I promised Blake a sketch of how I think a Mormon can reconcile divine foreknowledge with responsibility (semi-compatibilism). This is just a brief sketch, so forgive me for the limitations. However I've been saying I'd give it for so long now and just haven't had time to do so. The basic concept uses the notion of a "fall" from heaven in LDS thought along with some notions of Linde like multiverses.
The basic idea is that at the moment of creation of a universe we will enter, as eternal beings, all possibilities are open and collapse out of ourselves. That is we determine what our future choices will be at the moment of creation.
Now clearly this may not be conscious. However it seems to me we are responsible for acts we aren't aware of committing at the time of decision. The obvious reason for this is empirical evidence that shows we often decide in our brain prior to even being conscious of the choice being open, let alone conscious of making the choice. This may, for Libertarians, be controversial. But I'm prepared to defend it.
If that choice is made by all individuals, we end up with a situation somewhat analogous to middle knowledge, only on a far more complex scale. All possibilities within which all choices of individual agents arise at a consistent (i.e. logically allowable) state of affairs are possible. God can then, at that moment of choice, know the future as at that time the universe as a whole is created. In other words, the only difference between this scheme and the classic Libertarian scheme, is that all choices for all actions in this universe are made at once.
Presumably the "time" we move to a new universe is part of the creation of that universe.
Note that this is somewhat similar to a Spinoza view of universes, except that the Spinoza sense of the divine/transcendence is actually the collection of all intelligences in that universe. The universe clearly isn't equivalent to these individuals, but is a possible mode of those intelligences combined with other physical entities (if one feels there are non-intelligent entities).
Now, beyond the problem of the when of choices that I know Blake will object to there is the problem of foreknowledge. If the formed universe is formed as a four dimensional whole in a total creation, then the problem of foreknowledge doesn't logically occur for other beings within the universe. Now there may be problems for knowledge by beings outside of that universe. But I don't think that complexity need be dwelt upon. I should also note that whatever power that forms the universe may put restrictions on that universe and thus what possibilities of the free agents can be actualized.
Obviously this is highly speculative. However I don't raise it as something one ought believe. The notion of Linde universes, while popular among theoretical physicists, clearly is pure speculation, let alone the nature of inter-universe information flow. (Although as I noted a few weeks back, Lee Smolin has asserted such flow)
I raise this system purely as a way of reconciling the two positions - responsibility and foreknowledge. I think this way of thinking has a lot of other benefits as well. But I'll not dwell on those.
One quick acknowledgment of an other attack. Libertarians sometimes require a rational reflection on the choice. i.e. the choice must be made consciously and with knowledge. I disagree with that view since I think my unnoticed choices are fully mine and I am fully responsible for them.
But the attack that this "all in one" moment of choice doesn't allow any real kind of rational deliberation is a valid one, but does tend to make assumptions about our thought process as spirit beings. Further it would be a somewhat interesting choice for Blake given his particular exegesis of Moses 2.
I'll just say that one must make a distinction between compatibilism and semi-compatibilism. I'm here arguing the latter. Were I to argue the former I'd simply attack the various intuitions that Libertarian free will depends upon. However that is less interesting to me since the real issue for a Mormon are the theological commitments and it is there that the appeal to responsibility and divine judgment appear.
I do tend to be extremely sympathetic to the hard determinism revisionists who simply suggest that some of our intuitions are incorrect and need tweaking. So simply because someone may take various analogies and allegories too seriously isn't, in my mind, sufficient reason to force them as anything but analogies and allegories.
I think many of the medieval theologians were onto something here. They suggested that all our concepts of terms like good fall short of God. That is not to say that God isn't good, merely that he isn't the good we think of. Our conception of good is limited and incomplete and thus when applied to God will lead to conclusions that God isn't good. Which is ridiculous. But the flaw isn't in God, but in our concepts. (A similar notion occurs in Heidegger with his notion of for-the-sake-of)
John linked to me here from his blog so I should probably put up the caveats. This notion clearly won't work for most non-Mormon theologies. Our notion that in some sense we always exist (are necessary beings) is unusual in Christianity. There are some parallels in Judaism, but even there I think the typical Mormon interpretation and the typical Jewish interpretation are different. (Although one should add that there is actually a wide range of possibilities in LDS theology on this matter)
Put an other way, I don't think this is exactly too relevant to most people.
I should also add that there are some obvious parallels to certain interpretations of neoPlatonism in the above.
