For those jumping here from the sidebar, the post all of this is in connection to was a discussion of Alan Goff's claims about positivism at Signature. While I'm sympathetic to many of his elements, I think Goff is perhaps conflating naturalism with positivism. It also appears that he is pushing the "everything is apologetics" position a tad too far. Even if, as I agree, everything is apologetics in one sense. I think as a pragmatic matter we separate them out by degree.
This has become the thread that never dies. Although it is an interesting enough topic with the key actors in the debate contributing, so I certainly am not complaining in the least. Even so, I've added a few extra pages of comments. If you post a comment here it will go to the last page.
Addictio: I don't maintain that all experiences are on par. If we can determine that a particular experience is caused (in a hard sense) by an abnormal psychological etiology then we can rule it out as an experience of a "real" state of affairs. For example, visions as a result of fevers and schizophrenic hallucinations seem to be so explained. However, it is a mistake to assert that we can explain visions and spiritual experiences of people who are normal functioning in the same way -- and that is what Dan attempts to do. In the philosophy of religion, there is a very broad-based discussion of these notions parting from Alvin Platinga's epistemology of religious experiences where the linch-pin is precisely that the experiences are not the result of abnormal states. It is a very involved discucssion and I have avoided bringing it up because it seems that there are very few who are at all acquainted with the literature and the dialogue. From your comments, I take it that you are not aware of this discussion. However, it is time to begin that discussion. I will take it up in the days that follow.
However, I deny that Dan can simply equate the experiences of those where we know the etiology of the experience (such as hypnotic states, delusional hallucination and so forth) with experiences in "high-functioning individuals" in the Plantingean sense.
Just so that you're aware, my background is in neurophysiology or psychobiology and in particular in explaining abnormal behavior such as sociophathy in apparently normally functioning indivduals -- with emphasis on "apparently" because there is in fact a psychobiological comcommitant related to the "posivitive spike pattern" in the alpha wave during waking states that inopart explains such behavior. If someone could show me that all spiritual experiences have such a merely biological basis or are the result of abnormal pscychology, then they have explained the experiences without recourse to a "real" spiritual world. But of course no one has come close to such an explanation and Dan merely assumes without any evidence at all that such experiences can be equated.
I find his assertions that Joseph Smith hypnotized the 3 witnesses to be laughable. Is it logically possible? Of course. But as you point out, so are mermaids, so that's not a very important point. What he must show is that there is some basis for comparing abnormal states and experinces with the quotidian experiences that accompanied the experiences of the 3 witnesses. Sitting on a log and having a discussion is far from the type of circumstances that raise red flags for me. While I think that Martin Harris was somewhat unstable in his judgment, I see no evidence that he was mentally unstable -- and David Whitmer is the ideal witness in my view because he later changed his mind and yet refused to change his testimony regarding the experiences that he had and he is clearly a "high-functioning" individual in the Plantingean sense. So is Oliver Cowdery.
So you are right that not all experiences are on par and naturalistic explanations can be given for some "hallucinations" -- but to simply equate such experiences with those of persons having normal functioning faculties is a mistake and what I claim is that there is no way to assess the so-called probability claim that what these individuals experiences is somehow "unreal." There is simply no good way to assess that probability without begging the question in favor of an exclusivistic pan-naturalism.
Further, when I say that spiritual experiences are in the nature of things for LDS, what I mean is that LDS believe that we have spirit-matter bodies with spirit-matter senses analogous to the five senses that we have that allow us to experience realities in a different dimension not open to our five senses but still totally within our nature as a humans. In this sense, we have a sensus divinus that is natural for us -- so we are not making empty claims of supernaturalism where God causes states in us; rather, we have actual experiences that are natural for us to sense but not with the five senses of the body.
I don't have time to enter the discussion fully, so I'll just mention in passing that Dan's epistemology is built on an assumption of Lockean epistemology where he reduces everything to what is experienced by the senses and the brain (which has no experiences of its own and knows nothing of itself) and what the senses deliver to it. Needless to say, I don't think that his rather Lockean epistemology is worthy of serious consideration and as a pscyhobiologist I am appalled at the sheer ignorance of his statements. But that is a discussion for another day.
Blake, what paper by Platinga are you thinking of? I'm very sympathetic to reliabilism, although I think like Dennis Potter I'm a little more inclined towards Alston. (Although to be fair, I really need to read more Alston before saying that - he's definitely among the "to read" list)
I think, reading behind the text, that Dan might say that given certain symptoms, the assumption that one is high-functioning is what is under analysis. As I understand you, you are saying that these experiences can't simultaneously be taken as evidence for mental illness (whether temporary or chronic) and then the conclusion used to establish that they weren't spiritual experience. It is circular logic.
I fully agree.
However at the same time Dan could simply say that there has never been a case where these phenomena turned out, under scientific analysis, to be interpreted correctly. Put an other way, there has never been really significant results from para-psychology. Therefore, if we can establish that this phenomena took place, we can via other situations, assume that it is evidence that they aren't trust-worthy.
While clearly I'm sympathetic to your position, I think that this inductive claim avoids it being pure circular logic. At the same time, it is this inductive claim itself that seems to be where Mormons and their critics disagree. And, to be honest, I don't think it is a place where the two sides can reach agreement, simply because of what each considers plausible and, at a gut level, probable. At a certain point Dan will simply do the Missouri rejoinder of "show me" and Mormons with these sorts of experiences will say "show me my experience was false." Neither side can provide the evidence the other requires, and thus we are at an impasse.
Which, I must confess, makes these conversations less interesting -- that's the main reason I don't hang out at ZLMB anymore, for instance.
Oh, I finally got around to reading up a little on Bayesian epistemology tonight. (Even though it now appears no one was advocating it) The big problem was, as I suspected, generating the probability that some hypothesis obtains given certain evidence. I'm not sure how one can generate that in a non-question begging fashion. Further, the whole issue of whether there are real degrees of belief isomorphic to the set of Real Numbers seems difficult to accept.
Clark,
For what it's worth, I've never seen myself as asking for a demonstration that your spiritual experiences or any spiritual experiences for that matter, are true. You noted in our ET conversation, that the existence of aliens is plausable, I wasn't sure if you were going as far as saying that the Steven Greer telepathic communication is plausable as well. Since you asked the question of what it would take for a skeptic to be convinced, I've been trying to find out how you deem other similar anomolous experiences, and how you would have thoughtful outsiders consider them. I don't believe I have the tools to test the validity of either. If you have or others have some insights into how to do that, and in a way that can be consistently applied to experiences that may seem nutty to you as a mormon, but similar to the mormon experiences from an outsider view, I'm open. The best a "debunker" can really do is provide a sound, more everydayish explanation. What I can agree with you on, if it's indeed your position, is that sometimes the "debunker" explanations just arn't very good, but yet they're all too readily accepted. To give you an idea what I mean, I don't at this time, believe people are being abducted by aliens. I don't believe psychologists at this time are in need to seriously consider abduction as a viable possibility. But I also do not buy the "hag dream" explanation. And I think many skeptics accept the "hag dream" too readily simply because it provides ammo against abduction believers.
Clark et al.:
I agree largely with what you say. With respect to Plantinga, I have in mind his book "Belief and Proper Function" in which he rejects foundationalism and adopts the view that proper function of epistemological or cognitive faculties at arriving at belief is the key to warranted beliefs. That is essentially what I have been arguing here. It is found here http://www.haus-von-nomos.com/wpf.html His book Warranted Christian Belief is also essential. It is found here http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/?view=usa&ci=0195131924
Plantinga has been criticized by a number of philosophers, for instance here http://www.geocities.com/critical_discourse/re.htm
I also think that what Plantinga has to say about Methodological Naturalism is crucial to this discussion. he argues that a thoroughgoing naturalism is self-defeating in much the same way that positivism is bankrupt. You can find his discussion here http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od181/methnat181.htm and http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od182/methnat182.htm
As I said, it is a very large discussiona and getting into it require some background and I am still deciding how to approach it given the complete lack of familiarity with the literature and the arguments by those participating on the list.
Blake, I have Warranted Christian Belief and thoroughly enjoyed it, although there are a few chapters I need to go back and reread. I was more pushing for some links for all the other readers. This thread is actually one of the most heavily read. I often get 30 different readers during any given day. (Although I suspect a lot are just visitors clicking on the recent comments pane) Still a lot more people read this particular thread than you might expect.
As for how to introduce it, I agree, it is difficult. At best I can suggest the Stanford article on Analysis of Knowledge. As I said, I'm very sympathetic to Plantinga and moreso Alston although I think I've found Williamson's recent book the most persuasive discussion of knowledge I've read. Were I to point to a place I think we differ from Dan and company, it is over the internalist vs. externalist conception of knowledge. My sense is that he is adopting an internalist view, which I find deeply problematic even if we don't buy into reliabilism.
Gad, I strongly disagree with your claim that, "the best a 'debunker' can really do is provide a sound, more everydayish explanation." I think a great example is the Amazing Randy who simply asks people making claims to repeat them while he controls the hidden aspect that he thinks falsifies them as authentic "psychic" phenomena. That's not to deny that "everydayish explanations" are helpful. However I think they often avoid some serious issues and merely make us less interested in the claims than really debunking the claims.
As you say, you don't think psychologists need investigate the claims. But note that was what I was getting at with my rejoinder to Dan regarding publishing in the academy. Within the academy there are some topics that aren't interesting or aren't acceptable. If you do research in those areas it is politically problematics. I just think we ought to call a spade a spade and recognize that it is politics.
I should also say that I don't think psychological studies within parapsychology are bad. I think the studies themselves get an undeserved rap (although clearly there is some contamination to the whole field by the less than scientific investigations by some). I also think that the lack of any evidence for any "psychic phenomena" ought to count. However religious studies tied to psychology are far more recent and have thus far only studied a few phenomena. (Such as the feel of religious or mystical experiences) I think the results of these studies have been far more open than some realize, although clearly the studies have vast potential for being misused. (By either side) I think, for instance, Dan clearly pushed the studies of neuro-theology into a direction unwarranted by neglecting the difference between a token and a sign-function. (i.e. the nature of the phenomena and what the phenomena ought be taken to indicate in a given environment)
David L., I'm sorry if I overstated your position. I will try to be more careful. I'm not sure you're an 'average sort of fellow.' I detect a precision and tightness of composition in your writing that is obviously more than pedestrian. This is confusing to me. I find it difficult reconciling this with your positive assessment of Hogan's argument, which I consider of no consequence. Nevertheless, I will continue explaining my reasoning on this matter so that, even if you remain unpersuaded, you will at least understand where I'm coming from.
