For those jumping here from the sidebar, the post all of this is in connection to was a discussion of Alan Goff's claims about positivism at Signature. While I'm sympathetic to many of his elements, I think Goff is perhaps conflating naturalism with positivism. It also appears that he is pushing the "everything is apologetics" position a tad too far. Even if, as I agree, everything is apologetics in one sense. I think as a pragmatic matter we separate them out by degree.
This has become the thread that never dies. Although it is an interesting enough topic with the key actors in the debate contributing, so I certainly am not complaining in the least. Even so, I've added a few extra pages of comments. If you post a comment here it will go to the last page.
Probability in any thesis can be problematic. My sense is (and correct me if I'm wrong) that Blake is arguing for the necessity of some "absolute" knowledge from which to make sense of probabilities. (When he says,'When someone asserts that "it is probably the case that X,' they must have some justification for such an assertion, some way of justifying the claim.") However I think Bayesian Epistemology does offer a way to make knowledge claims without problematic kinds of foundationalism. So I think Blake is right there, even if I'm dubious of the place Bayesian inference ought to hold epistemologically. Of course even with Bayesianism one can argue that the "system" in which the judgments are made matters. But it seems that it does so in a fashion less problematic than some assert. Having said that though, even in Bayesian approaches if one judges that one has experienced many spiritual phenomena then how one judges other spiritual phenomena will be radically different. And in that I agree with Blake's critique of Dan.
Note that Dan brought up the problem of Bayesian inference with regards to miracles. However this was with respect to Hume's argument and not a problem in general. I don't see how this line of logic would apply to the Mormon conception of miracles which is typically taken in much more physicalist terms.
Dan also suggested that Bayesian statistics were, "a subjective method that can be used to make highly improbable things sound probable."
This seems quite incorrect. For instance in my job we use Bayesian statistics all the time. For instance we have an OCR package we hope to start selling soon. It uses Bayesian inference to learn from training data and at the moment we have it recognizing difficult (fuzzy) English text with 99% accuracy. I've also written programs using Bayesian methods to recognize languages in text. We have a partially assembled spell checker using Bayesian methods, a program that generates word breaks for indexing in Asian languages using enhanced Bayesian methods, and a few other programs including a categorizer. Many spam filters use Bayesian methods as well.
Regardless of what you think of it, Bayesian methods are rather widely used and surprisingly accurate. The fact that there are people out there who don't know how to utilize them says nothing about the methodology itself.
Dan also said, "[n]evertheless, in the sense that I have used 'probably,'as more likely than not, I think it is self-evident."
I don't think it is self-evident at all. That's why we're all querying you on it. If you simply mean "believable to me" then "probable" becomes rather unhelpful a term in an argument.
Perhaps a thought experiment might illustrate the divide between us. Let us say there is real communication going on in the "religious experiences." Is there anything, Gad, Dan, or Addicto would accept that would justify them? Or would they assert that even if they were real that all involved people ought to disbelieve them?
I ask, since it sure sounds like they are attempting to create a situation where even potentially real experiences of these sorts are unfalsifiable. People ought never believe anything until scientists tell them first. So, for instance, if I encounter some being arising out of some soft white and they tell me various things which come to pass, I am always to treat this as a hallucination.
Surely this isn't your position?
Note that this is a different matter from whether we can know if the people under discussion actually had a real experience. I don't think we can. At best we can say the class of experiences is possible or not independent of the history. Dan, Gad and others have independently arrived at the conclusion that the class of phenomena is impossible, or at least requires such strong evidence that they'd not accept it until scientists had come to consensus on it. Blake and I obviously differ.
Sorry for the tone of my last post. I was responding too much to style at the expense of substance. Having washed my mouth out with soap, let me make a few more comments.
I'm agnostic about what actually happened with the three witnesses. None of us was there, so it is difficult to determine what actually happened, behaviorally, before the event. One of my points has been that what did happen behaviorally is relevant to judging the nature of the claim being made by the witnesses, and the plausibility of naturalistic explanations for it. So are facts about the psychology, personalities and post-experience statements of the experiencers.
When Blake is not merely invoking ideology and logical possibility, his rejoinders to Dan about how, for example, the experiencers were "high-functioning" individuals, and the surrounding circumstances do not fit the profile of "mass hysteria," he is addressing the merits of a proposed naturalistic explanation. Similarly, when Dan suggests that, if the pre-event dialogue on the log were along the lines he suggests, using the "visionary" dialogue with Rigdon as an example, then the naturalistic explanation would be strengthened. Why? Because the event would then better fit the profile of persons using suggestion to induce and shape an experience. The problem, of course, is that Dan's suggestion is, on the record we have, highly speculative. For all he or anyone else knows, the participants were discussing something entirely unrelated and pedestrian. That doesn't change the logical point, however, which is that the surrounding circumstances are relevant to an assessment of the strength of a naturalistic explanation. The same is true about the kinds of facts I noted above about the personalities and post-event behavior of the experiencers.
I'm less interested in who "wins" that argument -- how we each end up assessing the strength of the naturalistic account and the inferences made in support of it -- than in being clear about the nature of the argument. What surprises me is that there should be such (apparent)disagreement over what type of facts and evidence can in principle count for or against a naturalistic explanation. Blake's position appears to be that unless an argument can be expressed in terms of a Bayesian probabilty claim it cannot be used to support a naturalistic account of a reported supernatural event. I can't tell what he means by that. I can't tell, for example, if he believes this to be the case about all claims about past events, or only claims about the occurrence vel non of genuine "spiritual" experiences or events.
The argument that it is reasonable to conclude that ALL claimed spiritual experiences originate entirely from social and psychological causes is, I think, a different one. I take Dan to be making both arguments, and in my view they should be recognized as distinct and assessed separately.
Clark, sorry for my delay, but I have to slow down my participation. I appreciate the less combative tone of your responses. I must confess, however, that I sometimes have difficulty making sense of what you're trying to say. You philosophers seem to be afraid to use the English language the way it was intended, so I have to be careful about assuming I know what you're saying. The guarded phrasing and finely nuanced definitions requires too much reading between the lines. So if it seems like I'm arguing off the subject, you will at least know why in advance.
You say, '[T]he issue is whether we discount, out of hand, all subjective reports.'Of course, I have not said that we discount 'ALL subjective reports.'Here you seem to be setting up what will come later. Hence, instead of saying 'reports of visions,'you say 'subjective reports,'by which you mean, I assume, 'reports of subjective experiences,' which can be expanded to all experiences. But, as I say, you have not specifically mentioned visions, which are extraordinary subjective experiences.
You seem to refer to visions when you state that my position 'opens [me] up to critics who find such reports plausible.' But then some people find the evidence for Big Foot plausible, don't they? (Not just laymen, either, but those who should know better, like Mormon scientist Jeffery Meldrum!) On the other hand, you seem to hint at a much broader concept of subjective experience than visions when you suggest that I 'may be inconsistent on what subjective accounts [I] discount.'I assume you intend a wider definition of 'subjective'because I have been clear about my skepticism of all claims of the paranormal. On the contrary, it is my opponents who arbitrarily choose which 'supernatural events'they want to believe and which they will discount. This is especially true of Mormons, who believe they belong to the only true church. That's why I made the following statement in the intro to my book:
'In my experience, those who champion the supernatural invariably do so arbitrarily, picking and choosing with little explanation which events qualify as genuine, which do not, and why one experience is superior to another. In my view, the defenders of a certain spiritual experience are vulnerable to the chaos of contradictory claims and lack the means--the methodology--to enable them to distinguish between theoretically 'real' events and those clearly explained by naturalistic assumptions.'
To anticipate what is coming, I know the difference between supernatural subjectivity and mundane subjectivity, or, rather, between delusional belief and having delusions. That's why I made the following statement in my book:
'Apologists for the supernatural argue that since true objectivity is impossible, faith-based history is as legitimate as secular-based history. Using the vocabulary of certain epistemologists, these writers confuse reasonable certainty with unreasonable doubt. Like all human endeavors, history has limitations, but I am comfortable to let the best reconstruction--the one having the fewest assumptions and inconsistencies, and requiring the least elaboration--prevail.'
Moreover, I'm not an extreme or radical skeptic, who denies that knowledge is possible, rather I employ a selective or particular skepticism.
You say, '... this ends up coming off as simply assuming your conclusions and then looking for evidence to back it up. Any other evidence is simply disparaged as the result of frenzied minds.'I have not been selective in my use of evidence for hallucination. I admit that I cannot conclusively prove all cases are delusional, circumstances do not permit it, but a good case can be made showing that a majority are. And neither you nor Blake have refuted this evidence. A variety of conditions are conducive to hallucination, including strong suggestion and a willing mind, but not necessarily a 'frenzied mind,'as you suggest. Although I have sometimes referred to schizophrenics to counter Blake's blanket statement that delusion is undetectable, I have consistently argued that normal people can hallucinate too: our brains are wired for it. It is part of the human condition. Since you mentioned 'evidence'(so I can't be accused of being a positivist), have you noticed that I have all the evidence and you have nothing? Why is that? What evidence do you think I have selectively ignored? I have stood toe-to-toe with Blake and, in my opinion, have shown that his confidence in the testimonies of the BofM witnesses is based on incomplete information and a lack of knowledge about hallucination and hypnotism.
All anyone can talk about is the phenomenon as it is experienced, in the brain. Any discussion of external causes will require revelation, which seems to be the unspoken evidence that you think you have. So this is the circular of all circular arguments, is it not? Using personal revelation to prove another personal revelation.
Now, if you do not think my case is 'probable,'I think you should admit that it is at least 'plausible'and therefore not the compelling case that some have argued. More importantly, it's not a reason to overlook the lack of evidence for the BofM.
NOW I see what you mean. Alan said in summarizing my views, 'The subjective doesn't count as evidence, so no proper evidence exists that there were gold plates.'And I said: 'I think you got it.'But this was followed by stipulations:
'Now, for subjective evidence to count, you must explain the following: (1) how do you explain contradictory subjective experiences, both in competing religious traditions and during the life of the same person; (2) why the experience of the witnesses weren't based on delusion, specifically Joseph Smith's strong suggestion? If the BofM is not a true history, isn't it natural to seek a naturalistic explanation for the BofM witnesses? Rather than changing our naturalistic world-view because of the subjective, and unreliable, experience of a few men?'