Clark,
As you probably know (or have 'foreknown'), I have many reservations about this kind of view. Here's my first question (well, a set of questions that all rest on a single idea), both for clarification and a challenge to your view: on what basis does our 'primordial choice of all future actions' occur? Is there any awareness of the possibilities, of the constraints that we will have to work within (as all free choices have such constraints), of the inclinations/habits we will acrue at any given time of choice that will 'weigh' some choices above others? Also, closely tied to the above, does this belay some sort of 'primordial omniscience' on the part of the 'intelligence' with which it makes its decisions that is thereafter lost and, if so, why/how is it lost?
Kevin Winters
It depends upon what you mean by awareness. If you mean conscious awareness, as I said, I don't think there need be and that this would be the most probable place of attack. Having said that though, I find many Libertarian arguments to downplay the role of the unconscious and our responsibility for it.
Regarding primordial "omniscience" I'm not quite sure what you mean by that. Could you flesh that out some more?
Probably the best analogy to understand what I'm getting at is quantum mechanics and the Von Neumann interpretation where there are overlapping wavefunctions, each representing possible choices. The system as a whole is described by a single wavefunction. The collapse of the wave function is the choice of the system as a whole.
Note that is an analogy (especially since I have problems with the Von Neumann interpretation of QM). However it is probably apt since I accept a kind of holism which means I reject the notion of completely independent entities. (i.e. the atomism of Pratt)
Clark: I have a number of questions and challenges about your view. First, how is information supposed to flow from one bubble universe to another. What you suggested is not merely speculation squared to the tenth power, it is contrary to every existing model of Linde's view of bubble universe because information cannot flow from one to another. Thus your view appears to be physically impossible in a very strong sense.
Second, you have anticipated that I have not merely grave reservations about people who make choices for which they are responsible without deliberation but also unconsciously. First, your view is not even semi-compatiblist in the least because it fails the criteria of reasons responsiveness. How do you distinguish "decision" (now there is an abuse of terms in your theory) for which we are accountable from those that we clearly are not accountable for -- e.g., a sleeping child pees his pants because he unconsciously fails to control his bladder.
Moreover, could you give me just one "decision" that is made unconsciously for which I am accountable?
As you know I have a background in neurophysiology, so I am aware that we process information faster than we can articulate our reasons. However, just what could the evidence be that "a decision" has been made since we don't know the neurophysiological correlates of thought or decisions? Just what does a choice or decision look like and how do we know it is made if the chooser is unconscious? I believe that your view that evidence shows that we "choose" unconsciously is just not supportable given the science.
More importantly, just what criteria are there for accountability if I am morally responsible for unconscious "choices"? It seems to me that your assertions are not merely counterintuittive but demonstrably false. If I am unconscious and my hand flinches and I punch someone unconsciously, we seem to have a a paradigm case where both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that that person is not morally responsible. Indeed, one thing they all agree on is that indeterminism or choices that are not reasons-responsive don't fit the criteria of choices for which we are accountable.
Blake, it isn't at all clear to me that I have to provide an answer for how information flows between universes. If you could explain why that is relevant it might help.
My model is reasons responsive, but as I mentioned to Kevin, I don't hold that the reasons need be conscious.
As for needing to provide a way of distinguishing decisions we are accountable for from those we aren't, I once again don't see why I must do that. It seems to me I must merely suggest that there is a distinction. i.e. those I choose from those events I don't choose.
You might reply that that's not an answer, to which I'll merely say that I don't uniquely determine all events I will experience. To the degree I have control over them then they are mine. i.e. my appeal is that in the choosing "process" at t=0 this all is determined. What I sense you wish to do is suggest a temporal requirement that distinctions of "mineness." We can see this by your appeal to neurophysiology, assuming that such matters are primordial.
Further you seem focus on our ability to know the situation with what the situation is. But this is conflating epistemology and metaphysics, which seems quite inappropriate.
Your claim that we choose unconsciously is not scientifically supportable may be valid. My example was from a few papers I read and I'm not going to try and support the example. So simply remove it and consider it purely for illustrative purposes. Let me simply assert that I believe we can choose unconsciously.
Regarding your counter-example. The fact some involuntary actions might be considered unconscious does not argue that there are not voluntary actions that are unconscious. So it certainly isn't demonstrably false.
Consider me absent-mindedly drawing without paying attention. I'm not even aware of drawing. Now clearly the drawing is mine. In a sense I intend the drawing. The drawing is voluntary. I think I am responsible for the drawing even if it is unconscious.