To review, you agree that 'Hogan's work does not even approach the level of sophistication, analysis, and research offered in my essay.' You also agree that I have made a 'very good case that the Book of Mormon uses anti-Masonic rhetoric,' although the group(s) described are not necessarily Masonic. Nevertheless, you find Hogan's anti-anti-Masonic argument 'compelling.' You have now restated this last part in stronger terms: 'I think [Hogan's] argument fatally undermines the thesis of your essay.' Let's see if I can at least soften that assessment.
To begin, I would advise caution since we are discussing authorial intent, which is a difficult matter for either of us. But you have the more speculative position since you are essentially asking why certain things are not present in the text, while I'm discussing what is present, which you agree sounds like anti-Masonic rhetoric. Yours is an argument from silence. No matter who the author intended to describe, some things are going to be left out of the description. That is unavoidable, so, in my opinion, it is unreasonable to impose your expectations on the text. We always want more evidence, to be sure, but we must utilize whatever evidence we do have. Let me add, we're not looking for the most perfect argument, only the best.
Hogan's argument is essentially that the BofM is not attacking Freemasonry because Freemasonry is not a 'secret society.' Imagine someone saying to John Kerry, 'I think Bush was alluding to you when he said a good leader doesn't flip-flop on the issues.' And Kerry responds, 'He must have been talking about someone else because I'm not a flip-flopper.' It's not what the Masons thought about themselves that counts here, it's the perceptions of their critics. The fact is that the anti-Masons believed Masons were a 'secret society' and a 'secret combination' seeking to destroy America. If you agree that there is anti-Masonic rhetoric in the BofM, why do you think its author would treat the Masonic institution fairly or accurately?
We should not assume that Hogan's definition of 'secret society' is the same as Joseph Smith's or any of his contemporaries. Indeed, Hogan admits that his definition is a correction of what has been commonly understood by both Masons and non-Masons. On page 297, he states:
'Freemasonry is a seriously misunderstood subject -- even among the rank and file Masons. We must not overlook nor forget the fact that American Freemasonry has achieved magnificently in confusing both itself and the general public as to what the distinguishing basic attributes of the Masonic Order really are. It should be strictly borne in mind that true Masonry is neither a SECRET nor a FRATERNAL association in the generally accepted meaning of those two words.'
I think it is unwise to take Hogan's definition of 'secret society,' so obviously designed to serve his own rhetorical goals, and then assume Joseph Smith held the same definition without any justification for doing so. There is also the assumption that Joseph Smith would not hold erroneous definitions, that is, if we accept Hogan's definition as THE definition. In historiography it is known as the idealist fallacy, which, according to David Hackett Fischer, 'consists in a presumption of rationality in human behavior.' He adds, 'A presumption of logical consistency is as unjustified as a presumption of the opposite.' Your position makes the following interrelated assumptions: (1) Joseph Smith's held the same definition of 'secret society' that Hogan did, (2) Joseph Smith applied that definition consistently, (3) Joseph Smith did not have other definitions of 'secret society,' (4) Joseph Smith did not skew his definitions for rhetorical effect. If you are going to assume such things about Joseph Smith, why not assume them of Smith's contemporaries who also used anti-Masonic rhetoric, like Thurlow Weed and W. W. Phelps? When we do, your premise (g) and conclusion therefore become manifestly erroneous:
'It's unlikely that [Thurlow Weed and W. W. Phelps] would repeatedly portray Masonic societies with characteristics that were the exact opposite of key characteristics that he knew were true of Masonic lodges. Therefore, it's unlikely that [Thurlow Weed and W. W. Phelps] would have always portrayed a Masonic group with exactly the opposite characteristics as (a) - (e) above.'
You say, 'And to refute premise (g), you refer back to the inaccuracies of the anti-Masonic rhetoric.' You counter by pointing out the same inaccuracies in the BofM as if they should not be there, when you have admitted the BofM reflects anti-Masonic rhetoric. This seems a contradiction to me.
Yu say, 'I think that you make a very good case that the BofM uses anti-Masonic rhetoric to describe certain groups. But it does not follow from this that the groups it so described are necessarily Masonic.' No one said the Gaddiantons were Masons, only that they were Masonic-like. On that, we seem to agree. The question seems to be: are these similarities there because of Joseph Smith's method of translation or his method of creating narrative? I think the first readers saw much more than 'remnants' of anti-Masonry in the BofM. Martin Harris reportedly called it the 'Anti-Masonick Bible.' The primary goal of my first essay was to determine the possible ways in which the first readers interpreted the book anti-Masonically. So I dispute the implication that allusions to Masonry are limited to rhetoric. Several of the stories in the book have plausible allusion to the Morgan affair and 1828 election.
You say, '[T]he primary characteristics of the BofM's secret societies include behaving exactly opposite (in very important ways) of how Joseph Smith knew Masonic lodges to behave. The BofM contains no evil orders whose membership rolls are public, who publish minutes of their meetings, whose meeting houses are clearly labeled, etc.' So far, you have not given examples of 'opposite' behavior; the examples given are arguments from silence. You give other examples later, but they are also from silence. So my answer to you is the same as I gave to some of Bushman's and Ostler's arguments from silence. Typically when assessing similarity one looks at what is said, not at what is not said.
Additionally, we differ on what is 'primary.' In the BofM, the 'primary characteristics' of both the Gaddianton robbers and latter-day 'secret combination' are the secret words, secret signs, and secret plans to obtain political power and wealth. These characteristics are integral to the BofM's narrative and cannot be explained away as 'remnants' from Smith's environment. This is the link the BofM makes between the Gaddiantons and the latter-day 'secret combination' seeking America's overthrow. So who at the time of the BoM's coming forth best fits this description? Do you have a better theory? If I am correct about the BofM's reference to latter-day Masonry, then the book itself makes the comparison between Masonry and the Gaddaintons.
By your method, barring a clumsy plagiarism, no one could ever speak about influences on any text. Yet you seem willing to accept the idea that the BofM reflects anti-Masonic rhetoric based on the same allusions to Joseph Smith's environment that Hogan wishes to disallow. There are different degrees of similarity, and conversely dissimilarity, but that does not mean there was no influence. Don't you not think it was an extraordinary coincidence that the BofM happened to come forth in the very place and at the very time when the anti-Masonic agitation was at its highest?
While you think these 'omissions' from the text are major, I regard them as minor. It's like an impressionist painting, you don't expect everything to be there to make sense out of it. If the painting looks like a bunch of paint blotches, well you're not necessarily wrong, but neither am I. What I'm saying is, your judgement that an omission is major or minor is a personal opinion that is impossible to argue about. I can only add that normally in scholarship arguments from silence do not count for much.
You seem to treat the first readers as separate from the environment. To me they are the link between the environment and the meaning of a text, especially when multiple readers say the same things. I don't interpret the first readers the way you set it up -- as proof of modern origin -- but as a means of exploring the rhetorical dynamic between the book (not necessarily the author) and its intended audience. This is true whether the book is ancient or modern. As I explained, my reasoning is not circular since I'm not trying to prove the BofM modern, but rather trying to understand its message better. In this way, questions of authorship and authorial intentionality become secondary and get answered along the way. Sort of like, gaining a better understanding of the theory of evolution usually makes the scientific creationist position untenable without having to address every counter issue directly. Indeed, some issues will never be answered. But, again, we are not looking for the perfect position, only the most defensible.
You say, 'Nephi doesn't privilege his first latter-day readers any more than he privileges you and me.' Forgive me, but as far as the BofM is concerned we aren't supposed to be here. The coming forth of the book was a sign that the end was near. Of course, we can argue about how near, but instead I will ask how you interpret Nephi's promise to be 'plain' and his expectation that his latter-day readers will understand his prophecies? There does not seem to be misunderstanding among the first readers with regard to the identity of the 'secret combination' seeking America's overthrow, but sharp disagreement among us.
Forgive me if I get off on a tangent here and tell a story about myself. In my early twenties, when I began researching Mormon history in a serious fashion, and I was trying to come to terms with the issues surrounding Joseph Smith's first vision and the Palmyra revivals. I happened to run into Milton Backman in the BYU Special Collections and struck up a conversation with him. I was well versed in the various positions articulated by Walters, Bushman, and Backman, and I was still a true believer. Indeed, I had recently returned from my mission. Near the end of our conversation, I said, I still believe Mormonism, but I honestly have to say that Walters is winning the debate on the issue of the 1820 revival. Needless to say, that statement surprised Backman, who admitted that he should revisit the subject sometime to make his arguments and evidence stronger. I think this was the correct conclusion to our conversation and I kind of think we should make similar conclusions with regard to the Masonic issue, regardless of our personal conclusions.
"Gad, I strongly disagree with your claim that..."
I don't think you read the way I intended. "Randi" type skeptics are exactly in the problem area I see.
Mr. Ostler, I find all of this talk about probability both confused and confusing. Getting down to brass tacks, I don't see how Bayesian probability helps analyze Mormon history. And so I have a few quick questions and two comments:
Given the standard probability calculus, any application or interpretation of it (Bayesian or otherwise) will tell us that accepting some distribution ratio of a specified property commits us to holding certain other ratios. In this manner, accepting the distribution ratio of faces on a die (stipulating those faces as our specified property) commits us to accepting the standard 1 in 6 probability attached to a given roll under pretty much any interpretation. What property or properties do you propose to examine, and what distribution ratio do you observe to be relevant?
I am guessing that you intend to use subjective probability (specifically Bayesian) to ascertain the degree of certainty with which the witnesses were entitled to believe their vision. Is this correct? If not, then what? And since Bayesian probability differs from standard subjective probability interpretations in that it substitutes conditioning for rationality, what conditioning algorithm do you intend to use?
I understand the probability estimate that Mr. Vogel offers concerning the witnesses to be a kind of statistical generalization. I understand this to be quite different from probability theory. It therefore seems to me that you are making a category mistake by asking him to name a probability theory that supports his generalization.