These questions have not been answered. When I said 'what it's evidence for,'I was anticipating a possible broadening of the term 'subjective evidence.'I had in mind a broader psychological interpretation of subjective and mystical experiences. What do they tell us about us? Why do they happen? What are we trying to tell ourselves? We have not discussed this because we are too focused on the three witnesses and the issue of 'reality.'In a sense, mystical and spiritual experiences are 'real'-- not 'objectively real'-- but 'real'in the same sense that emotions are 'real.'Just as our emotions can be manipulated, so too can the part of us we call spiritual. So I believe humans are spiritual/emotional creatures, that there is value in listening to that part of us, but that it's the spiritually/emotionally immature who interpret these things literally. In other words, I tend to interpret such experiences like Freud would dreams. Nevertheless, my wording 'evidence for'instead of 'how it is used'is perhaps an instance of not knowing the language of my audience. So your point is well taken. But, while I have been clear that I do not believe facts or evidence speak for themselves, I do believe some is less ambiguous that others.
You say, 'The problem is that you've confused literalist hermeneutics with subjective evidence.'That's an interesting statement. Who is being literal? Me? I don't think so. I have been trying to say that the experience of the witnesses was internal, not external as implied in the printed testimony. If internal, then the possibility of psychological origin becomes a more viable interpretation. Are you saying the witnesses understood their own experiences literally, and that their interpretations of their own experiences should not be taken at face value? If so, I think Moyle's interview with Whitmer shows that the witnesses well understood the subjective nature of their experience.
You say, 'the problem is simply the error that subjectivity entails a kind of foundationalist epistemology where the subject has Cartesian certainty in the content of the experience or a kind of direct realism.'I think it's possible that you are complicating things. At some point, both you and Blake need to study Mormon history, hallucination, and hypnotism. My lack of familiarity with 'philosophical terminology'is less significant as a problem in these discussions than is your innocence about the subjects being discussed. Not that I'm an expert, but at least I'm trying to educate myself on the key subjects. That said, I do not believe we have to be limited by the limitations of the observer. That's why I argued in the intro to my book:
'Even if we were to accept the idea that testimony regarding supernatural phenomena is reliable, we would still be under no obligation to uncritically embrace the witnesses' interpretations of those experiences. What [Robert] Berkhofer did in 1969 was to open the door to psychology and sociology--not to close the door on the humanistic sciences. Where historians do well to narrate the Salem witch trials of 1692 - as the participants themselves experienced them'--complete with accounts of paranormal phenomena, demonic possession, etc.--they are still right to make a case for mass hysteria, for example. Simply put, a researcher is not limited in his or her analysis by the subjective view of the participant or even the work of past generations. Often, succeeding generations of historians find additional sources and better tools with which to assess an event beyond what the participants themselves assumed.'
You say, 'I'm not aware of any Mormon miracle claim that violates known laws of physics.'How about the supposed demonic possession and levitation of Newel Knight? Or reading translations from a seer stone? Healing incurable diseases and raising the dead through prayer? Reading private thoughts and foretelling future events? Anyway, these are the claims. The supernaturalist, of course, has a ready answer for such things. But since you see such claims as a higher order of naturalism, you must explain how a rock can translate ancient writings. When Joseph Smith was unable to translate with another stone that Harris substituted, the implication was quite clearly that Smith's stone was special and not just a prop. Of course, I have lower level naturalistic explanations for all these claims.
I do not claim that the laws of physics as we understand them now 'are the final certain laws.'But I object to the implication that the discovery of new laws will explain all miracle claims. I know humans can't stop dreaming, but prophetic dreams are not evidence. Unless, of course, you can prove you are a prophet. Needless to say, the people we are talking about (Jesus, apostles, Joseph Smith, etc.) are not using this 'higher order of technology,'so who is? God? Angels? We'll that's begging the question, isn't it? Shouldn't we keep science fiction out of our interpretation of past events? To rest one's argument on scientific fallibilism and to suggest that the future will provide the needed proof is to commit several fallacies at the same time: the fallacy of 'potentially verifiable'questions, the fallacy of presumptive change, the fallacy of presumptive continuity. The problem is, you are arguing from the unwarranted assumption that science will 'progress'to the point that miracles will be explainable in naturalistic terms. You are attempting to use the supernatural (prophecy) to prove the supernatural (miracles). You are predicting that science will progresses to the point where miracles will no long be considered supernatural. You might as well say, 'You will see that I'm right in the next life.'It is also an old Nibley trick: Because we don't know everything, we know nothing for certain, therefore all things are possible. I believe this is an attempt to overthrow 'reasonable doubt'with a demand for 'unreasonable certainty.'
Of course, I do not disagree, in principle, with the idea of new phenomena expanding our naturalistic world-view rather than overthrowing it. That's why I said I'm not going too far out on a limb when I say I'm a naturalist. But that does not mean limitless expansion. If you believe it is, you might as well stick with traditional theology because you have not improved your position by trying to include the 'supernatural'within a naturalist paradigm.
When I said, 'Mormons also hold a quasi-materialism that includes the notion that spirit is a more refined matter; if that were true, E=MC2 would be false,'I meant: what is the formula for spirit matter? It can't be the same. So far as we know, the natural universe consists of these two things. Right? So where does spirit matter fit in?
Even from a Mormon perspective, Joseph Smith's was only speculating on spirit matter, not relaying knowledge obtained from revelation, but instead reasoning that '[t]here is no such thing as immaterial matter'(D&C 131:7-8). This was in response to a Methodist preacher's sermon and was not added to the D&C until 1876. Joseph Smith's other speculations about Kolob and the order of the heavens, etc., also have no bearing on reality but reflects the limited understanding of his own culture. That's what Brent Metcalfe and I tried to show in our essay on 'Joseph Smith's Scriptural Cosmology.'Regarding the idea of a physical God and a physical heaven: if Jesus were traveling at the speed of light, he would still be within the Milky Way. The person who wants to literalize and materialize his theology (i.e., Joseph Smith) must deal with scientific advances that do not support his views.
I realize that believers and non-believers are speaking different languages. That's what makes these discussions so interesting. But do not mistake, the believers have the burden of proof in public discussions. If they want to proselytize, they have to give reasons for believing their claims. Mormons do not have the luxury of saying it is all a matter of faith, because their claims are historically based and therefore testable. Believers have no right being indifferent about the criticisms of non-believers, as you seem to suggest. They are the one's asking the world to believe their claims. More importantly, believers should be troubled by the lack of historical support for the BofM and BofA.
I am responding to what the Mormons are claiming and expecting the world to believe. So I'm saying the BofM lacks significant evidence to support it's historical claims and there is nothing compelling about the testimony of the BofM witness. Of course, I can't prove to a believer that the witnesses hallucinated. But that's not my job. In fact, if you start from a believing position, there is no way to move that person off that stance. How does one prove a negative? How does one prove God doesn't exist? Or Big Foot, Atlantis, or the Nephites did not exist? But if you begin from a skeptical position -- prove it to me -- then it's easier to separate truth from fiction.
I don't know how many times I have been asked by believers, 'Admittedly there are problems with BofM historicity, but what about the witnesses who saw the plates?'My answer is: the more we learn about hallucination and hypnotism, the less difficult it is to understand the experience of the witnesses in naturalistic terms, so this need not be the stumbling block it at first appears. In my opinion, the believer is free to disregard the naturalistic explanation and believe whatever he or she wishes, but it's just a belief -- a leap of faith, if you will. My point has always been, Mormonism, despite its superior attitude, is just a faith like any other faith.
My comments about relativism pertain mostly to Alan's use of postmodernism as it has been presented by FARMS and other Mormon defenders. This brings up a point you made earlier that I wanted clarified. You said the 'classical' postmodernists were 'far from'relativism. Who exactly were you thinking of? From what you have said, you do not seem to deny that some current postmodernists and social constructionists are relativistic. Is that correct? Is not the belief that 'truth'is socially constructed imply relativism? I'm aware that some postmodernists try various ways to get around the relativism charge, and some Mormon apologists avoid discussion of the problem, but I detect in our discussions with Alan that you are aware of it. Are you a social constructionist who denies relativist implications? In your version of Mormonism, is revelation the only sources of truth?
When I said, 'Both Blake and Clark have equivocated on the issue of 'supernaturalism,''I meant that you both believe that what is usually discussed under the heading 'supernatural'(in the sense of against nature) can be explained in naturalistic terms if nature were fully understood. In declaring you are naturalists and materialists, albeit in a different sense normally understood by that term, you have become positivists to those who hold the traditional interpretation of supernatural. That is, under Alan's definition of positivism. That was my question to him.
I found your discussion Bayesian inference quite interesting. As I said, this is one of the areas that I will have to look into in greater detail. Not that I think inductive arguments need cumbersome devices in order to be considered compelling. Nevertheless, I hope you will oblige me if I take advantage of your expertise in Bayesian Epistemology. You say, 'I'm dubious of the place Bayesian inference ought to hold epistemologically.'What do you mean? Do you mean it works better in some situations, like the computer applications you described, but not as evidence, as in the case of using it to decide historical debates?
You say, 'one can argue the 'system' in which the judgments are made matters.'What do you mean? Do you mean, as above, it doesn't work with historiography?
You say, 'even in Bayesian approaches if one judges that one has experienced many spiritual phenomena then how one judges other spiritual phenomena will be radically different.' Different than what? And how does this apply to Blake's critique of me? Are you saying that having personal spiritual experiences will effect your interpretation of similar events one reads about? Are you saying that the mere fact that one has had spiritual experiences entitles one to be (1) biased, (2) an infallible interpreter of which are true, which are delusion, and which are prevarications? Are you not admitting that Bayesian approaches are subjective and different results are possible depending on who is using it in the situation that we are proposing? If I read you correctly here, then I do not understand why you disputed my statement that Bayesian statistics were 'a subjective method that can be used to make highly improbable things sound probable.'I, of course, had reference to those who use it to prove God exists and the resurrection happened. You seem to agree that some people have misused it. So, to use it under the circumstances that Blake suggested that we use it, in your professional opinion, is that a misuse of Bayesian inference?
