One of the ways of characterizing the disagreements over free will is over ones theory of time. Ostler makes this point quite well in his book on Mormon theology that I've been discussing the past while. These two main theories of time are often characterized in terms of becoming and being (or stasis). The theory that sees becoming as fundamental sees the experience of the flow of time as how we ought understand time. This theory is often designated the A-Theory of time. The theory that sees time in objective or mind-independent time says that the experience of time can't be fundamental, as that then ties us to a mind-dependent view of time. Typically people in this view treat the past, present and future as on the same ontological plane. This static view (since the past and the future are treated somewhat as equivalent) is often characterized as the B-Theory of time.
Discussions of these two theories of time often end up turning on discussions of special relativity. The reason for this is that relativity is typically taken to imply what is called a substantial space-time. i.e. treat all of space-time as a single curved sheet which is also a kind of substance. There are various good arguments for treating space-time as a substance which I'll not go into. The A-Time proponents have to limit this in various ways, or at least critique the very approach physicists take. (Indeed one can strongly argue that free will must be outside of science' reach)
I came across a good paper over at the Phil-Sci repository that addresses some of these issues and that some might find interesting. It doesn't necessarily support my own views but it is quite helpful and interesting.
On Becoming, Cosmic Time and Rotating Universes
In the literature on the compatibility between the time of our experience and the time of physics, the special theory of relativity has enjoyed central stage. By bringing into the discussion the general theory of relativity, I suggest a new analysis of the misunderstood notion of becoming, developed from hints in Gödel’s published and unpublished arguments for the ideality of time. I claim that recent endorsements of such arguments, based on Gödel’s own “rotating” solution to Einstein’s field equation, fail: once understood in the right way, becoming can be shown to be both mind-independent and compatible with spacetime physics. Being a needed tertium quid between views of time traditionally regarded as in conflict, such a new approach to becoming should also help to dissolve a crucial aspect of the century-old debate between the so-called A and B theories of time.
Just to give a good overview of the four-dimensionalist (B-Theory of time) perspective, C.W. Rietdijk has a good overview of his somewhat controversial theory. An other good writeup is the following on the ontological status of Minkowski Space
Clark,
Hasn't 'loop theory' in a sense argued against the ontologizing of space-time that Einstein's theory of relativity demands? I thought I recall reading something to that effect in Lee Smolin's Three Roads to Quantum Gravity (it was in relation to his attempt to develop a loop theory that was independent of a graph-like background, I think).
Smolin is definitely trying to do what Leibniz, Mach, and Einstein couldn't do - arrive at a fully relational theory. Whether this would affect a B-theory of space-time is an excellent question to which I'll 'fess up and admit I don't know the answer to. So now I have fodder for a future post when I have the time to think about it.
I should probably add an appropriate quote from Smolin though that is rather applicable to the whole A-Theory vs. B-Theory discussion.
I have been studying the question of what time is for much of my adult life.Ê But I must admit . . . that I am no closer to an answer now than I was then. Indeed, even after all this study, I do not think we can answer even the simple question: 'What sort of thing is time?' (Smolin, "What is Time?")
I'd also add, that I'm not at all convinced a more Leibnizean conception is incompatible with a B-Theory of time. Indeed given Leibniz' determinism, one can quickly understand why.
On the other hand Leibniz clearly views events and not moments as fundamental. (And events ought be viewed as processes, as I think Rescher fairly persuasively argues) So one could (and many have) argued that B-Theory doesn't make sense in a process view of this sort, let alone a view in which time is emergent. On the other hand space is emergent in Leibniz as well, so it isn't as if we are priviledging time. I suspect one could see it all as events within a single Spinoza-like substance and thus that would entail a B-theory of time.
I've closed comments in order to avoid spam since I don't check this older blog as much anymore.
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