And lastly, my view of probability is considered by most people to be fairly fossilized. I apologize in advance if I've fundamentally misunderstood your project in light of more recent developments in probability theory.
David, I can't speak for Blake but I suspect you are misreading him. (Of course I have to confess I was misreading him for a bit also) I think he was saying that if Dan is arguing from probability (Dan's words) or "statistical generalization" that the only position he can think of that would work would be Bayesian, not that Bayesian methods should be used. Put an other way, I think Blake is simply asking what on earth we mean by probable when discussing history in these pages.
My sense which I mentioned a page or so earlier, was that Dan simply means believable by him. i.e. plausible and not probable.
I think Blake is correct to point out that when we use language that sounds statistical or sound like we have some rigorous sense of the terms we better be able to support it. If we can't, then perhaps we ought to choose more careful language.
Blake, I'm glad to hear that you are 'more interested in a discussion than being right.' I hope that's true. It would make these discussions more fun. I entered the discussion thinking I was just going to explain why I wasn't a positivist, but have ever since been the focus of some intense criticism. I understand that we have and will always have some legitimate differences of opinion, but there have been no concessions on your part where I thought there should have been. Now, you are going to get one from me.
I don't claim to know a lot about probability judgements, so I eagerly await your explication of Bayesian inference. Hey, I'm always willing to learn new things. But from what little I have learned about Bayesianism, I don't think much of it. In terms of this discussion, if I had the choice of knowing about Bayesianism or knowing more about hallucination, I think I would choose hallucination.
If you recall 'probability' only came up because I was trying to help you and Addictio make an inductive argument of my position, which you said was not possible. So when I did, you started attacking the term 'probably,' which is a longstanding problem with inductive arguments that has nothing to do with me. I'm certainly not going to be able to solve this problem, which has occupied philosophers much more talented than I, but that was not your initial challenge.
I would rather discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the inductive argument, hallucination, and hypnotism. It may be that we will reach an impasse as Clark says, but if you're hear for the discussion and I'm hear to learn some new things, it shouldn't matter the outcome. In that way, we would all be winners. This will not happen, however, if you keep insinuating that someone who doesn't know about probability theory knows nothing.
If you don't think any 'probability theory is up to the job' when it comes to religious experiences, try this: you have a bag that you think is full of white and black balls. Randomly you pull out balls one at a time and place them into one of two other bags without looking. Then you pick one of the two bags to look into and you see nothing but black balls. What are the odds that the other bag contains some white balls? I know this model isn't exactly what we are confronting, but can you think of another?
You say, 'I don't believe that Bayesian theory or any other probability theory can tell us whether the 3 witnesses experienced something 'real' IN MY SENSE.' Of course not, because your reality, as you have explained it, only exists in definitional form. Under such a low standard of proof, who could dispute the claim that a schizophrenic's delusions are not 'real' IN HIS SENSE OF 'REAL.' Blake, let's face it, if this were in Mediaeval times and Mormonism held sway, you would be burned at the stake for heresy, and I for infidelism.
Now, when I told Clark that I had 'stood toe-to-toe with Blake and, in my opinion, have shown that his confidence in the testimonies of the BofM witnesses is based on incomplete information and a lack of knowledge about hallucination and hypnotism,' I did not mean to imply that I had won, only that I had scored some points. I complained that my evidence and arguments had not been 'refuted' or adequately responded to. If you are in this discussion for the sake of discussion and are not trying to win, as you say, I have to wonder why you have made no concessions when I believe I have made some reasonably valid points.
You accuse me of 'chest thumping,' then in the next sentence thump your own: 'Do you really think that I haven't read and carefully assessed virtually every statement by the witnesses that has been published or is available in the BYU and UofU (as well as Yale) archives?' To me, this is a strange statement since the three archives you name have very few sources on the witnesses compared with the LDS church archives, which you fail to mention. I hope you make use of my EARLY MORMON DOCUMENTS.
My 'toe-to-toe' comment to Clark was in response to his assertion that I had ignored or discounted counter evidence to my naturalistic thesis, that I was 'simply assuming [my] conclusions and then looking for evidence to back it up.' Part of my response was to say I have responded to all attempts to bring up counter instances and, in my opinion, had adequately defended my interpretations. Now, if my use of language was offensive to you, I'll try to tone it down in the future, if you will.
As to your comments about naturalism, I admit my views are not fully developed and I'm certainly willing to examine them closer. I'm especially interested to compare competing world-views. However, I must confess that Platonic dualism doesn't seem like much of a threat.
As to the human propensity for delusion, I have read some evolutionary interpretations of the God- and hereafter-beliefs. Starting points might be Matthew Alper, THE 'GOD' PART OF THE BRAIN: A SCIENTIFIC INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN SPIRITUALITY AND GOD and Joseph Giovannoli, THE BIOLOGY OF BELIEF: HOW OUR BIOLOGY BIASES OUR BELIEFS AND PERCEPTIONS. Now, if our brains are truly hard-wired for these beliefs, as the evidence seems to indicate, they are the biases of all biases. My brain is no different. So when I argue as I am wont to do, I am arguing against my biases and against my own personal interest.
Your discussion of sensus divinus reminds me of a PBS program that recently aired. Perhaps you saw it, Brent Metcalfe told me he saw it, so it did air in your area. The program had two levels: one was a discussion among intellectuals of various interpretations, including skeptic Michael Schermer, and the other was a dramatization of the lives of C. S. Lewis and Freud. Lewis explain the yearning for the divine much like you did, but Freud interpreted it as a projection of the wish for union with our early care-givers, our parents. In other words, mystical union is a vestige of the delusion that our parents were all-protecting, all-knowing gods. This delusion helped reduce stress imposed by the real world, which helped us concentrate on growing up. One aspect of the program that I think was beneficial was the idea that Lewis and Freud personify two aspects that all of us have. In other words, in our private moments, we all struggle between belief and disbelief but put the emphasis in different places.
David:
I think Clark said in response to you what I would say. If a distribution ratio is what Dan has in mind, then it manifestly will not work as a theory of probability because there are no such ratios for unique spiritual experiences -- and assuming that one kind of experience (e.g., a delusional one) can be compared in a distribution ratio with others (e.g., spiritual experiences of high functioning individuals) quite cleary begs the question and assumes what must be proved -- that spiritual experiences are relevantly like hallucinations and so can be compared in such a ratio. In fact, I am saying the exact opposite of what you take me to be saying. I am saying that a probability approach to such questions will not work. I believe that when Dan says that spiritual experiences are "probably" merely delusions, he is making an assertion that asserts more than can reasonbly be said. I believe that Dan is really asserting something what Alan implies he is really saying (though he took a long time to say it): "In my opinion, the evidence points toward delusion." I look at the same evidence and say, "in my opinion, the evidence points toward a shared spiritual experience that is real, i.e, not merely a subjective delusion." I account for the difference not in the fact that my reading of the evidence is infallible or that I am right and he is wrong or I am brighter than he is or he than me, but because I have a world-view or belief-set that disposes me to be open to that possiblity. It is a "living option" for me, in William Jamse's terms, and it is not a living option for Dan.
However, if a probability theory could work for such issues, it seems to me that the Bayesian theory is the only real candidate. Richard Swinburne has a book attempting to prove that the existence of God is probable using Baye's probability theorum and William Rowe has crafted an argument from the fact of evil in the world to prove that God's existence is improbable using the same theory. Swinburne published just last year a very long book, the Resurrection of God Incarnate (see a synopsis here http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2003/9/otte-swinburne.html) arguing that the resurrection of Jesus is probable given Bayesian probabilities -- but I don't really buy his arguments. I have done my own Bayesian probability analysis on the 3 witnesses and came out with a conclusion that the experience was real is very highly probable. However, I am not sure the theory really works despite that result.
Moreover, Dan has pointed out in his most recent blog that the evidence is open to two apparently equally plausbile views. So I go back to what I began with -- it comes down to faith it seems to me. Faith is a kind of openness to possiblities that manifest themselves as a living reality for some and not for others. I would add that it seems to me that in the end the eyes of faith are a function of the heart and openness. But I hesitate to suggest that somehow my cognitive faculties are superior to Dan's or Bertrand Russel's or William Rowe's (though the Reformed Epistemologists like Plantinga and Alston don't hesitate to conclude that the stubborness of heart manifest by unbelief is a result of original sin in a very broad sense).
The following addresses some of the issues brought up regarding the nature of the argument over the witnesses' testimony, why I find it so confusing, and how I can best understand it. (I wrote this during my subway ride this morning, where I don't have network connection. Thus, I hadn't read the responses to my post last night. Please excuse the rather heavy emphasis on probability.)
In my preceding post, I stated that Mr. Vogel's argument involved "statistical generalization," and this now strikes me as a poor choice of words. What I meant is simply that Mr. Vogel's argument concerns the classification of samples and not distribution in or among samples. In this light, I'm pleased to state Mr. Vogel's witness argument in a form like this: We have a class of religious experiences which are generally accepted as non-veridical, and this set has certain defining characteristics. The witnesses' testimony shares these characteristics, and therefore belongs to this set. (Let's call this form the restated witness argument)
The question of probability theory occurs only when one has sets (and reasonable samples from them) of both veridical experiences and non-veridical experiences as well as some reasonable estimate of frequency distribution between them based on logically equivalent characteristics. This is why I believe that Mr. Ostler's introduction of probability theory is beside the point.
Note that the restated witness argument does not require naturalistic assumptions. The naturalist can be taken to believe that the set of veridical religious experiences is empty (i.e., he identifies it with the null set). In this case, also, probability questions do not arise. Since the naturalist believes that no religious experiences are veridical, there remains nothing for him to extrapolate.
That said, even the naturalist can allow for the sake of argument that the set of veridical religious experiences may not be empty. But the burden of identifying the defining characteristics of some set and its putative extension lies squarely on the person who demands the existence of that set. As long as the naturalist has provided a non-circular characteristic sufficient to group the disputed religious experience into the non-veridical category, the burden is on his opponent to show that such a characteristic is either insufficient or not applicable to the experiences in question.
To bring this back around to the restated witness argument, Mr. Vogel's essay in American Apocrypha has identified certain characteristics of experiences which he believes are traits of non-veridical experiences. To simply insist that there is a non-empty set of veridical religious experiences is insufficient. What is required to counter Mr. Vogal's argument is some non-trivial, identifiable characteristic which is sufficient to classify someone's experience as veridical, along with an argument that the witnesses' experience fits this explanation.