Your are correct that the reference I used in regard to the use of Bayesian inference and miracles is a discussion of Hume's frequentist argument. You dispute my use of this source because Mormonism's concept of miracles is more physicalist than traditional Christianity's. Do you disagree with the observation I quoted from the article: 'The balancing of probabilities is of no use until it is decided what goes into the balance -- that is, what constitutes the evidence that is to be subject to the balancing of probabilities'?
Dan, regarding language, philosophers are often making more careful distinctions that "regular use" language doesn't. That's why reading philosophy, especially initially, can be frustrating. One of my professors used to joke that 90% of any philosophical argument was agreeing upon terminology. Generally there are reasons for the word choice. But you are right, it can be intimidating and confusing for those not used to it. I'll try to be a little more careful in my word choice. I had assumed more philosophical background on your part. My mistake and I apologize.
Regarding subjective reports, I meant subjective reports we don't already have independent reasons to accept. i.e. does a subjective report ever ground the novel? You're trying to narrow it down to religious experiences, but I think that a mistake as if you appeal to a general principle then we ought examine that principle in situations outside of where you apply it. Otherwise we end up just asserting our conclusions, albeit in a way that many might not notice right away. So we should avoid all circular logic, unless we make the circle sufficiently large. (As one professor wrote on a paper of mine criticizing Socrates)
Put an other way, I don't mind skepticism. Indeed I enjoy reading skeptical articles. It is when some move from skepticism into stronger assertions of falsehood or dishonesty that my goat gets raised.
You claim those who champion [authentic religious communications] do so arbitarily. (word changed as I find supernatural so misleading a term) In other words your claim is that it is all circular. We believe because we believe. There is no reason for our belief, and no grounds. But that is exactly what is under discussion. I already know you believe this. I just don't think you have good reason to believe it. I think the position of "I don't know but I doubt it" is defendable. I don't think the stronger positions you espouse are. They end up simply ascribing intellectual dishonesty to those you disagree with because they disagree with you.
If I might make a comment, I think that this charge is what gets people upset and is at the heart of the Signature/FARMS "war." Further I think many on both sides make this charge of the other. In both cases I typically think the charge unfounded. At a minimum it is not a terribly nice thing to accuse people of. I tend to take the charitable interpretation that neither side realizes what they are doing and that this isn't quite as intentional as it often seems. But it definitely is unfortunate.
Regarding legitimacy, I'm not entirely sure what you mean. I'd say that in most parts of the academy to treat religious entities seriously as real entities is impermissible. A few departments, such as liberal theological schools, allow it. But by and large you won't be accepted if you attempt to do it. Thus you can't be treated as legitimate if you invoke such entities seriously. I think religious believers can still write in the academy if they overlook questions about "what really happened" in religious experiences and merely focus on how people react to them. And, to be honest, I typically think that the fairest thing to do unless one is conducting a rigorous scientific study of some phenomena - something historians are rarely equipped to do.
So as I said, I don't begrudge you your naturalism. Clearly your position is the mainstream view. However if we view legitimacy not in terms of social legitimacy but logical legitimacy then clearly things become far more complex. As I mentioned, Bertrand Russell once said upon seeing a white house that we could legitimacy only say it was white on the side we see. It is the problem of our assumptions that I think are open to philosophical attack, especially when our assumptions differ from what is acceptable to the academy.
I think your critique of apologists is perhaps overly simple - especially in terms of postmodernism. (And, simultaneously this is why I critiqued Goff for bringing in arguments that aren't necessary) The fact is that Mormon religion takes as fact things the academy doesn't. Simple as that.
"I admit that I cannot conclusively prove all cases are delusional, circumstances do not permit it, but a good case can be made showing that a majority are. And neither you nor Blake have refuted this evidence."
Well, I've not even tried because it simply is an area I don't have much knowledge. I'd suggest, however, that unless you have some scientific survey of people in general you can't make the above claim. At best you can say that the majority of people studied are delusional. But that's a rather significantly different poll.
I'll certainly agree that I find historic-psycho-anlaysis questionable at best. Unless you have the patient to analyze it simply isn't accurate. Period.
"Since you mentioned 'evidence'(so I can't be accused of being a positivist), have you noticed that I have all the evidence and you have nothing? Why is that?"
Because you disallow subjective evidence. (i.e. my own experiences)
"All anyone can talk about is the phenomenon as it is experienced, in the brain."
Dan, you're talking like a positivist again. (grin) I don't accept the above. Indeed I think you'll find that there is a significant position in science typically called scientific realism that denies the above charge. Einstein, for instance, strongly rejected the claim that all that counts is phenomena as it is experienced. Many of us claim knowledge of stuff outside the brain and that we can discuss such matters in mind-independent ways.
"Now, if you do not think my case is 'probable,'I think you should admit that it is at least 'plausible'and therefore not the compelling case that some have argued."
Certainly I don't have problem with that. And perhaps Blake and I were being a tad too picky with terminology. However to people with backgrounds in science or philosophy, probability has a rather precise meaning.
I should add that I never found the testimony of the various witnesses that key. At best I think they provide a reason to start ones inquiry. But I've never argued they provide a ground to believe.
"Now, for subjective evidence to count, you must explain the following: (1) how do you explain contradictory subjective experiences, both in competing religious traditions and during the life of the same person;"
The same way I account for contradictory public measurements. I embrace a strong sense of fallibilism. i.e. that we can make mistakes. That's why consistency and investigation of ones claims is so important. However if I have some "private" experience correlated with some other phenomena, and I can consistently repeat this, then I think that is good enough, so long as I take a critical stance.
Well my parents just arrived from Canada to see the baby. So the rest will have to wait a few days.
OK, I'm waiting for iMovie to generate some baby films for DVD. So I can finish my post (which already was longer than I'd intended)
"You said the 'classical' postmodernists were 'far from' relativism. Who exactly were you thinking of? From what you have said, you do not seem to deny that some current postmodernists and social constructionists are relativistic. Is that correct?
I think there are people who label themselves postmodernists who end up fitting under the term relativists. I tend to think there are a lot amongst various people without training in philosophy but who've read a few philosophers (Nietzsche, Derrida, Foucault) oversimplify them or get caught up in fads. I've blogged alot about this the last month. As to naming names, I can't think of any names off the top of my head. There are a few I suspect, such as Baudillard, but I rather think that may be more due to my ignorance than their thought. So I'm loath to claim anyone as a relativist or the like without being familiar with their thought. And I've just not read many philosophers who really fit the bill. Most I've met who fit the bill are students engaging in shoddy thinking - especially from English and Literature departments. (And the arts - lots of artists think that way) But even there I'd never draw too broad a conclusion. There are lots in those fields who are a little more careful.
"In declaring you are naturalists and materialists, albeit in a different sense normally understood by that term, you have become positivists to those who hold the traditional interpretation of supernatural. That is, under Alan's definition of positivism. That was my question to him."
I'm not sure that is true. But my problem is really more with the term "supernatural" which I find so problematic. I don't think it is terribly meaningful. I can't think of anything I really fit into the postivist camp in. Note that I'm not denying phenomena nor demanding that metaphysics is meaningless. I'm not even saying all knowledge consists of positive, empirically verifiable claims. I've no problem with even the laws of nature being far more fluid than I think they are. My claim is that the term supernatural is overly vague and muddled and we ought to use a different term with which we can be more precise.
"Nevertheless, I hope you will oblige me if I take advantage of your expertise in Bayesian Epistemology."
For the record I'm not an expert in Bayesian epistemology. Far from it. I know relatively little about it. I am familiar with Bayesian methods in computer programming. They are, of course, related. But I just want to make that clear. Bayesian epistemology is quite interesting, and I have a few papers on it I've not read yet. But it is definitely one of those things on my "to study" list. So there may be some subtleties I'm not aware of.
"You say, 'I'm dubious of the place Bayesian inference ought to hold epistemologically.'What do you mean?"
Bayesian inference is a belief based system. It calculates the strength of a certain belief in terms of previous beliefs. As such it is a kind of coherentism. (i.e. epistemic strength or how strong our justification for a knowledge claim is found in terms of how consistent a set of beliefs are and not necessarily how well they correspond to something) Generally we set these belief values based upon encounters with previous phenomena. i.e. encountering phenomena X results in behavior Y.
The problem I have with this is that often the belief in question hasn't been encountered before. So you have to do some kind of similarity calculation, often based upon parts of the phenomena. But it seems to me that this is problematic for truly novel phenomena. At best you start believing and then modify your beliefs based upon some kind of success. I can see how to do this in computer programming because we, outside of the program, can state with absolute certainty something fits or not. (i.e. this mail message is junk or that shape is the letter A) However epistemologically that can't be done since the bayesian inference is what is justifying things.
As I said, I'm not well versed on its use in epistemology. I can think of how I'd use it for the religious issue. But I simply don't know how to consider it for the general case. So to me, I'd engage it pragmatically. (i.e. as a kind of correlation between a phenomena and a correlate). But as I move down that line, it seems that eventually I'm just doing pragmatism and not bayesian epistemology.
"Are you saying that having personal spiritual experiences will effect your interpretation of similar events one reads about?"
Yes.
"Are you saying that the mere fact that one has had spiritual experiences entitles one to be (1) biased, (2) an infallible interpreter of which are true, which are delusion, and which are prevarications?"
Well, one is always entitled to be biased in ones beliefs. (How could one be other than biased?) Certainly I'm not saying one is infallible nor inerrant. Far from it. I embrace a healthy fallibilism. No, all I'm saying is that if you've encountered a phenomena before, it is more believable if someone else claims to have encountered the same thing.
