenson or the majority of statements Whitmer gave contradict Moyle's account.
You say, 'Dan ... focuses on second hand assessments rather than first-hand statements ...' Well, as it turns out, you also use secondhand statements because, outside the published testimony (whoever wrote that), we have perhaps one firsthand account in his 1887 ADDRESS. As I explained, Moyle is both an interview and an assessment, or rather reaction. While Moyle was 'disappointed' that Whitmer's testimony was not as 'materialistic' as he would have liked, he did not lose his testimony. From a believer's point of view, Whitmer hadn't said anything that would cause apostasy. But Moyle knew that it was not the kind of testimony that skeptics would find persuasive.
You sarcastically state: 'Dan ... takes any sign that a vision is not simply like picking up a baseball as evidence that it cannot be "real' in the sense that I have used it.' Your idea of 'reality' is different than mine, but it's also different than the witnesses you are trying to defend. Reality, whatever it is, consists of more than definitions. I know you don't intend it this way, but when you talk about reality 'in my sense' and other 'world-views,' it sounds like social constructivism and relativism, which makes it a little contradictory when you criticize what you think is 'just' my 'opinion or preference.' Probable and parsimonious explanations work very well within a naturalistic world-view, so they are more than good ways of 'expressing an opinion or preference,' as you seem to think. They are only troublesome to those who want the world to respect their pseudo-scientific theories.
I have not said that 'a naturalistic explanation is always preferable.' I said, 'If the naturalistic explanation is sufficient to explain a particular phenomenon, there is no need to resort to a supernatural explanation. The supernatural explanation is superfluous.' Why did you ignore my explanation?
You suggest that when I talk about naturalism/supernatural, I'm taking advantage of a 'false dichotomy in LDS thought.' As with many of your statements, this is unclear. Are you trying to say that there is no dichotomy because the supernatural is part of the natural world? Or, are you trying to say that the natural/supernatural is a false dichotomy because there really is a trichotomy of naturalism, supernaturalism, and idealism? Since we have not discussed the first (although Clark brings it up), I assume you are alluding to our previous discussions about your idealist philosophy. However, your next comment seems to support my first guess because you suggest that my continual mention of the natural/supernatural dichotomy is a 'refusal to include within [my] world-view what others include within theirs, e.g., visions and spiritual experiences.' So you seem to be asking me to expand my naturalistic world-view to include the subjective beliefs that some hold about visions and spiritual experiences. In so doing, you try to make it appear that I'm intolerant and narrow-minded, which I find odd coming from someone who believes he belongs to the only true church of God on earth, that 'all their creeds [are] an abomination in [God's] sight; [and] that those professors [are] all corrupt.' How tolerant are you if you reject Catholic miracles and Ellen G. White's and Mohammad's revelations? I suggest that you are indulging in special pleading here. Blake, if you believe Mormonism and talk about God, angels, and visions, you are a supernaturalist. End of story.
Ultimately, Blake, if you are trying to change the definition of supernatural to be included within the natural world, you are moving closer to my camp because I already believe visions and revelations have naturalistic explanations. So, you see, I have already included these things in my world-view -- I just have a different interpretation of them than you. I also believe they are 'real' to the people who experience them, but the interpretation of them is quite another matter. Just because I acknowledge that people have such experiences does not compel me to also accept their interpretations of those events. Otherwise one would be obliged to accept the interpretations of the clearly delusional. In my experience, I have found that many people pile on loads of cultural assumptions when trying to understand such experiences, just as they do with every-day life. They are also prone to push the meaning far beyond the content of these experiences. Often in matters of Mormon testimony, particularly about the BofM, what amounts to a generalized feeling of 'burning in the bosom' about truth is interpreted to include matters about historicity.
You say, 'I can see no reason to limit "natural' to "verifiable.'' If you are saying that the supernatural is really a part of the natural world, this seems a contradiction to me. If we're talking about the natural world, it should at least be potentially verifiable. Interestingly enough, brain science is just now beginning to map out how the brain produces spiritual and mystical experience. So, your claims that such things are not verifiable might be too hasty. Nevertheless, now that you have redefined supernaturalism to avoid one problem, you have opened yourself up to other problems. For one, you can no longer hide behind the idea that the two world-view are completely separate and therefore unverifiable, although things like the BofM and BofA were always empirically testable. Mormonism has always been both potentially verifiable and potentially falsifiable than other faiths.
You make a distinction between private (subjective) verification and the 'publicly verifiable' and then say that my preference for the latter makes me a positivist. Maybe, but not necessarily so. You have heard Alan admit that naturalism is not positivism. You have also heard me say that I'm not a positivist because I do not limit evidence to positive, empirically tested, deductively deduced evidence, but I leave room for induction, inference, and intuition. In other words, I recognize that disciples like history, psychology, sociology do not have to model themselves after science to be legitimate forms of knowledge. But that does not mean that I have to step into the chaotic and hopelessly contradictory world of the subjective. The only way to survive in that world is to become a relativist or a religious/ideological authoritarian. Subjective experiences aside, should not the BofM and BofA be 'publically verifiable'? Would not this go a long way towards verifying the experiences of the BofM witnesses? So, I think your claim that such things are not subject to public verification is rather inconsistent given your own situation.