There may be some vague sense in which one believes that such and such a characteristic "probably" determines whether an experience is veridical or non-veridical. But this is, again, not related to probability theory. It's more related to something like subjective credibility, and should be taken in the same way that we commonly take statements like, "The Redskins will probably [or probably not] win the Super Bowl."
At any rate, I think that probability theory has nothing to do with Mr. Vogel's argument. Furthermore, it seems to me that Mr. Ostler's introduction of the term probability uses it improperly.
Just for the record, Blake didn't introduce the term to the discussion. But I agree it has been an unhelpful and misleading tangent to the discussion.
David: Your assessment of Vogel's argument just seems off-base to me. First, you still assume that I am basing some kind of argument on probability theory -- even though I said explicitly that I was not - thrice. It is frustrating to dialogue with someone who refuses to read what has been written. Vogel is the one who introduced the probability argument and I suggested that probability judgments don't work in this arena. You are simply wrong when you assert that Vogel didn't raise issues of probability. He asserted that based on the kinds of experiences we know to be delusional that it is probable that all spiritual experiences are also delusional. I invite you to go back and read his first five posts.
It is the very classification of examples that is at issue so it begs the question to simply assert that: "We have a class of religious experiences which are generally accepted as non-veridical, and this set has certain defining characteristics." What Vogel identifies are not religious experiences but experiences which result from a known psychological etiology. The distinction between the two groups is pellucid and needs no argument. I made the distinction between such experiences arising from persons who have abnormal psychology and those that are high-functioning individuals -- and it is a widely recognized distinction in the literature. It seems to me that given such a distinction, the naturalist must show that experiences of such high-functioning individuals can be shown to have the same non-veridical or mind-dependent status as experiences with a known abnormal pschology. That hasn't been done and until it is we can't make much progress talking with someone who approaches the issue as if the connection has already been made because of some superiority of the naturalistic world-view. Moreover, given the nature of such experiences I doubt that it can be done. And requiring anyone to show that some religious experiences are in fact "veridical" is clearly requring too much -- so I see your suggestions as non-sense in the broadest sense. So I am at a loss as to the point of your now demanding that the believer make a distinction between delusions, hallucinations and so forth and experiences which are known to be "veridical" religious experiences (whatever that means). However, I would be happy if Dan recognized his arguments as having nor more force that a prediction "I think the Redskins will win the superbowl."
David: I didn't pay enough attention to you disclaimer at the top of your most recent post which indicates that you hadn't read the most recent statements regarding putting too much emphasis on probability issues. Forgive me for doing the same -- although I am without excuse because I didn't write my reponse on the subway where I didn't have access to the net.
Mr. Ostler, I'm not sure why my assessment of Mr. Vogel's argument seems off-base to you. I've simply tried to restate the form of his argument in the most cogent terms that I can muster. I believe that I have an obligation to understand an argument this way (whether because of or in spite of its author) before I go about assessing its merits and demerits.
Also, I apologize for creating the impression that I have not been following the discussion closely, and I certainly meant no disrespect. I appreciate your patience, and I'll try to be more specific about the portions of the discussion that I'm referring back to. I trust you will continue to indicate the degree to which you believe I have succeeded.
Mr. Goble indicates that you did not bring up probability. You go even further by claiming "[Mr.] Vogel is the one who introduced the probability argument." Actually, it appears that Mr. Goble himself brought up probability in the essay that started this thread. Be that as it may, my comments relate to probability theory, which is a topic that you do seem to have brought up. (I've included the quotes at the bottom of this comment.)
That said, you seem to have taken my two posts on probability to refer to the same things, when I am trying to separate out two specific areas in which probability theory has been put to use in this thread. I'll address both of my comments in turn, hoping to clarify them.
The Focus of the First Comment on Probability
In connection with probability theory, you've said a number of things that I have struggled to make sense of. These include:
I have conducted my own probability test using that theory (which I am in the process of doing again as a test) applied to the experience of the 3 witnesses. The probability came out at .766 in favor of their experience being "real."
andBTW, I may choose to publish my Bayesian assessment of the 3 witnesses precisely to show that the kinds of "probability" judgments that Dan makes are not sound.
You seem quite confident in your views of probability theory (at least to the extant that you feel comfortable saying of others that they "simply [don't] understand probability theory"). Moreover, I am emphatically not an expert in such areas. Thus, I had wondered (albeit skeptically) if these statements reflected some insight on your part. So in my initial post on probability, I was aiming to understand what these statements of yours meant. This aim remains unsatisfied.
Toward the end of my first comment, I recognize that probability is commonly used to refer to several things, and I wonder whether you're imposition of probability theory on Mr. Vogel's usage isn't mistaken. This is the topic I take up in more detail in my second comment.
Responses to the First Comment on Probability
Mr. Goble said, "David, I can't speak for [Mr. Ostler] but I suspect you are misreading him." Mr. Ostler elaborated on this theme. I take this to mean that I failed to make it clear that I was referring specifically to Mr. Ostler's own purported analysis. I hope that the current comment remedies this shortcoming.
The Focus of the Second Comment on Probability
To be as clear as possible: You seem to have repeatedly faulted Mr. Vogel for misusing probability theory. This strikes me as incorrect, because I believe that Mr. Vogel's thesis neither uses nor has anything to do with probability theory. I intended for my second comment to explicate why.
Responses to My Second Comment on Probability
Mr. Goble stated:
I think [Mr. Ostler] was saying that if [Mr. Vogel] is arguing from probability ([Mr. Vogel]'s words) or "statistical generalization" that the only position he can think of that would work would be Bayesian, not that Bayesian methods should be used.
And you state: "I am saying the exact opposite of what you take me to be saying. I am saying that a probability approach to such questions will not work."
You may be relieved to learn that what I take you to believe relative to probability theory is not relevant to the points that I am trying to make in my second comment on probability. These are (first) that you seem to think that it is some fault of Mr. Vogel that he uses the term probability where a probability theory won't work, and (second) that the question of probability theory never even enters the equation, so that whether it may or may not work is actually beside the point.
Postscript: Mr. Ostler on probability theory
Your 10/02 05:51PM comment on page 2 (addressed to Mr. Addictio) contains the 1st explicit mention of probability theory of this thread (Mr. Adictio makes an oblique reference which I don't count.):
just what model or theory of probability applies to such claims? .... Given [Mr. Vogel's] assumption [that religious experiences aren't real], the probability that the 3 witnesses are deluded is always 1 on a frequency scale of probability.... if you really believe that [Mr. Vogel]'s argument is a probability argument, then I ask you to lay out the inductive structure of the argument....
You seem to be saying that Mr. Vogel intends to base his argument on probability theory and has failed, as indicated by your later statement: "If you think this is a probability argument, then [Mr.] Vogel has hoodwinked you."
Mr. Vogel's response mentions statistical probability in reference to in a specific study of hallucinations in living populations: "The fact that many apparitional situations occur following the death of a loved one, stress, and other psychological triggers means that there is a statistical correlation and an implied degree of probability." But he still makes no mention of probability theory.
You respond to Mr. Vogel, asking him directly to outline a probability theory:
Moreover, there is no way to assess the probability claim that you make. Just what probability theory are you assuming or using? Please explain it to me. Show me how you arrive at the probability (and mathematical probability tables would be a great assistance since you cannot assess probability without them).
In response to this one, Mr. Vogel finally takes the bate. (I think that this was a mistake on his part, since I believe that this does not do justice to his argument, and I have explained why above.)
Why don't we drop the whole probability discussion as a distraction.
For the record, the first occurrence in the comments was on the first page. There Dan said, "whereas a positivist seeks to establish history on positive grounds, I'm comfortable with interpretations that carry various degrees of probability. Hence, I would describe my position as basically a post-positivist ontological naturalist." That inclusion of the term "degree" suggested that Dan intended more than a loose sense of "probable." Thus we interpreted his later comments in light of that.
He said a little later, "while I'm not a positivist, I do believe some historical reconstructions are better than others. The theory that utilizes the documents critically and accounts for most of the evidence with the least elaboration and qualification is the one that is probably true."
I read Dan as just not being careful with language here and really meaning "more believable to me" and not something more rigorous. I don't have any problem with that. I speak loosely like that all the time. Analyzing Dan's words as if he were speaking as a philosopher making a careful philosophical argument is unfair. I think he rightly criticized us for being confusing with all the philosophy. Having said that though, I also think this entails Dan's position being much looser as well.
I did bring up probability, but only to say that, "discerning what is probable is frequently difficult." However I meant it is the loose sense of "likely" much like I think Dan did. The confusion between the loose and more technical senses of probability was unfortuante and probably we should just drop it.
Mr. Goble, since I don't wish to be intransigent, and since this is your forum, I'm happy to cease and desist this thread about probability theory if it is found to be an overbearing or otherwise unacceptable topic.
After all, a key part of my argument has been that Mr. Ostler was wrong to bring up probability theory in the first place. (And he did not do so by asking Mr. Vogel something like, "you said degrees of probability. Are you referring to some calculus of probability based on Kolmogorov's axioms?" He seemed to immediately assume that Mr. Vogel intended probability and proceeded to ask what interpretation of probability calculus he intended.)
That said, I do not see how this is any more of a distraction than (say) my ongoing dialogue with Mr. Vogel about anti-Masonic themes in the Book of Mormon. (And I do intend to return to this discussion, because I find Mr. Vogel to have made some very good points in his latest post on the issue. I'm hoping that he can excuse my getting sidetracked.)
Clark and David: I demur from your reluctance to discuss probability theories or, rather, the lack of an adequate theory that applies to experiences of the three witnesses for example (or to any religious experiences). The lack of an adequate theory is actually very telling in this area. How can we assess the strength of the assertions made by Dan (and others) that, given the possiblities of hypnotism, delusion, hallucination and so forth, we can conclude that the experiences of the witnesses or our own spiritual experiences are or are not like them, i.e., whether we must always doubt whether we have "veridical religous epxeriences"? It seems to me that such arguments are not very easily made in a way that doesn't simply beg the question in favor of a "naturalistic" world-view that is not shared by those who take such spiritual to be real. On the other hand, the kinds of experiences that believers take as foundational for faith cannot easily speak to those who don't already share the commitments of faith.