So some kid from some primitive tribe that's never heard or seen of cars (assuming there are any left) would be far more likely to disbelieve a friend describing seeing a car than someone who has seen three or four cars before.
It's really not that philosophical a point. It's just a recognition that we tend to be more skeptical of the unfamiliar. Bayesian inference will capture that mathematically.
"Are you not admitting that Bayesian approaches are subjective and different results are possible depending on who is using it in the situation that we are proposing?"
It depends upon what you mean by subjective here. They are objective in that they follow a rather determinate mathematical formula. They are subjective in that they relate to the strength of belief. So one must plug beliefs in. (i.e. my belief that certain shapes are an A)
"I do not understand why you disputed my statement that Bayesian statistics were 'a subjective method that can be used to make highly improbable things sound probable.'"
Because Bayesian statistics only deal with using past probabilities to determine future probabilities. Therefore if one uses them to make the improbable probable then one is using it incorrectly. It falls out of the math.
"So, to use it under the circumstances that Blake suggested that we use it, in your professional opinion, is that a misuse of Bayesian inference?"
Blake's comments were too vague for me to answer that. My guess is that it is just the calculation of future probabilities in terms of present ones. If I've encountered a phenomena before, then that'll affect the probability of the future phenomena. If you haven't encountered the phenomena before, then that will also affect it. (Typically making it very improbable)
Blake, a few comments about your definition of 'supernatural'and notions of extra sensory perception (ESP).
You say, 'What I mean by 'supernatural' is 'not included within the nature of things.''Are we not talking about supernatural power acting upon nature? Certainly, the term 'supernatural'is as relative as the word 'natural.'Such power is not supernatural to supernatural beings, that is, if there are such beings. It only seems supernatural to us. This would be true whether materialism is affirmed or denied.
You say, 'It is not contrary to the nature of things for people to have spiritual experiences and for what is experienced to be possible (i.e., possibly real) given the nature of the world as I see it.'I have never said 'spiritual experiences'were contrary to the 'nature of the world.'The dispute is not whether or not they happen, but whether they are part of nature or super-nature. Your world-view also includes a belief in delusion, so why do you choose to ignore that part of your reality when assessing the experience of the BofM witnesses?
You argue that science in the past has expanded it's ideas about nature (e.g., Einsteinian relativity), so perhaps one day science will also include the spiritual as part of the natural world. You do not know how often this paradigm-shift argument is employed by pseudo-scientists to support their crack-pot theories. I responded to a similar argument advanced by Clark in my last to him, so I won't repeat it here.
You say, '... people like Dan exclude as a possibility ... that spiritual experiences are in the nature of things are even possibly real -- mind independent.'Despite your skepticism, I have said that YOUR INTERPRETATION of 'spiritual experiences'is 'logically possible,'but highly improbable. On the other hand, I have not denied that 'spiritual experiences'occur, as you imply. Nor have I denied that they are part of 'the nature of things,'as presently understood. In other words, such experiences do not compel us to expand our definition of 'the nature of things.'Normally, a paradigm shift occurs to explain anomalies, and we have none. In brief, I believe spiritual experiences can be explained within the current naturalistic paradigm, while for some unexplainable and arbitrary reason you think a paradigm shift is necessary.
Here, as in other places, when you speak of mind-independence, I suspect that you are conflating (spiritual) materialism and (metaphysical) immaterialism.
You say, 'Mormonism has simply expanded the notion of what is in the nature of things to include the 'spiritual' or what is not experienced by the five senses.'Your notion of non-sensory 'visions'sounds like those who talk about ESP. Let me assure you, there is no evidence for ESP either. Don't forget we have five senses and a brain. The brain has no access to the external world, except through information it receives from the senses. In some instances, the brain does not know the difference between information received from the senses and memories. When the latter occurs, we call it hallucination. Dr. Ghazi Asaad defines hallucinations as 'perceptions that occur in the absence of corresponding external stimuli. ... [and] may involve any of the senses.'Meaning hallucination can involve sensations of sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste. Hallucinations can also involve none of the senses, but rather the belief that thoughts are being inserted into your brain by an unknown entity.
Although hallucination occurs without external stimuli via the senses, our brains are filled with sense-memories that can be accessed through electrical stimulation, dreams, hallucination, and hypnosis. Under certain circumstances, one can relive experiences long forgotten. The brain can also draw on various sense-memories to create new experiences that seem real, as in dreams.
You say, 'Because I believe that human experience is not limited to what can be derived from the five senses (I am not an empiricist) or proven by a logically necessary argument (I am not a rationalist) I believe that the realm of the real includes more than what the five senses deliver to us--and so I deem it perfectly natural to have experiences of things that don't involve the five senses.'
Not even an empiricist says the 'realm of the real'is limited to the 'five senses.'He might insist on empirical verification, which is a different thing. For example, we do not have direct sensory experience of the atom, but we have indirect evidence for its existence. However, you seem to have a contradiction when you define the 'supernatural'as part of the natural, then imply the possibility that science could one day expand its understanding of the natural to include things once considered 'supernatural,'and then say that such things are not discoverable through the senses.
There is also some ambiguity with how you would solve the mind/body problem. You perhaps sense the problems you create when trying to include the 'spiritual'within a naturalistic world-view. When you talk about what the senses 'deliver to us,'you mean 'to our brains.'We can't leave the brain out of the equation, because the brain is quite capable of creating its own perception of reality without sensory input. So you seem to me to be begging the question when you say this non-sensory information is 'deliver[ed]'to our minds from the outside. Nevertheless, I'll ask you the same question usually asked of proponents of ESP: what structure in the brain receives this extra-sensory information?
Blake perhaps thinks, as did Descartes, that mathematics is a form of pure reason. But without access to the outside world there would be no knowledge of numbers. Even to arrive at the number two, one would have to have the understanding of me/not me. This is a function of the orientation area of the brain, which continually processes information from the senses. When information from the senses is cut off, through meditation for example, there is a breakdown of the self and a feeling of Unitary Being occurs. In this state, numbers are impossible.
Do you not see we are describing the same phenomena in almost the same terms, only you add God to your interpretation. We both say the phenomena have no external components, that it happens in the mind/brain, that it's part of nature, that it's real to the person experiencing it and seems involuntary and independent of the experiencer's mind. You just believe that God is manipulating events. This is not much different than secular and sacred interpretations of historical events. Many historians do not realize that visions are also historical events, which causes them to shy away from discussing them. There is really no difference in analyzing subjective accounts of historical events and 'spiritual experiences'--neither of which are privileged sources of knowledge. Nor are the experiencers the final, inerrant interpreters.
Interesting post, Mr. Vogel. I hope you'll forgive me for entering the fray a little late here. Since I om entering it rather late, and since I hope to avoid beating a horse that you and others consider already dead, I'll offer something in the order of general comments.
Communicating with Philosophers
I tend to agree with you that discussions with philosophers can be maddening, because philosophers sometimes emphasize precision when they should be focusing on understanding and being understood. Karl Popper was fond of saying that precision should be pursued only so far as it is strictly necessary. Donald Davidson's essay "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" illustrates something that is self-evident outside of philosophy; viz., that we can be well understood even when precision is lacking.
Numbers and Self
I think that you're straying too far into purely speculative territory when you assert that "without access to the outside world there would be no knowledge of numbers." In fact, I'm wondering if your statement isn't demonstrably incorrect.
Without some primitive capacity to recognize numbers, humans simply wouldn't be able to use them. Number and quantity would have the same status that scents would have in beings lacking the sense of smell. Moreover, I see no reason why numbers must be premised on the notion of a unified self rather than vice versa. Indeed, your use of the term "Unitary Being" seems to presuppose a workable notion of number/quantity in order to be meaningful.
Positivism in history
For my part, I think that it's self-evident that something akin to the positivist approach to history (which I'll loosely define as the constellation of beliefs associated with the notion of "objective history") is valid, since it is traceable back to Thucydides. We can argue about exactly what this approach is (e.g., whether it contains all of the premises proffered by its critics), but I think that many criticisms offered against it are plain silly (Alan Goff's included).
FARMS scholarship
My problem with FARMS book reviews is that they generally cry out for more interventionist editing practices. Nearly every FARMS review I've read should have been about 1/3 of its length. I'm not opposed to long articles per se, but these things just seem to ramble on forever. Am I the only one that thinks this?
On Your (Mr. Vogel's) works
I'll provide the following feedback about your books from the point of view of a doctrinally conservative Mormon (I'm comfortable light-heatedly referring to my outlook by saying that I've "drank the Kool-Aid"):
The weakness that I've seen in your articles, Mr. Vogel, is related to the synthesis of the evidence that you present. Specifically, I don't generally find that you've done a really good job of tying together your evidence. It's been quite some time since I read them (well over a decade, if my memory servers), but my memory of your books Indian Origins and Religious Seekers is that they brought a lot of facts to bear on the issues, but did very little to explore their implications. On the other hand, your essay in American Apocrypha on anti-Masonic rhetoric in the Book of Mormon says at one point (and I don't have it before me, so I'm sure you'll correct me if I wrong) something to the effect that the Book of Mormon is basically a protracted Jackson-era, anti-Masonic harangue. And I do not believe that it is justified by the evidence that you present.
That said, I find your works quite well written stylistically (as opposed to the FARMS articles). They are good reading. Moreover, I continue to seek out your work because you seem to be a tremendously effective researcher, and I am invariably impressed by the sheer amount of information you are able to present. I should add that I thought your essay from American Apocrypha is among your best, though I find Mervin Hogan's arguments on the topic to be more persuasive.
David L., thanks for your comments. As to your criticisms of my early works, you are correct that they were weak in exploring implications. This was largely due to the fact that my own ideas were evolving at the time. You might find more of what you're looking for in my recent JOSEPH SMITH: THE MAKING OF A PROPHET. My ideas continue to mature and evolve, but I think I have a clear understanding of Joseph Smith and early Mormonism now than I did nearly twenty years ago.