A better example is a more Freudian one. Let us say I am a misogynist. (I'm clearly not, but we'll keep it as an example) I'm not aware I am a misogynist. I never consciously choose to say things in a form that manifests my misogyny, but I do say them. I'm not even aware of the effects of my sayings. Am I responsible for them?
It seems to me that the burden is not on me to say that one can be responsible for ones unconscious choices. Rather the burden is on those who claim one is never responsible for what one does not consciously deliberate about. If we appeal to intuition (and for reasons I've made clear many times I don't trust appeals to intuition) then it seems to me most people acknowledge that at least some unconscious choices are our responsibility.
Just one quick note. I think that any attack on the possibility of what I propose neglects the reason I proposed it. I think the appeal to Linde multiverses is theologically necessary for other reasons. Indeed you have used it yourself Blake in apologetics you've done.
The only real attack on the model that I think really seems appropriate is the question of generating possibilities. But I think that line of thinking (which I admit is very common) tends to assume that actualities is more fundamental than possibilities. Further it tends to assume spirits are functionally the same as our bodies. I'm not sure I can buy that. Although I fully confess I'm playing with the meaning of intelligence in a fashion you might not countenance Blake, although I didn't get into those issues in the above. But Plotinus is looming in the background of my comments.
Clark:
It seems to me that you rather clearly have the burden to show that your view is not merely possible, but plausible. I assume that you raise the Linde multiple universe scenario to suggest that what you propose is at least possible and backed by some mathematical theory of cosmology. Given that the purpose of the theory is to boost the credibility of your scenario, if I suggest that what you propose is not merely not remotely plausible but in fact impossible (as it certainly seems to be) then the credibility of your position is tubed.
As for your example of doodling that is "yours," you have overlooked that ownwership of action must arise in a certain way. First, I doubt that you are accountable in any relevant sense for your supposedly unconscious doodling. If you doodle a dirty word and you point out that you it was not intentional at just happened without thinking about it, that would suggest to me that you are not accountable. We give these kinds of explanations to escape accountability all of the time -- so my take on reactive attitudes differs fairly radically from yours. further, if I could show that your doodling were the result of a choice you made as a child before you even knew what the dirty word meant, it would completely exonerate you. More importantly, doodling is hardly a morally accountable action unless you bring in the notion that you intended what you doodled. If you doodle a word because he you suffer from manual Terrett's syndrome, then you are not accountable. Similarly, if you afre unaware of what your hand is doing, then you are not accountable. That is why in the law we require a certain mens rea for culpability.
I also disagree with your supposed Freudian misonygny -- as long as you are uneducated and unaware, that is sufficient explanation to excuse you from culpability. You are not an appropriate subject for praise or blame if you are unaware of your attitudes. However, I would add that in LDS thought it is literally impossible to be unaware of such morally reprehensible attitudes because we all have the light of Christ. In fact, D&C 93 suggests that the reason we are accountable is precisely because we have such light and awareness. So your view strains under what I take to be fairly fundamental statements of scripture.
As for burden: you are proposing something radically different from what generations of philosophers have elucidated and clearly articulated why there is an awareness of actions requirement for accountable conduct. What you suggest runs counter to the legal system which also requires certain states of mind and awareness as a basis for criminal fault. I have given examples of conduct for what which we are not accountable because we are not aware of what we are doing. I have suggested that scripture also suggests that accountability is based on an awareness born of the light of Christ. To suggest that you can duck explaining how we can be held accountable without being aware of what we are doing doesn't merely beg the the question, it avoids the central issue altogether. Your view just doesn't seem plausible -- or even possible to me.
Blake plausibility takes two forms. One is theological plausibility, which I think I've met. The other is scientific plausibility which is more problematic, not because of Linde universes. Everything I said about Linde universes is fairly mainstream and Lee Smolin has written on similar topics to oppose the anthropic principle.
The big issue of plausibility is the choosing by souls at the moment of descent. Now if you critique that from a scientific point of view, clearly it is not sufficiently plausible. However, I'd merely point out that neither is free will or more pertinently the vast majority of theological commitments that we are attempting to deal with.
My goal, after all is not to establish foreknowledge as a scientifically plausible situation, but a theologically plausible one.