Moreover, David, you asked for a distinction between such experiences that would suggest that the categorization of spiritual experiences with delusional experiences is not one that can be taken for granted. I gave such a distinction. Indeed, this very distinction (along with the notion of proper basicality) has been at the center of the discussion of religious epistemology in the last decade due largely to the works of Plantinga, Alston and Wolterstorff. So I think that the lack of an adquate theory of probability theory to address such issues sets limits to what we can intelligibly claim and assert in this arena. Are there really any good criteria that allow us to assess such questions that don't beg the question? Isn't the post-modern (and Kantian) recognition that our knowledge is perspectival and theory-bound a limit to what can be claimed regarding spiritual experiences and what they "prove"?
This discussion began with Alan Goff who maintains, I take it, that such discussions are inherently theory-laden and critiques of the LDS position beg the question in favor of a world-view not shared by LDS. I think that our own discussion shows that Alan was probably on the right track.
The reason I don't think it helpful is that it seems like everyone is in agreement - no one meant technical probability but the loose sense of "I think it likely" or "I find it more believable."
"Are there really any good criteria that allow us to assess such questions that don't beg the question? Isn't the post-modern (and Kantian) recognition that our knowledge is perspectival and theory-bound a limit to what can be claimed regarding spiritual experiences and what they "prove"?
I think the phil. 101 problem of infinite regress applied to knowledge, formal systems, or whatever, is acknowledged and discussed from perspectives outside of neo-Kantianism and postmodernism. I don't even think that's directly the point of at least, any of the postmodernism I've tried to understand. A lot of postmodernism grapples with "marginalized" perspectives, turning the tables, that kind of thing, but not all of it. And I don't know if there are enough similarities to argue for a universal epistemology from the "postmodern perspective." The infamous Jean Baudrillard for instance (my favorite!!), essentially argues that people are dumb terminals ruled by oppressive signifiers--no "mulitple perspectives" or plugs for pluralism with this guy.
"This discussion began with Alan Goff who maintains, I take it, that such discussions are inherently theory-laden and critiques of the LDS position beg the question in favor of a world-view not shared by LDS. I think that our own discussion shows that Alan was probably on the right track."
I'm not trying to be an ass, but how can you say Alan was right on track, as if there were any single, world-view independent shared criteria whereby to evaluate the discussion? I think Alan, or anyone else is on the exactly wrong track, when they offer fairly naive insights that essentially just work regress problems into whatever the subject matter is, and then invoke the authority of the inpenetrable and very professional sounding corpus of "postmodernism."
I definitely empathize with some of yours, and clarks criticisms of some of the philosophical naivity of skeptics (and I realize I myself am no more than a little just a little fish swimming around on this thread). But I think in general, Dan Vogal, or anyone else offering historical interpretations can be evaluated meaningfully without getting overly philosophical, or worse, getting overly anxious to classify a philosophical persuasion and then overturn the work in entirety on philosophical grounds.
Blake, Dave, Clark: I don't know about other readers, but I have found Dave's contribution to the discussion of probability very interesting and valuable. I agree with Clark that it's been a 'diversion' since Blake has used it to avoid discussing sensitive areas I have exposed in his position (e.g., why Whitmer and Cowdery could not tell true from false revelation? why he rejects Mohammad's revelations? what are his criteria for accepting and rejecting revelations?). Nevertheless, if Blake has exposed one of my vulnerabilities, I want to know it. So, in my opinion, to end the discussion now without Dave and Blake being able to finish their thoughts, I think would be an opportunity missed.
Clark is also right that I'm not as careful with my definitions as philosophers are, although I do not agree that the use of 'probable' with less than mathematical precision means that it's only a personal opinion. In such case, there would be no way to make inductive arguments, which is what Blake changed Addictio to do. Should we be required to say, for example:
Socrates is a man and is mortal.
Plato is a man and is mortal.
Aristotle is a man and is mortal.
Therefore there is a .773 (Bayesian) probability that all men are mortal.
Copi says of inductive arguments: '...we characterize an inductive argument as one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises only with probability, this probability being a matter of degree and dependent upon what else may be the case.' Now, Clark, does Copi's mention of 'degrees' of probability imply a theory of probability? No. Moreover, I think my argument is more an argument from analogy than probability, although the former implies the latter. The only way to argue against such an argument, in my opinion, is to show differences and prove that the analogy is irrelevant, which Blake has not done.
Blake has tried to do this, but in the attempt has misrepresented the facts. I sympathize with Blake's complaint that it's 'frustrating to dialogue with someone who refuses to read what has been written,' because Blake has repeatedly misrepresented the facts in this discussion. He tells David, 'What Vogel identifies are not religious experiences but experiences which result from a known psychological etiology.' This will be the third time I have discussed this and the second time I have corrected Blake on this false assertion. I have discussed two groups of hallucinators: (1) those with obvious pathology; (2) those with no obvious pathology. I have only referred to the first group for examples of obvious contradiction to Blake's initial claim that it was impossible to say if any person was deluded or not. It is harder to identify delusion in the second group, but not impossible. In this discussion, I have divided this second group into (a) delusional and (b) unknown. I have used (a) to inform (b). Hence, I have not used, as Blake asserts, examples from group (1) to inform (2). So I will repeated my previous discussion in the hope that Blake will, perhaps, finally address these issues.
On Oct. 3, I wrote to Blake:
'Naturalistic explanations of hallucination, on the other hand, can be studied. In his 1990 book, HALLUCINATIONS IN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Dr. Ghazi Asaad discusses more than fifty causes of hallucination IN NORMAL PEOPLE, including grief reaction, fatigue, sensory, sleep and food deprivation, and hypnotism or strong suggestion. To suggest that in such a vast sea of delusion you can find the real visions, that you are not mistaken, when in fact there is no way for either you or the visionaries to know the difference, is quite extraordinary. ... The fact that many apparitional situations occur following the death of a loved one, stress, and other psychological triggers means that there is a statistical correlation and an implied degree of probability.'
On Oct. 10, I wrote to Blake:
'Blake, your notion that delusions are SUI GENERIS and that 'real' spiritual experiences are UNIVERSAL is an invention not consistent with experience. ... Only about 1 percent of the population experiences the bazaar-type of schizophrenic hallucination that you characterize. At the same time, one should not suppose that hallucinations resulting from a psychiatric condition such as schizotypal personality disorder would be obvious to others, nor would it otherwise distinguish that person from the general non-hallucinating population. Several psychometric studies conducted during the 1970s and 80s has resulted in a continuum model of hallucinations, which range from the extreme audio-visual disturbances of the schizophrenic to the benign and transitory hallucinations of ORDINARY, NONPSYCHIATRIC PEOPLE. As Richard P. Bentall of the University of Manchester, England, observes: 'For every person who receives a diagnosis of schizophrenia ... there are approximately 10 who experience hallucinations without receiving the diagnosis.'' ...
'Hallucinations come in all varieties imaginable and do not fit easily into the artificial categories you have invented. They are as unique as the individuals who have them, although there are certain classes or species. Blake, you are mistaken when you assume that delusions cannot mimic cultural and religious expectations. How does your system of interpretation explain bazaar visions by otherwise normal people that contain universal religious symbols? Even schizophrenic hallucinations often contain religious symbolism. One study 'compared the religious hallucinations of 23 psychiatric patients with descriptions of visions from the Middle Ages. The authors noted that there were many points of similarity between the two classes of phenomena and pointed out that none of the medieval visionaries had been identified as mentally ill. They suggested that cultural norms have a central role in determining the attribution of mental illness.' ... Should not these examples qualify in your closed-system of definitions as both 'real' (mind-independent) and 'true'?'
'You state, 'the very fact that you compare the clinical study of psychologically-induced hallucinations as being on par with spiritual experiences in high-functioning individuals shows me that you haven't read the literature.' I don't know what you have been reading, but I have read some studies under the heading neurotheology. Such studies distinguish between higher mystical states of union with the divine, lesser mystical states of the ecstatic variety, hallucinations, pseudo-hallucinations, and psychotic delusions. But they all have neurophysiological components and sometimes involve different areas of the brain. Religious and mystical states can be induced through prayer, meditation, dancing, fasting, chanting, etc. True, there is a difference between mystical states, and most of the fifty causes of hallucination I mentioned. But, as Addictio argued, there is some overlap. As it turns out, many of the methods mystics use to induce spiritual states also induce hallucination.'
'From my readings of this literature, the BofM witnesses do not qualify for the mystical-union state of higher-functioning people to which you allude. (By the way, many schizophrenic people are high-functioning.) Rather, they seem to describe a typical visionary experience on a par with the appearances of the Virgin Mary at Fatima that you mention. Briefly, there is an area of the brain that endows certain experiences with the feeling of realness. When a hallucination involve this area of the brain, the experiencer is unaware that he is hallucinating. When the hallucinator is aware of the unreality of the experience, that is called a pseudo-hallucination. So far as I can tell, the three witnesses fall into this second category because they were aware of the uniqueness and unreality of the experience, which they called seeing with the 'spiritual eye.' In other words, it was not like Richard Anderson asserted a 'natural super-natural experience.' While it seemed visually real, Whitmer was well aware that it was more like Paul's vision of Christ than it was like Jesus' appearance to doubting Thomas. Recall Moyle's recording in his journal that Whitmer 'then spoke of Paul hearing and seeing Christ but his associates did not. Because it is only seen in the Spirit.' This kind of experience is not like the experience of high-functioning mystical experience, which has a different psycho-physiological explanation.' ...
'The basis on which I say the unknown group of hallucinators are PROBABLY delusional is the fact that the two groups are otherwise indistinguishable. There is variation and complexity in different experiences and there may be different brain functions operating to produce the various effects, but this seems true for either group. But the two groups you describe (i.e., delusional/dysfunctional/hallucinators vs. high/normal-functioning/visionaries) is pure fiction. You are wrong in your assumption that delusions do not happen in high-functioning and normal people, evidence of which I have already given. The survey to which I referred was of 15,000 normal people. Most of the causes of hallucination that I listed were for OTHERWISE NORMAL PEOPLE. Whenever I referred to those cases with 'dysfunctional etiology' (as you call it), they were counter-instances for your argument that delusion was undetectable.'