Regarding my essay on anti-Masonry and the Book of Mormon, I'm sorry you weren't convinced by my discussion. I'll have to try harder. Nevertheless, it would be extremely unrealistic on my part to expect to convince everyone. Your self description (as someone who would 'drink the Kool-Aid') tells me that you are pretty hard to de-program. So your criticism tells me more about you and your ability to resist than it does about my ability to persuade. In my view, you have just as much responsibility being convinced as I do at being convincing. I'll try harder, if you promise to try harder.
For the record, I do not think the BofM is 'basically a protracted Jacksonian-era, anti-Masonic harangue.'This oversimplifies the BofM and my views. Hogan's work does not even approach the level of sophistication, analysis, and research offered in my essay. His only objection to the anti-Masonic interpretation of the BofM is that Freemasonry is not a 'secret society.'Keep in mind Hogan was a Mason and would have the same objection to the accusations of nineteenth-century anti-Masons. The fact that you regard Hogan as more persuasive than my arguments tells me that your judgment of my works is clouded by a very strong need to believe and to support that belief on the thinnest of evidence. In contrast to my essay, Hogan gives no indication of having read the BofM or of having actually done the research in the pre-1830 anti-Masonic sources necessary to support his opinion or to overturn the unanimous interpretation of the first readers of the BofM.
Finally, you obviously misunderstood my comments on numbers and Unitary Being. My observation comes from studies in neuro-theology, which can explain how the brain produces a feeling of mystical union with the divine, or what is called Absolute Unitary Being, Unio Mystica, Nirvana, etc. Through meditation sensory-input going to the orientation area is blocked. This area tells us what is us and not us, where out body ends and the not-us begins. When this area receives no information from the senses, the us part expands endlessly giving the feeling of oneness with everything, even God. The ego breaks down and there is no concept of us and the other; not even the concept of a personal God exists. (See, e.g., Andrew Newberg and Eugene D'Aquili, WHY GOD WON'T GO AWAY: BRAIN SCIENCE & THE BIOLOGY OF BELIEF.) In other words, no concept on which to base the notion of numbers. So my argument is that mathematics would not exist without the senses, and therefore not a product of pure thought.
As far as positivism is concerned, you'll have to take that up with Alan Goff.
I don't mind being held accountable for my biases, which is why I don't mind being up front about them and why I'm happy to discuss them light-heartedly. That said, I don't think that your characterization of me as "pretty hard to de-program" is consistent with the candor of your rest of your response. So I'll happily take it as a tongue-in-cheek characterization.
Even so, regarding the convincingness of your attempt to persuade: you're trying harder, and so will I.
Before I read Hogan's arguments (just a few years ago), I tended to be sympathetic to the view that the Gadianton robbers were Masonic in nature (I felt this way even before I read your earlier essay in New Approaches many years ago). Moreover, I never found Peterson's response to you especially persuasive (and it was too long, to boot). So I'm surprised to read "The fact that you regard Hogan as more persuasive than my arguments tells me that your judgment of my works is clouded by a very strong need to believe and to support that belief on the thinnest of evidence." I'm also surprised that you seem to believe that my aside about your essay provides some serious insight into my intellect. At any rate, I hope to convince you otherwise by elaborating on my offhand remark.
Make no mistake: I agree with your statement that "Hogan's work does not even approach the level of sophistication, analysis, and research" offered in your essay. In the Hogan essay where I found his argument, he mentioned it merely as an aside. And it's this argument, quite apart from the rest of his essay, that I find to be compelling. I understand Hogan's argument to be as follows:
(a) Membership rolls of Masonic lodges are publicly available
(b) Schedules of Masonic meetings are publicly available and Masonic meetings are open to the public (apart from the ceremony portion).
(c) Minutes of Masonic meetings are available to the public.
(d) The location of Masonic meeting places is public information.
(e) These are key points that are true of every Masonic lodge.
(f) Joseph Smith was familiar with (a) - (e) above.
(g) It's unlikely that Joseph Smith would repeatedly portray Masonic societies with characteristics that were the exact opposite of key characteristics that he knew were true of Masonic lodges.
Therefore, it's unlikely that Joseph Smith would have always portrayed a Masonic group with exactly the opposite characteristics as (a) - (e) above.
I find this to be a reasonably compelling argument, and I don't believe that you addressed it in the American Apocrypha essay.
I think that you make a very good case that the Book of Mormon uses anti-Masonic rhetoric to describe certain groups. But it does not follow from this that the groups it so described are necessarily Masonic. This is not my programming speaking--it simply doesn't follow.
Perhaps you think that this is simply splitting hairs. But I am no more surprised to learn that the Book of Mormon contains remnants from early 19th century America than I am to learn that the King James Bible contains remnants from Jacobean England.
Moreover, we should privilege first readers' interpretations only insofar as we believe the Book of Mormon to be entirely a product of their environment; the first readers' impression of an English translation of Tolstoy doesn't count for much. I think that this makes your argument from first readers impression circular.
I still disagree with your argument concerning numbers. The "oneness" notion entails a number rather than the absence of number. Moreover, I don't know what sense to make of your statement that "mathematics would not exist without the senses, and therefore not a product of pure thought." Since there neither senseless nor environment less behavior or thought, I'm not sure that anything at all exists without sense or environment.
Also, I'll be buying "Joseph Smith: The Making of a Prophet," and adding it to my reading list. I look forward to reading it.
Lastly, thanks for your prompt and thoughtful reply.
Dave L., when I said 'de-program,'I was playing off your allusion to the tragic ending to the Jonestown cult drinking poisoned 'Kool-Aid.'I thought you were admitting to being an extremely loyal Mormon. My comment about your preference for Hogan's arguments was influenced by your initial self-description and by the fact that you seemed to brush off my research and arguments for something so inconsequential and superficial. It was not a comment about your 'intellect,'however, it was an observation, admittedly based on slight exposure to you, about how your apparent emotional commitment has compromised your judgment. Nevertheless, I'm eager to be proved wrong -- or else this exchange would be a complete waste of time.
I'm glad we agree that Hogan's work is outdated and in no way refutes my thesis. At most, it might be said that he proposed one issue for which you could not refute. From my point of view, his argument was based on ignorance of the BofM and the pre-1830 environment. I thought the discussion had evolved so far beyond Hogan's work that it was no longer relevant, but perhaps I should have included it in my essay. As I explained, Hogan was a Mason who obviously did not see Freemasonry as a secret society. Similarly, Mormons do not see themselves as a secret society, although they have secret ceremonies, which they call sacred. But how Masons and Mormons view themselves is not at issue here. It's how outsiders view them. Anti-Masons called masonry a 'secret combination'and a 'secret society.'This Hogan admitted, but said it was the description of the prejudiced. Why did anti-Masons call Freemasonry a 'secret society'? Because they had secret ceremonies, secret signs, secret words, and, as they believed, a secret plan to overthrow the government. Admittedly, some of this was rhetoric and not reality -- but it was the perceived reality. Now, look at the BofM and you see the same things attributed to the Gaddianton robbers. Don't forget that the BofM also describes the existence of similar 'secret combinations'in the last days in the U.S. at the time the book would come forth. The reasons Hogan gives for Masonry not being a 'secret society'are hardly important in light of the post-1826 abduction and murder of William Morgan and the environment of the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson.
When you say that Joseph Smith was familiar with Hogan's pro-Masonic arguments, you fail to realize that he was also familiar with anti-Masonic arguments. Remember Joseph's 2 December 1830 letter to Hyrum, warning him to 'beware of the freemasons.'As I said in my last post, what could be said of Smith could also be said of any anti-Mason. Would you say, for example, that anti-Masonic publishers like Thurlow Weed and W. W. Phelps knew that some Masonic meetings were open to the public? Of course, they did. Yet they described Masonry as a 'secret combination'for the reason I have given. If the latter-day 'secret combination,'described as possessing secret words and signs and seeking to overthrow the U.S. government, is not Masonry in league with the Jacksonians, what was it? Remember, the group existed at the time the BofM appeared.
If you agree that the BofM contains anti-Masonic rhetoric, my job is half over. That's more than Hogan would admit.
You say, 'But it does not follow from this that the groups it so described are necessarily Masonic.'Remember, at the end of my essay I listed the characteristics of the latter-day 'secret combination'(singular) and I argued that it was the Jacksonians, not specifically the Masons. Of course, this is an interpretation, not a 'logical necessity' or 'deduction,'but I have yet to hear a better interpretation.
You say, 'But I am no more surprised to learn that the BofM contains remnants from early 19th century America than I am to learn that the King James Bible contains remnants from Jacobean England.'If everything was as you describe, you might be correct. But they are not. The situation with the BofM is different than what you would expect from a normal translation. That's why Blake Ostler has suggested that Joseph Smith made inspired expansions to the text. It is not always a case of flavoring. In my essay on anti-Universalist rhetoric I tried to show how the supposed pre-Christian authors used New Testament passages as anti-Universalist proof texts. That's more than flavoring.
When we consider the interpretations of the first readers and the environment in which an author and his audience communicate, we are trying to take advantage of their vantage point. Otherwise, we could be in danger of committing presentism. This is rhetorical and historical criticism. Without this kind of information you could have never admitted that there is anti-Masonic rhetoric in the BofM, which was likely due in part to the opinion of the first readers. Regarding Tolstoy, I would be more interested in the author's intended audience, rather than the first readers of a translation. As to this being a circular argument: yes and no. Whether you believe the BofM is nineteenth-century or ancient, the opinion of the first readers count. Remember, Nephi said that his prophecies would be understood by the first readers, so the BofM itself privileges that audience. I would add, however, my goal in using the pre-1830 sources is not always to prove the BofM is modern -- I think the lack of archaeological evidence proves that -- but rather my purpose is to better understand its message.
I don't have much to add to your recent comments Dan. I tend to think you vastly overstate the significance of first readers. That's not to say their views aren't interesting, but I think it gives us far less insight on the text itself than you suggest.