Regarding the misogyny I would disagree with you. (And so would most feminists I suspect) However this simply illustrates the problem of appealing to intuitions. I thought that would be an example you'd agree with. I think it the case that we intuitively accept accountability for many unconscious acts. Perhaps the more appropriate place to go at this point is less intuitions than theology and the scriptures.
Your claim that "it is literally impossible to be unaware of such morally reprehensible attitudes" seems demonstrably false. I think many of us are unaware of incorrect acts. I can think of many such situations from my own life. So I think your application of scripture doesn't line up with what we all experience. All of us have become aware of incorrect activities that we didn't at the time realize were inappropriate.
This is, it appears, your main complaint. You feel I must explain how one can be accountable without being aware. My complaint with this line of thinking is that it appears to be merely someone already a Libertarian critiquing a position in terms of Libertarian. By the same measure I could turn around and ask how you can assert one must be fully conscious of a decision to be accountable for the decision. I recognize you've address that somewhat in your book, so I'll do a separate entry on this later today.
I'd just listened last night to John Fischer's talk at the freedom conference. I think that a lot of people brought up similar complaints. A committed Libertarian will remain committed until their position is found inconsistent. A committed Compatibilist will do the same. Examples like the above simply might make a point to those uncommitted one way or the other. However critiques that simply pre-assume a Libertarian or Compatibilist position seem problematic.
Clark:
As far as your alleged plausibility claim that it is standard fare -- it is not. No one claims that choices were made at the time of the collapsing wave function. No one claims information can transfer from "outside the singularity." I'm very familiar with Smolin's work -- he doesn't support notions of choices being made, information transferring or even the possibility of sentient beings (he's an agnostic BTW) at the time of the wave function collapse.
As for free will being scentifically implausible -- well, it is plausible. We cannot predict individual decisions and there are several articles which I cite in my article "Mormonism and Determinism" regarding scientific plausibility of the libertarian view.
You are right that many of us are unaware of incorrect acts -- however, I cannot think of any for which I am morally accountable unless and until I become aware of them. When little children play around with sex we don't hold them morally blameable. They are unaware of the difference between right and wrong and so are not accountable for such judgments. I'm not claiming we are unaware of our attitudes -- I'm claiming that until we are aware of their moral import and the fact that we hold them we cannot be accountable.
As for your claim that semi-compatibilists feel that we can be morally accountable for what we are not aware of -- well, that isn't so. Fischer himself has articulated a fairly clear reasons-responsiveness account of moral accountability which your view clearly fails since it doesn't involve reasons responsiveness in the least. One cannot be reason responsive to what one is unaware of. So my critique is not even from a libertarian point of view, but from an almost universal recognition that if things just happen without our awareness of them we cannot be accountable for them. As I said, even semi-compatabilist maintain a position that is inconsistent with what you propose.
Blake, as I said, the Linde universes fulfill a theological necessity in LDS thought - that of a possible infinite past. If your criticize them for theological utility in other areas, it seems you are picking and choosing. As I mentioned, you appealed to Linde universes in your own apologetics for dealing with an infinite past.
I never claimed Smolin claimed entities could move between universes. But if the big bang is real (as most science asserts) then it is necessary for the theology of our spirits. Your critic thus reduces down to critiquing the LDS notion of intelligences and spirits, which seems an odd track to take.
Regarding your comments on the unconscious, I put up an other thread to discuss that. I don't think we say we are only morally accountable when we become aware of our immoral acts though. That seems a very difficult thing to assert. The appeal to children seems beside the point since the problem with children isn't awareness in the sense of consciousness but intellectual awareness in the sense of understanding. So at best you are equivocating there and at worst arguing beside the point.
Regarding Fischer, I think you're still either equivocating over the meaning of aware or simply assuming some presuppositions regarding consciousness. I just checked his book and a few papers and I simply don't see the topic of unconscious control being addressed. If you do, it would be helpful for discussion to be specific. Please place comments on unconscious awareness in the other post.
Oh, regarding information flow. Information can't be exchanged but a universe can determine the boundaries for the daughter universe, which is all I require.
Regarding the bit about the choice occurring prior to the phenomena of being aware of choosing, I'd note the following, somewhat relevant, post at Fake Barn Country on the phenomena of a runner starting to run after hearing the gun. They don't bring up the issue of choice, of course.
I wish I could find the paper I was thinking of. Alas I can't. But I am quite sure of experiments regarding when a choice is made and when we perceive ourselves making the choice. Not that this is necessarily relevant for the above thought experiment.
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