'You raise the issue of whether or not delusions can even be detected. Responding to my assertion that most of the 10-15 percent of the population that will see an apparition, most will follow the death of a loved one, which implies a strong possibility that there are psychological factors involved, Blake charges: 'No one could assess the truth value of this statement [because it is impossible?] to ascertain that such experiences were merely delusions.' That's what you might assume. The 10-15 percent comes from surveys, not clinical studies, but I think we can apply what we have learned from controlled studies to that figure. Clinical studies focus on statistical correlates of hallucination or conduct experiments designed to induce hallucination. There is a vast amount of literature on this subject, but a good summary can be found in Richard P. Bentall, 'Hallucinatory Experiences,' in VARIETIES OF ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCE: EXAMINING THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, Etzel Cardena, Steven Jay Lynn, and Stanley Krippner, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2000).'
'... Concerning grief reaction, Bentall reports: 'Auditory and visual hallucinations are a commonly documented part of the grief reaction, with as many as 70% of recently bereaved people experiencing either illusions or hallucinations of the deceased' (99).'
'The first survey of anomalous experience was the taking of THE INTERNATIONAL CENSUS OF WAKING HALLUCINATIONS in 1894, which excluded anyone with obvious mental or physical illness, interviewed more than 15,000 people. As summarized by Bentall, this survey found that '7.8% of men and 12% of women reported at least one vivid hallucinatory experience, the most common type being a visual hallucination of a living person who was not present at the time of the experience. ... [and] appeared to occur most commonly in people between 20 and 29 years of age, a period that approximately corresponds to the subsequent established high-risk period for psychotic illness' (94). Now, Blake, does the fact that the most common type of visual hallucination in this survey consisted 'of a living person who was not present at the time of the experience' not point very clearly to delusion? This delusion is not SUI GENERIS but qualifies under your criteria as universal and therefore mind-independent and 'real.' So you are wrong about delusions being undetectable. ...'
'You also raise the issue of relevancy: 'Vogel has not shown that the experience have anything in common except his assumption that they are both delusional experiences.' How similar do these experiences have to be in order to be 'relevantly similar'? This is largely a value-judgment. Nevertheless, you cannot escape the implications of the obvious. At a minimum, you need to admit that the brain has the capability to mimic spiritual experiences to the point that fooled even Whitmer and the hysterical hallucinators at Fatima. As I discussed in my essay, given Whitmer's description to Moyle, that a 'different kind of light' and a 'soft haze' replaced the natural environment, Whitmer's experience has a lot in common with what is called a 'waking dream' variety of hallucination.'
On Oct. 18, I wrote Blake:
'The basis on which I say the unknown group of hallucinators are PROBABLY delusional is the fact that the two groups are otherwise indistinguishable. There is variation and complexity in different experiences and there may be different brain functions operating to produce the various effects, but this seems true for either group. But the two groups you describe (i.e., delusional/dysfunctional/hallucinators vs. high/normal-functioning/visionaries) is pure fiction. You are wrong in your assumption that delusions do not happen in high-functioning and normal people, evidence of which I have already given. The survey to which I referred was of 15,000 normal people. Most of the causes of hallucination that I listed were for otherwise normal people. Whenever I referred to those cases with 'dysfunctional etiology' (as you call it), they were counter-instances for your argument that delusion was undetectable. Since this is the second time you have made allusion to high-functioning visionaries being different without giving a reference or cogent argument therefrom, I think it's time for you to prove that assertion.'
'I do not believe you can call my argument a 'hasty generalization' since it is a generalization based on the majority of cases. The survey I referred to showed that most of the 10-15 percent hallucinated a living person. ...'
To continue with Blake's incorrect assertions: 'The distinction between the two groups is pellucid and needs no argument.'
Yes it does. To repeat, the two groups Blake wants to compare is group 1 (pathological) and group 2 (non-pathological), where as my comparisons were between subsets of group 2.
Blake: 'I made the distinction between such experiences arising from persons who have abnormal psychology and those that are high-functioning individuals--and it is a widely recognized distinction in the literature.'
I won't make any claims about 'high-functioning' (in one of his posts, Blake also included normal people), but my group 2 are normal, ordinary people without obvious signs of dysfunction, some of whom it can be shown experienced delusional hallucination. The only thing that distinguishes these two subsets of group 2, is that one lends itself to a demonstration of delusion (e.g., of hallucinating a person that is still alive). Blake has yet to give us references to establish his repeated claims to this proof, although I suspect that this literature only high-functioning visionaries are not crazy.
Blake to Addictio: As I have explained, mystical experiences are more vivid than hallucinations, but the witnesses were aware of their altered state, Whitmer described a light and soft haze, so it was not a 'quotidian' experience.
Blake: 'It seems to me that given such a distinction, the naturalist must show that experiences of such high-functioning individuals can be shown to have the same non-veridical or mind-dependent status as experiences with a known abnormal psychology.'
As I have been arguing, Blake has made the wrong distinction. But now he makes another categorical error by suggesting that the naturalist show the hallucinations of normal high-functioning people have affinity with the hallucination with 'known abnormal psychology.' This is a direct contradiction of the distinction he has been trying to make in support of his thesis. How could normal people have experiences resulting from abnormal psychology? As I have previously argued, and Blake agreed, it is normal for humans to have a propensity to be deluded. Having hallucinations does not mean you are abnormal or crazy. It is the due to the imperfect conditions of our brains. But, obviously, there are different degrees and causes of hallucination. If a hypnotist makes your arm rise involuntarily or see pick elephants, you are not crazy. Blake repeatedly represents the subject with the false dichotomy of the witnesses were high-functioning, therefore their visions were real. Only obviously crazy people have delusions. If Blake would read what I have written, he would see that I have been comparing 'experiences of such high-functioning individuals' with other high-functioning people who we know hallucinated. That is the proper comparison.
Blake to Addictio: 'If someone could show me that all spiritual experiences have such a merely biological basis or are the result of abnormal psychology, then they have explained the experiences without recourse to a 'real' spiritual world.'
If we ignore Blake's loaded terminology like 'all' and 'merely,' which function as escape routes should such evidence be produced, then perhaps the findings of neurotheology might be helpful. So far as I can tell, Plantinga's discussion does not utilize this research. Blake talks about alpha brain waves in association with 'abnormal behavior such as sociophathy,' evidently indicating the kind of evidence he is seeking. D'Aquili and Newberg have mapped the brain dynamics of the mystical experience in detail, using EEG, CAT, MRI, PET, SPECT technologies. A sample of their findings:
'Electrical stimulation of the right amygdala has been found to produce vivid visual hallucinations, out-of-body sensations, deja vu, and numerous types of illusions. ... Overall, it appears that the amygdala, hippocampus, and neorocortex of the temporal lobe are highly involved in the production of vivid hallucinatory mystical experiences, although their functioning in these cases must be understood to arise within an integrated and extremely complex web of neural structures and their interconnections. ... The interaction of the visual association area [of the brain] and the amygdala and hippocampus can result in eliciting visions and hyperlucid hallucinations' (THE MYSTICAL MIND: PROBING THE BIOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, 43, 44, 102).
These experiences can be triggered through meditation, prayer, repetitive chanting, singing, dancing. I would add that D'Aquili and Newberg are modest in their claims and try to be sensitive towards the people they are studying, but their findings have serious implications for the psycho-biological and naturalistic explanation for mystical experiences.
Blake: 'That hasn't been done and until it is we can't make much progress talking with someone who approaches the issue as if the connection has already been made because of some superiority of the naturalistic world-view.'
Blake says this as if he hasn't privileged his own position. Actually, he does not realize it but Joseph Smith's claims are such that one either accepts them or rejects them on naturalistic grounds. This last comment is not limited to infidels like me, but also other believers in the supernatural that aren't Mormons. Let me explain. Christians, for example, have three options when confronted with the Mormon challenge: (1) believe; (2) counter with a naturalistic explanation; or (3) of speculate that Joseph Smith was deceived by evil spirits. So barring the evil-spirit theory, every one employs a naturalistic world-view when rejecting one religious claim over another. That's why I asked Blake to explain his rejection of mohammed, David Koresh, etc. My point is, I have only rejected one more religion on naturalistic grounds that Blake does. Given the nature of the Mormon challenge, I have no other option than to resort to naturalistic explanations. So, when I take up the challenge, people like Blake show up to accuse me of bias and insinuate that I'm being unreasonable and attacking their faith.
In this regard, I think it's important to recognize that the Mormon position is a probability argument also. The whole idea of having witnesses, in the absence of the plates themselves, is to convince the world that Joseph Smith probably had some plates. So, to respond to this challenge, one should perhaps demand statistical proof, if we follow Blake's reasoning.
As I have repeatedly said, if it comes to a draw, I would be satisfied, because all I'm trying to prove is that Mormonism is a faith like any other. Notice that when I put my argument into standard form, it accounted for the different world-views, asking believers to admit that the 3 witnesses 'could have' experienced delusion. I only defended the skeptics right to conclude probability. So, Blake, when you tell David: 'So I go back to what I began with--it comes down to faith it seems to me,' I think to myself, now only if more Mormons thought this way. It's not likely, since, as Alan has argued about positivists, they have a rhetorical advantage over other faiths that they are not likely to give up. So, Blake, why don't you join me in convincing Mormons that there is no non-subjective evidence for their beliefs, that none of the witnesses literally saw the plates, that there is no direct connection between the BofM and the real world, and that Mormonism is a faith in the truest sense of that word? I think you know the answer.
For the record, I have not said that the spiritual and rational are 'equally plausible views' of reality. Feelings and emotions are not 'plausible,' they just are. They tell us about ourselves and our psychological needs, not about the nature of reality. Faith and religious dogma are employed by religious/political groups to exploit our innate spirituality, which creates that illusion that spirituality and religion are the same.
Mr. Ostler, I have five points to make in this comment.
Point 1:
On the one hand, you say "I am saying that a probability approach to such questions will not work." On the other hand, you say that "The lack of an adequate theory is actually very telling in this area." I'm certain that I don't understand you, because these two positions strike me as contradictory.
Point 2:
I don't understand how you've responded to my previous comments.