The only other comment I'd make is with regards to neurotheology. I tend to think that the aspects of religious experience it deals with (the "feel" of the experience) are less significant in LDS thought than in other religious experiences. That's not to say Mormons don't care about the "feel" of the experience. However the "feel" of the experience is only but one sign within the experience. (By sign meaning anything which signifies something else) In many religious experiences it is the "feel" that is most important - especially in mystic experiences. But, as I'm sure you are very familiar with, Joseph Smith downplayed such aspects focusing in on intelligence communicated.
I think that the real issue for discerning revelation is making the correlation between various kinds of experience and phenomena in our day to day experience. Once through repitition and habit we can develop a code (basically a connection between sign and thing signified) we then can build upon that.
Those Mormons who claim to be able to utilize personal revelation I think, consciously or not, develop this. I'd also say that the very nature of this connection entails a very vague sense of knowledge.
My point, however, is simply that pointing to neuropsychology doesn't tell the Mormon much, positive or negative, beyond that there is an experience. It is the connection between experience and world that is most important.
"Let us say there is real communication going on in the "religious experiences." Is there anything, Gad, Dan, or Addicto would accept that would justify them?"
I'll answer your question in good faith that you'll answer mine.
What would it take for you to be convinced that real communication is going on in "REs" that if real, would contradict your beliefs as a Mormon?
And further, are your beliefs as a Mormon, to you, confirmed by evidence at least that strong?
Dr. Steven Greer, a well known contraversial UFOologist, takes tour groups through a kind of "boot camp" training where they go into the mountains and get hands on experience contacting aliens and drawing alien craft to the camp ground. He and others who have gone out with him, swear that on many occasions they've had very interesting encounters with real, live alient crafts. This guy, if he's a nutcase, certainly knows how to sell himself, he's actually put together some of the best military testimonies of aliens and "black projects" and seems to have had (I havn't followed up too close here yet) audience with many top US and foreign officials to discuss these two subjects.
From what I can tell, anyone can join one of his "workshops". It's just a matter of 700$ and a week PTO time. Hell, I'd do it, if I could convince myself there is at least a 1% chance to see an alien ship. But then as I've dug into it, it's not the skeptics that try to expose the group, or lack of testimonial for the group's success. But you know, it's hard to tell exactly first of all, what they're really claiming. Because while there are all sorts of flare signaling, and high traffic locations frequented, precise minutes detailing the physical motions of the aliens in the ship, there's also telepathic communication involved, not to mention telepathic "guiding in" of the actual alien craft. And as former group members have said, you come prepared with everything, geiger counters, audio tape, cameras--the works, but the cameras always fail. You know, the angel always takes back the plates (and of course there are the standard good reasons for this). At least that's what it seems like to me.
The reason why I keep bringing up aliens, is because in my own little world, there's a grain of seriousness in my UFO web studies, I do think it would be really cool if aliens were visiting the earth. So with that favorable bias, I can then ask myself your question, what would it take to convince me? The issue here being the validity of the RE, or anomolous contact experiences (I think they are roughly the same kind of thing from an outside perspective). I guess, outside of very impressive external evidence, I'd have to experience it myself--to even seriously consider it, let alone believe it.
What I wonder, is if a Clark not raised in the church, but with the same science and philosophy background were to encounter and study the church for the first time with all this knowledge, what kind of probabilities he'd be assigning to the 3 witnesses in his own private Bayesian calcualations.
For the record, once again, I'm not advocating a Bayesian epistemology. That was Blake. I only commented that there was a Bayesian epistemology and that Bayesian methods are very successful. However I think that for Bayesian methods to be successful they must rest upon a non-Bayesian analysis to start things off. But, as I mentioned to Dan, I'm simply not well read on the topic of Bayesian epistemology. So I can't speak to it much more than what I've said. Perhaps Blake can.
As for some religious experience to convince me something I might say is within Mormon doctrine is false - it would simply be the experience occurring in a normed behavior so that a strong consistent correlation can take place. At that point I think the message can be trustworthy. That doesn't mean without error, of course. As you know I am a healthy fallibilist. I think one can think one knows and not necessarily know. So one ought always re-evaluate ones beliefs. (I think that important as well due to the issue of memory, but that a tangental point)
As for space aliens, I don't disbelieve in them but allow for the possibility. As to how I could be convinced, if I saw a space ship or some other alien communication that I could falsify or test in a normed fashion, that would be good enough for me. Thus far that hasn't happened and so I am "agnostic" towards alien life but rather doubt they are around.
But if I were to move beyond that position to actively arguing that they don't exist then I think I'd be exceeding the evidence. I may think that accounts of alien appearance may better be interpreted as hags dreams, much like Dan ascribes hallucinations to spiritual experiences. But I'd never argue (as I think Dan would) that hags dreams can be taken to account for all the experiences. While I may be doubtful of many alien abduction or encounter stories due to things exterior to the stories, I simply say, "I don't know what happened" to many more.
"As to how I could be convinced, if I saw a space ship or some other alien communication that I could falsify or test in a normed fashion, that would be good enough for me. Thus far that hasn't happened and so I am "agnostic" towards alien life but rather doubt they are around."
But you have had the equivelant normed fashion test for the three witness account? (Or for some other church matter whereby, the three witness account would necessarily follow.)
I'm still trying to figure out Clark, what it takes for YOU to accept "religious experiences." ; )
Gad - you must have missed where I said we couldn't know what the three witnesses experienced. I tend to give them a little more slack, but clearly I do because I've had spiritual experiences myself and not because I have any real insight into what happened. (i.e. I merely see the class of experiences as plausible)
I have just returned from Europe. Imagine my surprise to find that Dan Vogel has declared himself the winner of some great contest that I didn't know had even occurred! I don't have time to respond right now -- but I will. I will also respond to Addictio -- though given his tone I'm beginning to feel that he too is more interested in winning some imaginary contest than a real dialogue. I am more interested in a discussion than being right. In any event, let me just state for the record (because it is likely to be some time before I will get time to respond to the voluminous texts by Dan) that there are so many glaring errors in reasoning and such a self-presumptive approach that my response will have to be piece-meal to address them. It seems to me that Addictio ends up committing the very errors that he attempts to attribute to me (let's call it the mirror princpal) and it is rather obvious that Dan simply doesn't understand probability theory. I'll get around to it -- someday.
Just to clear matters up. I have not proposed a Bayesian theory as a way of promoting a probability analysis of religious experiences to determine whether they are are "real" or not. I have stated over and over that I doubt that any probability theory is up to the job. However, the only theory that could apply, it seems to me, is the Bayesian theory. I have conducted my own probability test using that theory (which I am in the process of doing again as a test) applied to the experience of the 3 witnesses. The probability came out at .766 in favor of their experience being "real." However, as I said I am examining my mathematics again and the underlying value judgments that are inherent in application of the theory. What the theory may allow us to do is to take the kinds of probability judgments that the opponents of view that the 3 witnesses experienced something real are likely to accept and then show that the probability judgments they make don't follow and in fact are mistaken.
Just to be clear, I don't believe that a Bayesian theory or any other probability theory can tell us whether the 3 witnesses experienced something "real" in my sense. I don't promote a Bayesian epistemology. It just seems to me to be the only viable candidate for making the kinds of assertions about what is probable that Dan is wont to make -- and needless to say I believe that Dan doesn't know what he is talking about. His comments betray the fact that he doesn't have a clue about applying such probability judgments to the evidence -- as I will dicuss at length later. As for Addictio's attempt at reducing my view to a number of false dichotomies, I'll have to address that at greater length later.
Mr. Vogel, you state, "we agree that Hogan's work is outdated and in no way refutes my thesis. At most, it might be said that he proposed one issue for which you could not refute." I had to chuckle when I read this, since it so thoroughly subsumes my argument to your assumptions. Just the same, it mistates my position with regard to Hogan, which is that he provides a compelling argument (restated above) that the secret societies in the Book of Mormon are not essentially Masonic, that I think that the argument (as restated) is logically valid, that I think the argument fatally undermines the thesis of your essay, and that I don't believe that you've refuted the argument.
You seem to agree with premises (a) through (f) of the argument. Your objection appears to be with premise (g). And to refute premise (g), you refer back to the inaccuracies of the anti-Masonic rhetoric. But let's be clear: the primary characteristics of the Book of Mormon's secret societies include behaving exactly opposite (in very important ways) of how Joseph Smith knew Masonic lodges to behave. The Book of Mormon contains no evil orders whose membership rolls are public, who publish minutes of their meetings, whose meeting houses are clearly labeled, etc.
Moreover, the Book of Mormon civilizations cycle in and out of apostasy, but nowhere do we find a group of plotters using an open club as cover for their dastardly deeds. A fortiori, we find no open club morphing into the horrific secret combinations of Jacksonian anti-Masonry. Instead we find anti-Masonic rhetoric used to condemn societies that are always already evil and closed; the al-Qaeda of the American continent, if you will. This is no minor omission, and I do not believe that I'm demanding "a literal of reflection of what was actually happening" (to use your words--I reread your essay on the subway this morning). This is my argument for premise (g), and I conclude that the Masonic hypothesis is incorrect.
You state that, "The situation with the BofM is different than what you would expect from a normal translation" regarding its traces of early 19th century New England. Nevertheless, translations of religious documents--especially ancient religious documents--are never quite "normal translations." There is more than a little Jacobean England (and Tudor England, given the influence of earlier works) to be found in the King James Bible. There is even more of Jerome to be found in his Vulgate, and more yet of Alexandrian Judaism to be found in the Septuagint.
I do not see how your defense of first readers' insights addresses the issue of privilege. You seem to accuse me of inveighing against environmental analysis altogether, as though I'd insist that Dickens' social outlook tells us nothing about his novels. This is false, and it has nothing to do with privileging first readers' impressions of the Book of Mormon. I'm not at all sure what you mean when you say that your argument is and is not circular. Nephi doesn't privilege his first latter-day readers any more than he privileges you and me.
Also, I didn't mean to neglect your essay on the witnesses' testimony. I did not mention it in my initial post because so much has already been said about it, I was becoming conscious of space, and it got displaced by my compliment to your essay on Masonry in the Book of Mormon. But I did thoroughly enjoy it, and I found it quite interesting. But I do think that when it came to analyzing the data, you rather overstated your case.