You state, 'I think it is important to show how the controlling paradigm and assumptions of those like Dan pre-determine their use of evidence. Their underlying assumptions dictate the outcome -- garbage in, garbage out.' I have already dealt with this subject: 'I also think it's a mistake to call naturalism an "assumption' as if there is another reasonable alternative. Rather naturalism is a "hypothesis' or "working hypothesis' with emphasis on "working' since it has been tested and repeatedly corroborated.' If naturalism works, how can it be called 'garbage'? While naturalism is self-correcting, your subjectivism has no way to correct itself, and no way to justify its arbitrary acceptance or rejection of various subjective claims.
You ask Clark: 'why isn't it important both to focus on the particular evidence and also to look at why those who are looking at the same evidence reach different conclusions?' I think we have seen why you reach different conclusions than me. The reasons seems to be: (1) a lack of familiarity with the sources; (2) no clear methodology for analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of testimony; (3) an arbitrary and unrealistic system of definitions; and (4) a naive view of the human condition.
You next criticize Clark: 'The notion that we simply assess evidence independently of some world-view or commitments is non-sense ... assessing how one's assumptions may impact the way the evidence is assessed is important. It is also important to look at the viability of the assumptions ...' This, coming from someone who says that his world-view is not open to examination and inductive analysis? Then you have the nerve to say 'Dan's assumptions are unsupportable and self-contradictory.' This anti-naturalism would make more sense if it was not coming from someone who apparently redefines the supernatural to be included within a naturalistic world-view, not to mention your dependence on naturalism in every-day life and in your scholarship. Someone who claims a tool doesn't work but keeps using it is not to be taken seriously. While you cannot live without naturalism, many others do just fine without your world-view. In this sense, you and other apologists are not really operating within a different paradigm, but rather working within a scientific and naturalistic paradigm very poorly.
As I see it, the sources of our misunderstanding have been my lack of familiarity with metaphysical terms and your poor communication skills. Generally, when there is misunderstanding, an author assumes the responsibility of explaining himself more clearly and does not blame his readers. Now, unless you can begin dealing with what I'm saying and explain your positions more clearly and fully, rather than using blanket accusations without proof, then we will continue to speak past one another and further communication will indeed be fruitless.
It seems to me that Blake is arguing in two different ways, but without acknowledging it.
The first way embodies the modal mistake I've mentioned, but to no apparent effect. On the one hand, Blake wants to sugggest that the debate is purely metaphysical or ideological. Hence his most recent post.
Blake says in part:
"What I mean by "supernatural" is "not included within the nature of things." Given such a definition (and I may add that this was one prominent scholastic view) what is supernatural depends on what is natural or in the nature of things."
Really, Blake, sometimes I can't tell if you are being willful or naive. If you want to define "in the nature of things" generously, to include the inferred realities behind all sincere first-person reports of "extra-sensory" experiences, then have at it. Animists and Jesuits are then all of a piece. But (checking my watch) that's not a very interesting position, here in the early 21st century.
You go on:
"It is not contrary to the nature of things for people to have spiritual experiences and for what is experienced to be possible (i.e., possibly real) given the nature of the world as I see it."
No, it isn't "contrary to the nature of things" for people to have spiritual experiences, and (moreover) to make claims about the nature of reality based on them. Empirically speaking (good grief), this is a garden-variety form of human behavior; it has been going on for centuries. What, do you think you are announcing something new?
Next, you go on to say that it is not "contrary to the nature of things" that the "spiritual experiences" people have are "possibly real." Again, you're reverting to logical possibility. Same uninteresting modal mistake. Do you realize what a weak claim you're making? Yes, the harms inflicted by voodoo pins also are "possibly real." Look around. Who disputes that Mormonism is "possibly real" in the same sense? Why would they bother?
You go on:
"For example, it used to be that it was not natural for matter to be a form of energy. Now it is because our idea of matter has broadened to include such states."
Really, Blake (yes, again), I can't tell whether you're being naive or willful. Do you really not get it? The reason we now talk about matter as a form of energy is because of painstaking scientific investigation. Why in the world would you think that particular scientific advancement somehow supports your religious position?
You go on to say:
"Because I believe that human experience is not limited to what can be derived from the five senses (I am not an empiricist) or proven by a logicaly necessary argument (I am not a rationalist) I believe that the realm of the real includes more than what the five senses deliver to us -- and so I deem it perfectly natural to have experiences of things that don't involve the five senses."
Here we are again among what is either necessary or possible. Blake believes that "the real includes more than what the five senses deliver to us." What possible body of evidence could convince him otherwise? None.
The world of logical possiblity is both fascinating, and uninteresting. Fascinating because everything is and remains (merely) possible. In that world, voodoo and television faith-healing (and faith-promoting Mormon stories) are all on the same plane, and page. Equally fascinating.
Yet still uninteresting. For obvious reasons. In the world of logical possibility, every merely beguiling story has the same status. (Do I need to explain further?) Yet Blake thinks that because he has fallen in love with a particular story, that story is somehow privileged. It emerges triumphant from the confusion of voodoo and animism and all the other (millions of)instances where people thought they saw --or glimpsed -- the nature of things, outside of our five senses, and were yet confused.
The second way Blake argues is on the facts. Should we pause there? I think so.
If Blake's "metaphysical" arguments were sufficient, there would be no need argue the historical issues. If the dispute really were only about about ideology, and metaphysics, Blake would be content to rest his case there. But he doesn't. Blake argues that he knows what David Whitmer meant, the correct way to read him, based on the documents. If the dispute were settled merely by invoking ideology, why would Blake bother?
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