Point 3:
Having explained in my 2nd comment why I believe that probability theory has nothing to do with Mr. Vogel's argument, I will now endeavor to explain why I do not believe that it is a useful tool for analyzing history.
The judgments of probability theories (be they standard probability or coherent subjective probability) refer to sets of things and not individual things. One misuses probability theory when using it to assess the probability of a single thing. Quite a lot can be said about this, but I'll be brief: A probability theory might say "witness-like experiences occur x% of the time," but it cannot assign a probability judgment to the individual witness experiences.
Moreover, a probability model requires a plausible distribution pattern of properties that are equally probable, mutually exclusive, logically independent, and of the same basic logical type. (This is the sort of thing that Mr. Vogel brought up in reference to pulling marbles out of a bag.)
There are numerous problems this causes vis a vis history. To choose one: an historian would have to determine which logical type of property he is going to use, and decisions among types quickly becomes unwieldy and arbitrary.
Watling's example comes to mind. In it we must predict which way a man will choose to go when presented with three roads: two heading downhill and one headed uphill. We can take the probability of him going downhill and uphill as being equal, resulting in a {1/4, 1/4, 1/2} distribution pattern for the roads. Or we can take each road to be equally probable, and resulting in {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}. One must choose between these two types of decisions, because we can't have it both ways.
Unfortunately, to apply probability theory we must have already chosen between these types. Thus, we must decide which type is more probable before probability even enters the picture. But even worse, these type choices quickly become far too complex.
Building on Watling's example, let's say that one of the roads forks. This gives us even more possible distributions. We have the variations on the original two: {1/4, 1/8, 1/8, 1/2} and {1/3, 1/6, 1/6, 1/3}. Plus we get {1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4} and any number of variations based on the determining properties of the road resulting from the fork. Once we get much more complicated than this, we have too many distributions and logical types to be useful--and this is an artificially simplified example.
In conclusion, I do not believe that this type of reasoning can shed light on historical questions. You seem to take it for granted that it can, but you have yet to explain exactly how this is so.
Point 4:
You state:
...you asked for a distinction between such experiences that would suggest that the categorization of spiritual experiences with delusional experiences is not one that can be taken for granted. I gave such a distinction....
I believe that you misunderstand my 2nd comment on probability, where I identified the form of argument that I believe Mr. Vogel is making and the type of distinctions that participants in such an argument are obliged to make. I made no pronouncement on whether anyone has or has not provided any such distinctions.
Point 5:
You state:
Are there really any good criteria that allow us to assess such questions that don't beg the question? Isn't the post-modern (and Kantian) recognition that our knowledge is perspectival and theory-bound a limit to what can be claimed regarding spiritual experiences and what they "prove"?
Sorry, but I don't buy Kant or post-modernism (to the extant that the term post modernism can be taken to meaningfully designate a set of philosophies, that is). I certainly don't buy the kind of free-wheeling relativism that you statement seems to embody.
Dan, I don't have much time, I'd just say that induction alone is always problematic. Indeed it has been a big philosophical problem much of the last century. I think the way to avoid inductive problems is through testing - both attempting to falsify or demonstrate a point. But the big problem of speaking of probable, is that even if in theory something is more probable there is no way of knowing in any particular how probable it is. Now in the sciences there are ways of dealing with this. i.e. if a test if confirmed by numerous examples, has a good theoretical explanation, and can't be falsified after numerous attempts, we hold it as true. I do think that to speak of "degree of probability" in such a case is misleading though. At best it means "I believe it more."
While people can try and sweep the subjective element under the carpet, I believe it is always misleading to do so. Which, of course gets us back to the starting point of all this. Our decisions about what is probable are intrinsically biased by perspective. That's not a controversial point at all and needs no invocation of postmodernism. Further, the perspective of a believing Mormon who's had spiritual experiences is different from that of a person who doesn't believe that spiritual experiences have content that is trustworthy.
Which, is really the point I think that this rather long winded discussion has settled upon. People may try and move beyond that. But when they do, I fear they move beyond what the evidence warrants.
I can understand Mr. Vogel's frustration with philosophy-speak. It seems like every time he brings something up, someone changes the subject by talking about what his words are supposed to mean.
Blake: Isn't the post-modern (and Kantian) recognition that our knowledge is perspectival and theory-bound a limit to what can be claimed regarding spiritual experiences and what they "prove"?
David: Sorry, but I don't buy Kant or post-modernism (to the extant that the term post modernism can be taken to meaningfully designate a set of philosophies, that is). I certainly don't buy the kind of free-wheeling relativism that you statement seems to embody.
I confess I'm not quite sure what you are arguing David. Are you saying that the effect of perspective on knowing is negligible? Are you saying Kant is a relativist? I guess I'm a little at a loss. I don't think Blake is saying anything terribly controversial. I can understand arguing about how relevant it is to the current discussion. I can even understand someone who buys into Popper or related thinkers thinking we can easily overcome the perspective we bring to our inquiry. I'd disagree of course, but it's a fully defensible position. But I guess I don't see how anything Blake says entails anything like relativism. To say that our perspective can't be eliminated is not to say truth is whatever we think it is.
David: I can understand Mr. Vogel's frustration with philosophy-speak. It seems like every time he brings something up, someone changes the subject by talking about what his words are supposed to mean.
To be fair there are big differences between the two basic camps. If we divide the two views into the perspectivist camp and the non-perspectivist camps we then have one that says we have to carefully consider how our theoretical biases obscure information while the other says this can be easily overcome and isn't that significant. The former also allows private evidence to count towards knowledge while the latter, probably following Popper, would say we ought only believe when the evidence is public. Those differences will lead to big differences in conclusions between different groups.
Hopefully we all agree upon that.
Further, these differences are philosophical and not at the higher level.
Now to repeat the points I initially made, I think a lot of debate can be conducted without touching upon these theoretical underpinnings. Indeed I think that's where the debate ought primarily be conducted. But of course this is a philosophy blog, so what most here focus on is the philosophy and not the history or neuropsychology. (At least I do, since I have limited knowledge of the latter two disciplines) However Goff's original article, which is under question, is about the philosophy. I think that's fair game. But if the only response is "who cares" or "I don't accept that philosophical premise" then the discussion is over. So if the discussion is to move on, we have to get more detailed about why we disagree.
I think it fair, whether quantitative or qualitative notions of "probable" are used, to question why we can say something is more probable than something else. If the claim is that by "probable" we mean something objective and not subjective then I think that is a rather strong philosophical assertion and the debate will rage. As I said, I think had Dan kept to a loose subjective sense of "probable" then there is no problem. You may be right at this being unfair to Dan, but sometimes he speaks as if he is moving well beyond the loose subjective sense. In which case what choice do we have but to talk about what his words mean?
Clark, I want to hear all approaches to problems, and I believe everyone here has an important role in the discussion, but I think you are missing David's point, which is: Alan and Blake, especially, have a tendency to give non-responsive answers to points opponents bring up. Sometimes it seems diversionary tactics are employed. There is very little acknowledgment of opposing views, no wrestling with ideas, but a lot of posturing. That is not the philosophy I know.
Mr. Goble: I confess I'm not quite sure what you are arguing David [with reference to relativism].
Actually, I'm not advancing any argument against relativism. I'd call my statement something of a brief expression of disagreement.
Mr. Goble: Are you saying that the effect of perspective on knowing is negligible?
No.
Mr. Goble: Are you saying Kant is a relativist?
No. I don't see that Kant's philosophy (as such) is relevant. Kant posited single perceptual filter (e.g., his categories) that together with raw perceptions (or a priori intuitions) result in the phenomenal world. Kant himself is not advancing the notion of theory laden-ness; he is still working within the notion of "the given."
On the other hand, 20th century Kantians (who are relevant to this conversation) seem to me to be, by and large, relativists.
I may well have misunderstood Mr. Ostler. I take the notion of theory bounded knowledge as generally relativist and theory laden knowledge as not generally relativist. Perhaps this is too subtle of a distinction to introduce without warning. (Indeed, having just re-read the previous paragraph, this now strikes me as true.)
Even so, I don't think that my closing paragraph above loses any of its force if you remove it's last sentence. If this makes my it more palatable, then by all means truncate.
Quick correction: In my preceding post, I used the term a priori intuition to describe raw perception. This is an editing error on my part. Having pasted it from the parenthetical that precedes it, I neglected to remove "a priori". Kant intends for a priori intuition to indicate things like space and time. At any rate, I intended to say merely "intuitions."
Actually Dan, I think you'll find that goes on in philosophy much more than you think. I don't think Blake is being evasive. Rather I think that what he sees as the key issues upon which your other arguments depend, you think is a given. Thus you see him avoiding what you see as the really important arguments while he sees you as taking those for granted which then generates a particular kind of answer for the other evidence you bring forth.
We may disagree with one an other, but there is definitely a kind of non-debate going on because of those differing assumptions. (Which, if I might say, actually helps establish Alan's original argument)
Personally I don't think this gulf can be overcome. Which is why I'm starting to see this whole discussion going around in circles.
David, I think I fundamentally disagree with your characterization of what is or isn't a relativism. Certainly though, it would appear that you must characterize both Blake and I as relativists (and probably Alan too). Once again I see an abyss across which we likely can't reach common ground.
One brief comment before I likely bow out of the discussion. (Unless something new is said - I think most of my posts of late have been mere restatements of what I've said before)
Dan: Feelings and emotions are not 'plausible,' they just are.
There actually is some research of late that suggests that feelings and emotions are actually kinds of judgments. There was a recent paper to this effect over on Weatherson's list of new papers in philosophy. I must confess to only have skimmed the paper, but it was basically a summary of recent research. "Emotion and Cognition: Current Developments and Theraputic Practice" Whether this approach pans out, I can't say.
As is widely known, the last 25 years have seen an acceleration in the development of theories of emotion. Perhaps less well-known is that the last three years have seen an extended defense of a predominant, though not universally accepted, framework for the understanding of emotion in philosophy and psychology. The central claim of this framework is that emotions are a form of evaluative response to their intentional objects, centrally involving cognition or something akin to cognition, in which the evaluation of the object relates to the concerns, interests, or well-being of the subject.
I know this thread has largely died. But one big issue in it was the relationship between probability and certainty for being able to establish probability. I found the following paper that seems relevant.