I appreciate your willingness to argue your point and your interest in having clear reasons for believing the way you do. I'm just an average sort of fellow, and it is exciting to have the opportunity to discuss these things with you directly. I'm eager to be proven wrong as well, and (failing that) to have my beliefs qualified, clarified, or curtailed.
Blake, my apologies for thinking you were espousing Bayesian epistemology.
Clark, it's not so much the terminology that's frustrating -- I can look up the terminology -- but rather the awkward and elliptical wording, hedging, and vacillating between particular and general concepts. I'm sure some of our communication difficulty is due to haste.
Your follow-up to our discussion on subjective reports is an example of what I'm talking about. In avoiding concrete statements, you have left me with only a vague understanding of what your are trying to say. Responding would require so much deciphering and work that I would be making your case for you before I would be in a position to answer it. You ask if the subjective ever grounds the novel, but you don't answer it. You suggest that I'm applying a general principle that should be examined outside visionary situations, but you do not define that general principle or give examples that would make your point. So it is not possible for me to determine in what way you think I'm 'asserting [my] conclusions'or using 'circular logic.'
I do not agree that a skeptic has to stick with 'I don't know but I doubt it.'It's certainly a safe assertion, but not a necessary one. Sometimes the 'I doubt it'part is asserted strongly, maybe too strongly, but I see nothing inherently wrong with it. It usually is in response to some flimsy excuse by the subjectivists for not dealing with the evidence. Although you have not specified what they are, I do not believe my 'stronger positions'are inherently indefensible. That judgement very much depends on who is judging and how motivated they are in avoiding the consequences of the evidence. Don't get me wrong. There are legitimate differences of opinion, but in some instances the resistence is unreasonable and the explanations offered far fetched. I do not feel compelled to accept such rationalizing as reasonable differences in opinion. And I do not believe restating the evidence in stronger terms is an accusation of 'intellectual dishonesty.'It is certainly not done because someone simply disagrees with me, but when they are being evasive. Nevertheless, your advice on being more charitable when interpreting of people's motives is well taken.
I think you missed the point on legitimacy. I was not defining legitimacy from the Academy's perspective, but from the point of view of the apologists. 'Apologists for the supernatural argue that since true objectivity is impossible, faith-based history is as legitimate as secular-based history. ...'
Actually, I like your reference to Bertrand Russell and his rejection of inference, because it sort of reminded me of you and Blake. I'm fine with saying the house is probably white on all sides. Of course, there is a slim chance that I would be wrong, but most likely I would be right, and, most likely, you would agree with me.
Regarding, surveys of hallucination. There have been many surveys of the general public, some more random than others, but all exhibiting very consistent results. The most comprehensive survey in 1991 was a random selection of the general population of 18,572 people, which was compared to the 1894 survey and found to be 'remarkably similar.'
I understand your hesitancy with 'historic-psycho-analysis.' I would agree with you on Freudian psychoanalysis. While writing the bio on Smith, I examined some of the methodologies used by psycho-historians. While I found some insights interesting, I decided against using such methods. I use more accessible psychological perspectives, including family-systems theory, which is a more sociological analysis of family dynamics. I'm not even sure psychoanalysis is 'accurate'on living people. I'm not saying it has no value -- just acknowledging that it's another of the many imperfect tools we are forced to work with. But it's better than nothing. The same is true of other psychological perspectives. I have already argued on this board that all historians, especially those doing biography, are bringing to their work a theory of human behavior, whether consciously or unconsciously. So the question is not whether one does psychology, but whether one does it well or not.
Regarding the psychology of religious and mystical experiences, how can you not utilize new understandings in assessing the past? Actually, what we used to call the 'psychology'of religious experience is now coming under the 'biology'of religious experience. This is exciting to me. It means knowing better who we are as homo sapiens.
In my reading of neurotheology, there is a distinction between religious experiences and mystical states. Mystical states are associated with Nirvana, Brahman, Toa, Unio Mystica, or Absolute Unitary Being, involve a different brain dynamic than do 'lesser mystical states,'such as divine presence, born-again, burning in the bosom, and religious awe. These lesser states primarily involve the limbic system, the same area that drives our primal urges. Unlike the state of mystical-union, those who experience the lesser states retain a belief in a personal God, who is usually endowed with all the prejudices of the believer.
You say, 'I think that the real issue for discerning revelation is making the correlation between various kinds of experience and phenomena in our day to day experience. One through repetition and habit we can develop a code (basically a connection between sign and thing signified) we then can build upon that. Those Mormons who claim to be able to utilize personal revelation I think, consciously or not, develop this [skill]. I'd also say that the very nature of this connection entails a very vague sense of knowledge.'
So here we finally have it. This is the 'subjective evidence'that you think I have been discounting because of my 'positivism.'I do not want to be disrespectful of your personal experiences, but there are other possible interpretations of those experiences. You seem to acknowledge this with your concept of spiritual fallibilism. I think that's healthy, although not typical of Mormons.
The Mormon notion of 'spiritual witness'is not unlike the Methodists. It is more a confirmation process than a revelation of new information -- a working it out in the mind, then asking God for confirmation. Joseph Smith also taught that such experiences were personal revelation and did not pertain to others, especially the church. He also said, according to David Whitmer, some revelations were of God, others of man or the devil. Presumably, he believed time would demonstrate which revelations were which. I tend to think that time has shown that at least some of Joseph Smith's revelations were of man. Nevertheless, I do not see anything wrong with listening to your inner voice (at least the good one, grin); I try to do that myself. That is part of the spiritual quest. But I understand that this is a personal truth, not a universal, external truth. It is not reliable and has no authority for answering historical and scientific questions.
Now, a further word of caution about being overly confident about the 'correlation between various kinds of experience and phenomena in our day to day experience.'Generally, humans are not logical in the way they engage the world. They have a tendency to invent ad hoc hypotheses to explain contradictory or unexplainable events. They also have a knack at making meaning out of vague data. So if we hold a providential view of history, we go through life looking for and creating evidence supporting the view that God is manipulating events to help us or teach us things. It is a full-proof system, because nearly every event can be construed to have meaning. In my study of psychics, I learned that humans also have a tendency to emphasize the similarities and ignore the dissimilarities, which is called 'retrospective falsification'and 'selective validation.' This is similar to remembering dreams that come true and forgetting the multitude that do not.
To avoid being called a positivist does not entail my having to accept every claim a subjectivist makes. Everything subjectivists say is not the truth, and rejecting their interpretations is not the same as being a positivist. Declaring that you are a subjectivist does not privilege your interpretations. The idea that there is fallibilism in spiritual matters seems to open them up to various interpretations, including the possibility that hallucinations/visions are delusional. So I'm not necessarily denying your evidence, but rather questioning your interpretation.
You might not regard the BofM witnesses as key, but, as I have mentioned, they are a stumbling block to many. I have tried to remove that block so as not to distract from the evidence against BofM historicity.
The similarities between visions and the like only indicates similarities in the human condition, not the reality of such experiences. I knew someone who said he knew Joseph Smith's first vision was true because he had a similar experience of the devil binding his tongue so that he could not pray. This person was obviously delusional. Is a schizophrenic justified in believing his delusions are real because they are similar to other schizophrenics? No one has denied that spiritual experiences are universal. The question is: how do we interpret them? How much authority should they have? To acknowledge that some people who have similar experiences are delusional and do not know it while at the same time denying the possibility for our experiences is to miss a very important point. Meanwhile, a 'critical stance'is good.
On postmodernism: I was looking for names of postmodernists who were not relativists. I guess you think Derrida and Foucault fit that description. Are there any others? The fact that you could not think of any postmodernists who were relativists seems to imply that you are not aware of the problem. Do you recognize social constructionists as postmodernists? And do they not believe that truth is a social construct? Is not relativism implied in such a position? Is this not part of the postmodernist critique of science?
Regarding your comments about the significance of the first readers. On subjects like anti-Universalist and anti-Masonic rhetoric, the interpretations of the first readers are supported by an examination of pre-1830 sources. This is strong indication that the BofM is engaging the nineteenth-century audience at some level. It certainly cannot be dismissed out of hand as some think. There is more to that picture, of course. The ways that the BofM is unique and contributes novel twists on familiar themes is also important. But you can't make that determination without examining Joseph Smith's environment.
Now, you have mentioned the FARMS/Signature feud several times without my commenting. But now I will. FARMS penchant for ad hominem, general nastiness, and intellectual snobbery is a matter of public record. So far, at least, I have not seen the same things coming out of Signature. At most, there has been a protest about FARMS's tactics, which is only natural. But I have observed a conscious effort to remain above the fray. About the closest Signature has come to ad hominem was in Quinn's 2nd ed. of MAGIC WORLD VIEW, where he accused his critics of being polemicists, which I think is sometimes the case. I agree that most of the time, those who write for FARMS are sincere. But at other times, I think they know better. It is quite apparent that a purely scholarly debate is not their intent, but they are waging primarily a political battle of expediency.
Blake, welcome back. I don't know where you get the idea that Addictio and I have declared ourselves the winners. There are no winners in this game. Nevertheless, please feel free to enlighten us if we have misunderstood you.
Dan, I don't have much time to write this week. But I think we're getting down to the point where we may just have to agree to disagree.
Regarding vagueness, I think recognizing and acknowledging vagueness is an important part of intellectual honesty. Perhaps it is largely due to my reading of the American pragmatist, C. S. Peirce, but I believe we know vaguely and that this knowledge then becomes more and more determinate as we progress in our investigations. I think that true of all knowledge but I find it especially helpful in understanding personal inspiration and revelation.
Regarding vagueness with regard to the discussion, alas, that is in part simply due to trying to explain technical points briefly. I face the same problem trying to explain physics. I could be more precise and specific, but then my already volumous writing would balloon even further. In some things I can give you the answers you want, in others I can but gesture towards where you can find it.
Regarding postmodern philosophers who aren't relativists. My point was that I suspect none of them are relativists. Indeed I tend to see the relativist charge as a consistent boogey man with which philosophers label each other. This tradition goes back to Plato's labeling of Protagoras. That's not to say there may not be a few real relativists out there. However they seem rarely to be found in philosophy departments but instead in English, literature, anthropology, and related departments. About the only fair charge of philosophers I can see is the danger in reading them by readers who aren't careful and may turn into relativists.
Regarding mental phenomena, I think you miss the point. The issue is the correlation and development of a code. (i.e. a normed connection between a sign and what it purportedly signifies) My point is that to simply point to the part of the brain which can generate part of a phenomena begs the question of the connection of that phenomena at a given time and some other phenomena.
To give a clearer example, it is akin to pointing to part of a brain that can produce visual images in consciousness without ever asking the question of whether what I see has any connection to other experiences.
This is, unfortunately, a rather common failing in analyzing the Mormon view of spiritual experiences. It puts the "feel" or immediate experience under analysis without ever asking the relationship to other experiences. Of course when that sort of analysis is done spiritual experiences make no sense. Neither would any other kind of analysis of experiences in the brain. It isn't what state the brain is in that counts but what state the brain and the exterior world is in.
This is why most faithful Mormons who think they have spiritual experiences tend to scoff when critics simply attack Mormon spiritual knowing as knowing by burning in the bosoms. The real phenomena is much more complex than that.
Regarding the FARMS/Signature debate, both sides tend to make similar points. I don't consider the debate to purely be the debate as waged in the published papers. Since Signature doesn't publish anything akin to the review FARMS does, such a comparison would tend to miss out on a lot. I do agree that the second edition of Magic World View was quite bad though - at least as worse as the worst of FARMS. Which was unfortunate as he had a lot of very good points and arguments in it. If ever there was a great book within a problematic book, that was it. I think some serious editing could have made that a fantastic book.
Do I think social constructionist as relativists? No, I think that vein of neo-Kantianism is about as far from relativism as one can go. However that would require a bit of a discussion of Kant to explain why. To argue that knowledge of things is mediated by consciousness is not to say that we can make things whatever we will. Merely that our experience of the thing will be dependent upon the relationships we find ourselves in.
I'm not a neo-Kantian, although clearly Kant does factor into some of the positions I hold. (I also don't consider myself a Kuhnian, although I think he made some excellent points - but Kuhn is anything but postmodernist)
I knew someone who said he knew Joseph Smith's first vision was true because he had a similar experience of the devil binding his tongue so that he could not pray. This person was obviously delusional.
And that is where we depart. I clearly do not think that entails them being delusional. I'd be willing to entertain the postulate that such experiences really were hag's dreams, especially if the phenomena took place between the ages of 17 - 24. With extra evidence I might even entertain some mental illness. However I would not, based solely on that comment, think them obviously delusional. Far from it.
Thus the divide.
Hi Blake. Good to hear from you again. As I said in my last post, I'm more interested in understanding the logical character of the arguments being made than in deciding who is wrong or right in their judgments about the strength of a naturalistic account of say, the reported experience of the 3 witnesses.
Sometimes, as in the post I last responded to, you write as if the issue to be considered or debated is whether claimed spiritual experiences are merely possible (are "possibly real") or not. My response has been that a claim asserting logical possibility is so weak that it is not worth debating. I think perhaps you actually hold that view as well, but if so then I don't understand the point of affirming, as you do above, that spiritual experiences are possibly real.
The more interesting issue to me is the nature of your (apparent)claim that the only way to make legitimate inferences about whether a particular claimed spiritual experience is "real" in the sense of say, being a genuine instance of communication with an angel, a being who exists independently of the person's experience, is by using a Bayesian probability analysis. I hope you will give us a detailed example of how such an analysis would be constructed and work, using the witnesses or some similar hypothetical as an example.
Once you've done that, and I hope you will, I'll be in a better position to understand what you're saying. Let me try to be clear about something else in advance, though. You also will need to explain which group or class of events/experiences are, in your view, covered by the logical claim you're making. The logical claim would be that for a certain class of events/experiences, the ONLY way to make legitimate inferences about whether they involve mind-independent entities -- (like the above angel example) or (more broadly) are caused by a source existing independently from the experiencer's mind -- is by undertaking a B-probability analysis. Unless you specify what that class or group is, I don't think anyone could judge the scope and strength of the claim you're making.
Dan said: "I don't know where you get the idea that Addictio and I have declared ourselves the winners. There are no winners in this game. Nevertheless, please feel free to enlighten us if we have misunderstood you."
Dan, I don't think that the following statement can be taken as anything other than a declaration of winning a game in which we went "toe-to-toe":
"And neither you nor Blake have refuted this evidence.... I have stood toe-to-toe with Blake and, in my opinion, have shown that his confidence in the testimonies of the BofM witnesses is based on incomplete information and a lack of knowledge about hallucination and hypnotism." Frankly, this statement is just so much chest thumping in my view. Do you really think that I haven't read and carefully assessed virtually every statement by the witnesses that has been published or is available in the BYU and UofU (as well as Yale) archives? We can do better than such claims of superior knowledge, can't we?
Addictio said: "Blake's position appears to be that unless an argument can be expressed in terms of a Bayesian probabilty claim it cannot be used to support a naturalistic account of a reported supernatural event. I can't tell what he means by that. I can't tell, for example, if he believes this to be the case about all claims about past events, or only claims about the occurrence vel non of genuine "spiritual" experiences or events." That doesn't even come close to my view, as my most recent comments should make clear. My point is that if we make probability claims we are making a modal-type claim. It is not merely possibly the case, and it is not necessarily the case, but it is something that we ought to accept because it is probable given the evidence. However, such claims of probability, if they amount to anything more than merely an expression of preference or opinion (which is what I believe Dan is really doing) must be based on some sound way of assessing probability. With spiritual experiences, it seems to me that the only theory of probability that could apply is the Bayesian theory. If someone has a better suggestion, I'm all ears. As I said earlier, I don't think that even the Bayesian theory is adequate to the job of assessing such probabilities. It's just the best we can do. As as I also said, I think that Dan is not really doing the kind of work that could support a sound judgment of probability, but merely expressing his opinion that follows already from his naturalistic biases. But then what drives his conclusion is not evidence but a predetermined bias. I take it that Alan was pointing that fact out and it is important to explain why someone who looks at the same evidence comes to a very different conclusion.
However, that said, it is important to assess whether Dan's naturalistic world-view (which I believe reduces to a positivistic world-view although he is now backing off of the kinds of statements he made at the beginning of this discussion) is superior to some alternative. I don't think that we can assume that merely because Dan has biases and assumptions that his view can be dismissed -- since we all have biases and assumptions. Thus, it is the underlying view that needs to be assessed to see what drives his foreordained interpretation of evidence. Comparing and assessing world-views is very complicated work and I want to take it carefully because I don't believe that his view is sound -- but showing it is a very large discussion. For example, if we are all subject to delusion merely because we are human (as Dan claims), then Dan must make allowance for this fact in his world-view, it seems to me, and provide some expnanation why we we are that way. What possible evolutionary function could such predispostion to delusion have? Moreover, Dan cannot except himself from the predeliction for delusion and self-deception. I think that Dan is right to the extent we are in fact predisposed to self-deception (which is the beginning of my view of "original sin").
On the other hand, the view that we are all predisposed to spiritual experiences argues for something like a sensus divinus as Calvin expressed it -- it a sense of the divine that reveals itself to us just because we are the kind of beings that we are. Thus, we are predisposed by nature to have spiritual experiences -- and that seems to me to be evidence of a spiritual reality rather than a predispostion to delusion as Dan takes it. I don't want to oversimplify the matter -- but I cannot see any reason why Dan's judgment of the meaning of our predisposition to spiritual experiences is preferred to a "real spiritual" explanation. Dan assumes that such experiences are evidence of spiritual delusion and I see it as evidence that we are fit with a sensus divinus that leads us to long for God. How can we compare the two interpretations of the same evidence? It seems that one's underlying assumptions may well dictate how one views and weighs the evidence and, if so, then there is no such thing as bare evidence but only evidence that has the meaning we give it. I'm not sure that there is a way out of that impasse. We just see things differently.
BTW, I may choose to publish my Bayesian assessment of the 3 witnesses precisely to show that the kinds of "probablity" judgments that Dan makes are not sound. I haven't decided yet (it's about 35 pages already).
I came to Bayesian probability through Carnap's attempts to formalize induction, and I thought that its most significant practical application was open source junk mail filters. Imagine my surprise when I find that it can be used to assess the validity of the witnesses to the Book of Mormon!
On the other hand....
It looks like I overlooked your clarification above, Blake, ie, your denial of any and all probability claims (including any using a Bayesian model) about whether spiritual experiences are "real."
In that case, my response is rather different, and has already been suggested in my previous questions and comments. If your position is that there are never rational grounds for judging the adequacy or strength of a naturalistic explanation for ANY claimed spiritual/supernatural experience, I think that is, at a minimum, overbroad. Moreover, as I've suggested, when you have responded to Dan by characterizing David Whitmer's subsequent conduct, or made arguments based upon the status of the witnesses as "high-functioning," or have distinguished between the experiences of the 3 witnesses and instances of what you termed "mass hysteria," you are acknowledging that empirical evidence can in principle be relevant to the adequacy or strength of a naturalistic account.
I don't know why you would want to maintain (if this is indeed your position) that ALL claims about spiritual experiences, irrespective of their claimed content, circumstances, and the behavior and personalities of the experiencers, are equally immune from interpretation and plausible explanation using naturalistic assumptions and inferences. Because the cases vary, such a position is both overbroad and unnecessary.
Note that nothing I've said is meant to demonstrate affirmatively that the three witnesses actually experienced a delusion rather than an intervention by God or angels. That is a separate issue from what kinds of evidence can in principle count as evidence supporting an inference that an experiencer's own explanation/account is less plausible (or less likely) than a naturalistic one.
The comments were so popular on this particular entry that I started up a a few more pages. If you post a comment here it will go to the last page.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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