"Probability Without Certainty? Foundationalism and the Lewis-Reichenbach Debate"
Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. Here we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis's assertion, and Reichenbach's denial, that probability relations must depend on statements that are certain. We show that both positions can be maintained in different empirical circumstances, by describing first an example where Reichenbach is right, and then an example where Lewis's reasoning applies.
I'm sorry to see this thread die out. I had planned on a posting at least two additional responses, but I just haven't had the time to write them.
My first planned post was a response to Mr. Vogel's last comment on anti-Masonic politics in the Book of Mormon. Mr. Vogel has impressed me with the vigor with which he is willing to argue his positions (and others have disappointed me with the short shrift they've sometimes given him). I am flattered that Mr. Vogel disagrees with my statement that I'm rather average, but on this point of disagreement the weight of evidence is clearly on my side. In sharp contrast to Mr. Vogel, searching for my name in Amazon returns zero results; googling my name turns up nothing of interest.
I intended for my second planned comment to propose that this thread be renamed "Philosophers behaving badly." It seemed to me that the tendency among the two professed philosophers who contributed most to the thread (Mr. Ostler especially, and Mr. Goble to a lesser degree) tended apply philosophical concepts and jargon to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand. Even worse, it seemed to me that they (again, Mr. Ostler especially, and Mr. Goble to a lesser degree) at times tried to lure those with whom they disagreed into tangential discussions outside of the their area of expertise simply to clobber them. Perhaps Mr. Ostler will surface again in this thread to set me straight on this.
But at this point it appears that my full posts would simply beat a dead horse.
That said, thanks for pointing out the Lewis v. Reichenbach paper, Mr. Goble. I look forward to reading it. It warms my heart to see positivist ideas and arguments analyzed and reviewed anew. I still have a very clear image of Dr. Carter gesturing wildly his arms while exclaiming at me in utter disbelief, "Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer! Nobody takes them seriously!" But I always have. Perhaps there's something perverse about getting the warm-fuzzies over heavy-handed empiricist epistemologies, but perhaps some of their ideas are ripe for revival. Recently I was thrilled to see Carnap's Aufbau recapture the popular imagination after years of neglect when U2, the cutting edge alternative rock band, released their transformative album Aufbau Baby.
David, one thing to keep in mind is that we all here are focusing in on philosophical issues. Goff's paper likewise was primarily focusing in on a philosophical issue. As I mentioned in my initial comments, I don't think that these philosophical points are necessary for the dispute. However I don't think the philosophical issues are merely some sophistry designed to find an area where Dan isn't as well versed and attack him on weak ground anymore than Dan's bringing up psychology I'm not familiar with was designed to do the same to me. I honestly think that some of the philosophical disagreements are valid and do represent a gulf.
If you wish to continue your comments on those points, I'd be more than willing to. I would ask you be specific about what philosophical issues are confusing matters rather than clarifying them and why.
David: Time to put quit obfuscating and get specific. Since we were discussing the merits of Goff's critique and the implications of Dan's hard naturalism and positivism, I take it that you either don't grasp the issues or just wanted to talk about your own issues with Dan. So I agree with Clark, it's time to tell us what you mean with your vague references to confusing you and trying to avoid the issues. What issues? How were they avoided? Why weren't the points about what is possible for us to rationally argue on point? Why do think that positivism has a breath of validity given that it cannot meet its own demand for meaningfulness?
And now we begin the argument about the argument...
I've only got a few minutes here, so here's a very quick run at clarifying. I'll try to put together something more detailed later:
Mr. Ostler: I take it that you either don't grasp the issues or just wanted to talk about your own issues with Dan.
You raise a very good point here. I may well fail to grasp the issues that you've been discussing in this thread. I'm in no position to judge whether arguing with me is a waste of your talents. I am certainly no expert in these areas.
That said, I'm not sure that I see the connection between my discussions with Dan and the comments that I've directed toward you. These concerned, specifically, probability calculus and the structure of Mr. Vogel's witness argument. (See, for example, October 28, 2004 10:34 PM comment as well as points 1 and 2 from my October 29, 2004 07:33 PM comment.)
Mr. Ostler: So I agree with Clark, it's time to tell us what you mean with your vague references to confusing you and trying to avoid the issues.
Note to self: Write that second comment that I'd planned on posting.
I'm pleased to see that this thread isn't the dead horse that I'd supposed. Therefore, I am happy to clarify: While reading this thread, I observed that you tended to emphasize peripheral issues. Moreover, your use of these peripheral issues tended to obscure rather than clarify the topic being discussed. Lastly, I'm not complaining about the way that I've been treated--I'm just happy to be a participant here. I am offering my observations about the way that I've observed others being treated.
Mr. Ostler: What issues? How were they avoided?
For example, let's take your exchange with Mr. Vogel about probability calculus. He mentioned that he considered some things probable, and you then demanded from him an explanation in terms of probability calculus (or some interpretation of it). It is customary to use the word probability in a few different ways (both within and without philosophy), and Mr. Vogel didn't seem realize that his usage of it had been hijacked.
You then began discussing the Bayesian interpretation of probability calculus, and said some very odd things for which no clarification has been forthcoming. You also took Mr. Vogel to task for not using an adequate theory of probability, saying (for example), "The lack of an adequate [probability] theory is actually very telling in this area." I have tried to outline very clearly why probability theory (a) has nothing to do with Mr. Vogel's argument, and (b) isn't relevant to history in general. But if (a) and (b) are true, then there is no reason to challenge Mr. Vogel to produce a probability theory. From the flow of the comments, I've observed that you appeared to lure him away from his field of expertise in order to trap him in an irrelevant argument about probability.
Mr. Ostler: Why weren't the points about what is possible for us to rationally argue on point?
I did not mean to imply that they were not.
Mr. Ostler: Why do think that positivism has a breath of validity given that it cannot meet its own demand for meaningfulness?
If there are things that you wish to understand about positivism, you might try couching your questions in less overtly hostile terms.
Moreover, I do not believe that this thread has ever focussed for long on the merits and demerits of being a positivist, and this question strikes me as unrelated to the thrust of my comments. If my answer is a lousy one, I'm sure that you'll take great pains to tell me. But it will have no bearing on the comments that I've directed toward you about probability calculus and the structure of Mr. Vogel's witness argument.
That said, I'm happy to answer. I presume that you're referring to the principal of verification, which I state rather weakly as indicating something like, "A statement is meaningful if and only if evidence can be adduced for or against it." All of this, of course, hinges on what it means to adduce evidence for or against something, and about this, books have been written. Without committing myself to any side of such debates, I'll stipulate simply that such evidence must be inter-subjectively demonstrable and replicable, and we can perhaps debate what these mean later.
I'm aware that some people believe that rules must be self-satisfying to be valid. I do not myself believe this. Even so, I don't see any reason why one can't adduce evidence both for and against the principal of verification.
David, I think you are right that no one has really focused on the value of positivism. However I think most of us take it for granted that this is an overwhelmingly decided issue in philosophy. You simply don't find many self-identified positivists. That's not to say philosophers like Ayer or Russell are neglected. Far from it. I consider Russell one of the top philosophers of the 20th century. I think there is often great things to learn from him. But I think that of Leibniz, Plato, Duns Scotus and many other figures as well, even if their overall philosophy is problematic.
However if you position is merely that positivist ought not be a pejorative term, I am curious as to whether you agree with Alan Goff's original thesis that Dan adopts positivist arguments at times...
Regarding probability, I think this was simply a misunderstanding regarding whether we were to take "probable" as a subjective claim (i.e. I personally find something believable) or as an objective claim. I'm not sure it fair to take misunderstandings as using philosophy to confuse matters. Rather the confusion took place prior to the philosophy entering in.
I'm pleased this thread isn't dead, but would like to suggest re-focusing the discussion a bit.
I came here originally to discuss Alan Goff's article. While the discussion of the BoM witnesses and their statements has been interesting at times, it has obscured what I think are a number of more interesting and important questions. Important in part because they apply more broadly to the nature of historical inquiry, rather than focusing, for example, on the narrower issue of how (and whether) a naturalistic account of religious experiences in general can be given. I see the answer to that question as quite distinct from the broader historiographical and philosophical issues raised by Goff in his article.
Let me give an example of what I mean. Blake has invoked probability theory in the context of attempts to explain the BoM witness statements using naturalistic assumptions. I share some of Landrith's problems with understanding what exactly Blake is arguing about the necessity of using/invoking probability theory in the context of arguments about the status of the witness statements. In any case, what would be more helpful and illuminating, in my view, is to re-focus the discussion back on issues of historiography. For example, is Blake's (or Clark's?) position that ALL historical inquiries about and accounts of historical events must be judged by, evaluated under, some probabilty-theory standard? I expect not. But if not, what about inquiries into (accounts of) the past that are related to claimed religious experiences, as most significant events in Mormon history are? Same question about the function of probability theory.
If the answer to both those questions is "no," as I think it should be, then Blake's more narrow claim about the witness statements (that one would need to use some kind of probability statements to justify concluding anything about their occurrence vel non as genuine or non-delusive religious experiences) is less interesting, because he is addressing a special case.
Put differently, I think we can bracket whether (or the skeptic/naturalist can acknowledge) there is no way to determine any particular likelihood or probability that the individual witnesses, on the day in question, experienced some genuine divinely-caused event, or not. What then? So, what? It doesn't follow from that bracketing or concession that there is no way to judge between (evaluate) all competing claims about or accounts of the Mormon past. (Consider, for example, the historicity of the BoM.) The latter is a broader historiographical (and yes, philosophical) question.
On that latter question, I think Goff is (and recognizes he is) in a minority among LDS apologists who write about the Mormon past. Folks like Peterson and Hamblin, for example, don't advocate and don't want anything to do with "postmodern" philosophical assessments of the nature of historical inquiry. Yet if Goff is correct, both they and Dan Vogel fundamentally misunderstand the nature of what they're doing, when arguing about the Mormon past. Unlike Blake and Clark, I don't see that the disputes and arguments on this thread about the BoM witnesses and their statements shows -- or even supports any positive claim about -- the correctness or adequacy of Goff's position on the nature of historical inquiry.
The comments were so popular on this particular entry that I started up a a few more pages. If you post a comment here it will go to the last page.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
and Theology
Number of unique visitors:
Blogged by Clark Goble